A TREATISE OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE AND ATTRIBVTES.

BY

THOMAS IACKSON Doctor in Divinitie, Chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and Vicar of S. *Nicolas* Church in the Towne of *Newcastle* upon *Tyne*.

The first Part.

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A

TO THE RIGHT HONOVRABLE AND TRVLY noble WILLIAM Earle of *Penbrooke*, Lord high Steward of his Majesties Houſhold, Knight of the moſt noble Order of the Garter, and Chancellor of the Vniverſity of *Oxon*;

The bleſſings of this life, and of the life to come be multiplied.

HAd the conſciouſneſſe of my weakneſſe left any place for expectation that my poore Labours ſhould have found ſuch benigne acceptãce with men of higher place and judgement, as by the report of Honourable perſonages, and mine owne late experience of your noble favours, ſome of them I now perceive have found with your Ho-

nour, theſe preſent papers had come to crave your patronage in a better dreſſe than now they doe. Beſides the conſciouſneſſe of my inabilities to pleaſe the acurate judgements of this age, want of opportunities for theſe many yeares to give my ſelfe that contentment, which I was once bold to promiſe unto my ſelfe, had almoſt deterred me from publiſhing any part of my former labours, which were not popular, and for the Pulpit, of which ranke this preſent Treatiſe is not. The ſubject or matter of it is Academicall, and was conceived in that famous Nurſerie of all good literature, which for theſe many yeares hath flouriſhed, and many more may it flouriſh under your Honorable patronage. If either theſe, or other of my Labours of the like argument, which tooke their firſt being from the benignitie of that ſoile, may finde acceptance with your Lordſhip, I ſhall need no other Apologie for publiſhing them beſides my unfaigned deſire to leave the Chriſtian world a teſtimonie of that high eſteeme which I have ever made of your Honourable favours to

that

that renowned Vniverſity, and of my thankfulneſſe for my particular intereſt in your generall goodneſſe. If this manifeſtation of my weakneſſe may occaſion other Academickes to ſhew their ſtrength in this and like Arguments, it ſhall bee a great part of my joy and comfort to ſee better fruits of your Lordſhips favour brought foorth by others, than I can preſent unto you. But if theſe may finde that acceptance which I moſt deſire, your Lordſhip will haply bee deemed by ſome, to patronize not my weakneſſe onely, but mine errors. It is not ſo unuſuall, nor ſo much for me to be cenſured for an *Arminian*, as it will be for your Lordſhip to be thought to patronize *Arminianiſme*. To give your Lordſhip that ſatiſfaction therefore in this point, which I am not bound to give unto others; If the man which moſt miſlikes the *Arminian* or *Lutheran* doctrine in the points moſt controverted through reformed Churches, will but agree with me in theſe two, *That the Almightie Creator hath a true freedome in doing good; and Adams off ſpring a true freedome of*

doing evill; I ſhall not diſſent from him in any other points controverted, unleſſe it be in this one, that there needes to be no other controverſie at all betweene the *Arminians* and their oppoſites in point of Gods Providence and Predeſtination. In all other particulars, ſave onely ſo farre as they are reducible to theſe two, I have not yet the learning or underſtanding to conceive, what contradiction there is or can be, betweene men not willing to contend about words. But if any in oppoſition to *Arminius*, will maintaine that all things were ſo decreed by God before the Creation of the world; that nothing ſince the Creation could have fallen out otherwiſe than it hath done, or that nothing can bee amended what is amiſſe, I muſt crave pardon of every good Chriſtian to oppugne his opinion, not as an errour onely in Divinitie, but as an ignorance which involveth enmitie to the ſweet diſpoſition of the All-ſeeing and unerring Providence, as a forerunner of ruine to moſt flouriſhing States and Kingdomes where it growes common, or comes to full light.

light. For ſupplanting or preventing the growth of ſuch opinions, I make bold to crave your Lordſhips patronage. Thus with my continuall praiers for your Lordſhips health, with all increaſe of honor and happineſſe, I humbly take my leave.

Your Lordſhips in all

duty and obſervance,

THOMAS IACKSON.

From my Study in *Newcaſtle* upon *Tine*, November 20. 1627.

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A TREATISE OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE AND ATTRIBVTES.

SECTION I.

Of the one abſolutely infinite, and incomprehenſible Eſſence in generall.



THe originall of Atheiſme, of errours, or miſperſwaſions, concerning the Being, or Attributes of the Divine nature, being in a former Treatiſe at large diſcuſſed; the next enquiries, which exact Method would in this Argumẽt make, are, Firſt, how this truth of *Gods being*, moſt certainly known, by internal experience unto ſome, may by force of ſpeculative argument be made manifeſt unto others. Secondly, how his nature and *attributes* may be fitlieſt reſembled.

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My first resolution professed in the beginning of the discussing of the *originall* of *Atheisme*, as yet restraines me for adventuring too farre in the former. For whilest I view the progresse which I have purposed; to debate this point, upon my first entry into that Paradise of contemplation, (within whose territories I now encamp) by syllogisticall force of argument, seemeth to me as great an oversight, as to entertaine an enemy, more desperate then potent, with a pitched battaile, when as all his forts might, by constant prosequution of advantages gotten, be orderly taken, each after other, without possibility of any great losse, or apparent danger. Now the Atheists chiefe strength lying in a preconceived impossibility of a *Creation* and *Resurrection*, the conquest of the whole truth will easily be compassed, after those weake holds be (as in due time they shall be) utterly demolished. Or in case, after their overthrow, he be of force to bid us battaile, we shall be most willing to try our intended quarrell with him by dint of argument, in the Article of the last Iudgement. In the meane time, we may, without danger of his checke, proceed upon those advantages, which the grounds of nature give us.

CHAP.

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How far we may ſeeke to expreſſe what by light of Nature, or otherwayes, may be conceived concerning the incomprehenſible Eſſence, or his Attributes.

1 FIrſt, if every particular man, or body generable, have precedent cauſes of their beings; their whole generations muſt of neceſſitie have ſome cauſe: otherwiſe all ſhould not be of one kinde or nature. Now this progreſſe from effects unto their cauſes, or betwixt cauſes ſubordinate, cannot be infinite: but as all progreſſive motion ſuppoſeth ſome reſt or ſtay, whence it proceedeth, ſo muſt this progreſſe, whereof I ſpeake, take beginning from ſome cauſe, which hath no cauſe of its being. And this is that incomprehenſible Eſſence, which wee ſeeke.

2 But whereunto ſhall wee liken him? Things compared alwayes agree in ſome one kinde, or have (at leaſt) a common meaſure. Is then this cauſe of cauſes contained in any predicamentall *ranck* of being? Or can our conceit of any thing therein contained, be truly fitted unto him? Or may his infinite and incomprehenſible nature be rightly moulded within the circumference of mans ſhallow braine? One thing it is to repreſent the infinite Eſſence, another to illuſtrate this truth, that *He* cannot be repreſented. Though nothing can exactly reſemble *him*, yet ſome things there be which better notifie how farre *he* is beyond all reſemblance or

Sect. 1. compariſon, then others can doe. By variety of ſuch reſemblances as his works afford, may our admiration of his incomprehenſibleneſſe bee raiſed higher and higher, and with our admiration thus raiſed, will our longing after his preſence ſtill be enlarged. The nature of things finite and limited, no Philoſopher can ſo exactly expreſſe, as Painters may their outward lineaments. But as ſome ſenſible objects, beſides their proper ſhape or character, imprint a kind of diſlike or pleaſance in creatures ſenſitive: ſo have our pureſt and moſt exact conceipts intellectuall certaine ſymptomaticall impreſſions annexed, which inwardly affect us; though we cannot outwardly ſo expreſſe them, as they may imprint the like affection in others. Hence it is that the more right reſemblances we make to our ſelves of any thing, the greater will be the ſymptomaticall impreſſion of the latent truth; ſome part or ſhadow whereof appeareth in every thing, whereto it can truly be compared. And though we cannot in this life come to a cleare view of that *nature*, which we moſt deſire to ſee; yet is it a worke worthy our paines, to erect our thoughts, by variety of reſemblances (made with due obſervance of *decorum*) unto an horizon more ample then ordinary; in whoſe skirts or edges, wee may behold ſome ſcattered rayes of that glorious light, which is utterly ſet unto men, whoſe thoughts ſoare not without the circumference of this viſible world; for all we ſee with our bodily eyes, is but an hemiſphere of midnight darkneſſe, to the habitation of Saints, and ſeat of bliſs.

The

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3 The rule of *decorum* in all resemblances of things amiable or glorious is, that as well the *simple* termes of comparison be sightly and handsome, as the proportion betweene them exact. Supposing the ods of valorous strength betweene *Aiax* and ordinary *Trojanes*, to have beene as great, as *Homer* would have us beleeve it was; the manner of this Champions retreat, being overcharged with the multitude of his Enemies, could not more exquisitely be resembled, than by a company of children, driving an hungry hard-skinned Asse with bats or staves out of a corne-field or meadow. The Asse cannot, by such weaklings, be driven so hard, but he will feed as he goes; nor could *Aiax* bee charged so fiercely by his impotent foes, but that hee fought still as he fled. The proportion is approved, as most exact, by a * teacher of Poetry that was his Arts Master, who notwithstanding, with the same breath disallowes the invention, as no way applyable vnto *Turnus*, at least in the courtly censure of those times wherein *Virgil* wrote. Bee the congruitie betweene the *termes* never so exquisite or pleasant; the Asse notwithstanding is no amiable creature, nor can wisdome or valour, for his many base properties willingly brooke

* *Nec dictis erit ullus honos, si cum actus ab urbe*
Daunius hostili Teucris urgentibus heros,
Vix pugna absistit, similis dicetur Asello,
Quem pueri læto pascentem pinguia in agro
Ordea stipitibus duris detrudere tendunt;
Instantes, quatiuntq; sudes per terga, per armos.
Ille autem campo vix cedere, & inter eundum
Sæpe hic atque illic avidis insistere malis:
Omnia conveniunt, verumq; simillima imago est.
Credo equidem, sed turpe pecus, nec Turnus Asellum,
Turnus avis atavisq; potens dignabitur heros.
Aptius hanc speciem referat Leo, quem neq; terga
Ira dare, aut virtus patitur, neque sufficit annus
Tendere tot contra, telisq; obstare sequentum.
Hieron. Vida Poet. lib. 2.

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brooke compariſon with him in any. More fitly (as this Author thinketh) might *Turnus* his heroicall ſpirit have beene paralleld by a Lion, which though unable to ſuſtaine the fierce purſuit of many hunters, yet cannot bee enforced to any other march, then *Paſſant gardant*.

4 But wee muſt allow the Poet (whoſe chiefe art is to pleaſe his Readers appetite with pleaſant ſauces, more then with ſolid meates,) to bee more dainty and curious in this kinde, than it is requiſite the School-divine or Philoſopher ſhould be: albeit neither of them neede much to feare, leſt their diſcourſes be too comely, ſo ſolidity of truth bee the ground of their comelineſſe. No courtly Poet is more obſervant of the former rule of *decorum* in their compariſons, than the holy Prophets are. *Thus hath the Lord ſpoken vnto mee* (ſaith *Eſaias*, *cap.* 31. *verſ.* 4.) *Like as the Lion, and the young Lion roaring on his prey, when a multitude of ſhepheards is called forth againſt him, hee will not bee afraid of their voice, nor abaſe himſelfe for the noiſe of them: ſo ſhall the Lord of hoſts come downe to fight for mount Sion, and for the hill thereof.* Saint * *Auſtin* hath noted three ſorts of errors in ſetting forth the divine nature: of which, two go upon falſe grounds, the other is altogether groundleſſe. Some (ſaith he) there be that ſeeke to meaſure things ſpirituall by the beſt knowledge which they have gotten (by

* *Et hic quidem omnium morbus eſt trium generum quæ propoſui: et eorum ſcilicet qui ſecundum corpus de Deo ſapiunt, et eorum qui ſecundum ſpiritualem creaturam ſicuti eſt anima; et eorum qui neq; ſecundum corpus, neq; ſecundū ſpirituale creaturā, & tamen de Deo falſa exiſtimant: eo res otiores à vero, quo id quod ſapiunt, nec in corpore reperitur, nec in facto & condito ſpiritu, nec in ipſo creatore. Qui enim opinatur Deum (verbi gratia) candidum vel rutilum, fulgitur, ſed tamen hæc inveniantur in corpore. Rurſum, qui opinatur Deum nunc obliviſcentem, nunc recordantē, vel ſi quid huiuſmodi eſt; nihilominus in errore eſt: ſed tamen hæc inveniuntur in animo. Qui autem putant eius eſſe potentiæ Deum, vt ſeipſum ipſe genuerit: eo plus errant, quòd non ſolum Deus ita non eſt, ſed nec ſpiritualis nec corporalis creatura. Nulla enim res omnino eſt, quæ ſeipſum gignat ut ſit.* Aug. de Trinit. lib. 1. cap. 1.

ſenſe

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sense or art) of things bodily. Others doe fit the Deity with the nature and properties of the humane soule, and from this false ground frame many deceiptfull and crooked rules, whilest they endeavour to draw the picture or image of the immutable Essence: A third sort there be, which by too much straining to transcend every mutable creature, patch up such conceipts, as cannot possibly hang together, either upon created or increated natures, and these rove further from the truth then doe the former. As (to use his instance) He which thinkes God to be bright or yellow, is much deceived; yet his error wants not a *cloke*, in as much as these colours have some being (from God) in bodies. His errour againe is as great, that thinkes God sometimes forgets, and sometimes calls things forgotten to minde; yet this vicissitude of memorie and oblivion, hath place in the humane soule, which in many things is like the Creator. But he which makes the Divine nature so powerfull, as to produce or beget it selfe, quite misseth not the marke onely, but the Butt, and shoots (as it were) out of the field: for nothing possible can possibly give it selfe being or existence.

5 But though in no wise we may avouch such grosse impossibilies of *him*, to whom nothing is impossible; yet must we often use fictions or suppositions of things scarce possible, to last so long till we have moulded *conceipts* of the essence and attributes incomprehensible, more lively and semblable, then can be taken either from the humane soule alone, or from bodies naturall. To maintaine

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taine it as a Philoſophicall truth, that *God is the ſoule of this univerſe*, is an impious errour * before condemned, as a grand ſeminary of Idolatry. Yet by imagining the humane ſoule to be as really exiſtent in every place, whereto the cogitations of it can reach, as it is in our bodies, or rather to exerciſe the ſame motive power over the greateſt bodily ſubſtance in this world, that it doth over our fingers, able to weild the Heavens or Elements with as great facility and ſpeed, as we doe our thoughts or breath: We may, by this fiction, gaine a more true modell or ſhadow of Gods infinite efficacie, then any one created ſubſtance can furniſh us withall. But whileſt we thus, by imagination, tranſfuſe our conceipts of the beſt life and motion, which we know, into this great ſphere, which we ſee, or (which ſuit better to the immutable and infinite eſſence) into bodies abſtract or mathematicall: we muſt make ſuch a compound as *Tacitus* would have made of two noble Romanes: *Demptis utriuſq; vitiis ſolæ virtutes miſceantur: The imperfections of both being ſifted from them, their perfections onely muſt be ingredients in this compound.* Yet may wee not thinke, that the divine nature, which we ſeeke to expreſſe by them, conſiſts of perfections infinite, ſo united or compounded. We muſt yet uſe a further extraction of our conceipts, ere wee apply them to his incomprehenſible nature.

* In the 5 Book, Section 3.

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Cap. 2.

Containing two philoſophicall Maximes which lead us to the acknowledgement of one infinite and incomprehenſible Eſſence.

1  NTo every Student that with obſervance ordinary will ſurvey any Philoſophicall tract of cauſes, two maine ſprings or fountaines do in a manner diſcover themſelves: which were they as well opened and drawne, as ſome others of leſſe conſequence are, wee might baptize moſt Atheiſts in the one, and confirme good Chriſtians in the other. The naturall current of the one directly carries us to an independant cauſe; from whoſe illimited *eſſence* and *nature*, the later affords us an ocular or viſible derivation of thoſe generall attributes, whereof faith infuſed giveth us the true taſte and relliſh. The former we may draw to this head, [*Whatſoever hath limits or bounds of being, hath ſome diſtinct cauſe or author of being.*] As impoſſible it is, any thing ſhould take limits of being, as beginning of being from it ſelfe. For beginning of being is one *eſpeciall limit* of being.

2 This Maxime is ſimply convertible, [*Whatſoever hath cauſe of being hath alſo limits of being,*] becauſe it hath beginning of being: for [*Omnis cauſa eſt principium, & omne cauſatum eſt principiatum,*] Every cauſe is the active beginning or beginner of being, and an *active beginning* eſſentially in-

Sect. 1. cludes a beginning paſſive, as faſhionable to it, as the marke or impreſſion is to the ſtampe. Or in plainer Engliſh, thus; *Where there is a beginning or beginner, there is ſomewhat begunne.* Where the cauſe is præexiſtent in time, the diſtinction or limits of things cauſed or begun, are as eaſily ſeene as the divers ſurfaces of bodies ſevered in place. But where the cauſe hath onely precedence of nature and not of time, (as it falleth out in things cauſed by concomitance or reſultance,) the limits or confines of their being ſeeme confounded, or as hardly diſtinguiſhable as the divers ſurfaces of two bodies glued together. Yet as wee rightly gather that if the bodies be of ſeverall kindes, each hath its proper ſurface, though the point of diſtinction be inviſible to our eyes: ſo whatſoever we conceive to have dependance upon another, wee neceſſarily conceive it to have proper limits of being, or at leaſt a diſtinct beginning of being from the other, though as it were ingrafted in it. But whether we conceive effects and cauſes diſtinctly as they are in nature, or in groſſe, ſo long as we acknowledge them (this or that way conceived) to be finite and limited, wee muſt acknowledge ſome cauſe of their limitation, which (as wee ſuppoſe) cannot bee diſtinct from the cauſe of their being.

3 Why men in theſe dayes are not Gyants, why Gyants, in former, were but men, are two Problems which the meere naturaliſt could eaſily aſſoyle by this reaſon, for ſubſtance one and the ſame. The vigour of cauſes productive or conſervative of vegetables, of man eſpecially, from which he

he receiveth, nutrition and augmentation, is leſſe now then it hath beene at leaſt before the Flood; though but finite and limited, when it was greateſt. Why vegetables of greateſt vigour, ingroſſe not the properties of others leſſe vigorous, but reſt contented with a greater numericall meaſure of their owne ſpecificall vertues; is, by the former reaſon as plaine. For in that they have not their being from themſelves, they can take no more then is given; nor can the natures whence they are propagated, convey them a better title of *being*, then themſelves have. This as the ſeale communicates his faſhion to the waxe, ſo doth the limited force or vertue of cauſes, alwayes imprint bounds and limits upon their effects. If further it be demanded, why the Elements having the opportunity of mutuall vicinity, to wreake their naturall enmities or hoſtilities, do not each treſpaſſe more grievouſly upon other; as why the reſtleſſe or raging water ſwallowes not up the dull earth, which cannot flye from any wrong or violence offered; or why the Heavens, having ſo great a prerogative by height of place, largeneſſe of compaſſe, and indefatigable motion, do not diſpoſſeſſe the higher Elements of their ſeat? The naturaliſt would plead the warrant of natures charter, which had ſet them their diſtinct bounds and limits by an everlaſting undiſpenſable law. Yet is nature in his language alwaies an internall or eſſentiall part of ſome bodies, within which it is neceſſarily confined. As the *nature* of the Heavens hath not ſo much as liberty of egreſſe into neighbour Elements, nor the proper *formes* Cap. 2.

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4 And Being, may be *limited* or *illimited* two wayes: Either for number of kindes and natures contained in it, or for quantity and intenſive perfection

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fection of every ſeverall kinde. Of things viſible, we ſee the moſt perfect are but perfect in ſome one kinde; they poſſeſſe not the entire perfection of others; and that perfection, whereof they have the juſt propriety, is not actually infinite, but finite and limited. Whatſoever thus is, it was as poſſible for it not to have beene, and is as poſſible for it not to be, as to be but of this or that kinde, not all *that is*, or hath *being*. Even thoſe ſubſtances which we call immortall, as the heaven of heavens, with all their inhabitants, be they Angels or Archangels, Principalities or Thrones, enjoy the perpetuall tenour of their actuall exiſtence, not from their *eſſence*, but from the decree of their Maker. *Manent cuncta non quia æterna ſunt, ſed quia defenduntur curâ regentis. Immortalia tutore non egent, hæc conſervat artifex, fragilitatem materiæ vi ſua vincens.* Seneca Epiſt. 58. *All things continue in being, not becauſe they are eternall, but becauſe they are defended by the providence of their Governour. Things immortall need no guardian or protector. But the maker of all things preſerveth theſe things* (which we ſee continue in being) *overmatching the frailty of the matter by his power.* In this mans philoſophy nothing which is made, can be by nature immortall, though many things be perpetually preſerved from periſhing. Nothing which is immortall, can bee made. He groſſely erred, if he were of the ſame opinion with ſome others of the * Ancient, that God had a

* *Mittamus animum ad illa quæ æterna ſunt. Miremur in ſublimi volitantes rerum omnium formas, Deumq; inter illa verſantem, & providentem, quemadmodum quæ immortalia facere non potuit, quia materia prohibebat, defendat à morte, ac ratione vitium corporis vincat. Senec. ib.* Whether for thus ſaying hee fall under the cenſure of *Muretus* in his annotations upon this place, I refer it to the judicious Reader. *Impie ſtulta veterum opinio, Deum voluiſſe quidem à primo omnia immortalia facere, ſed non potuiſſe, propter materiæ vitium. Quaſi non, ut cætera omnia, ita materiam condiderit, ac procrearit Deus. Recte Lactantius. Idem materiæ fictor eſt, qui & rerum materia conſtantium.*

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5 If that which Philoſophers ſuppoſe to be the root

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root of incorruption in the heavens, can brooke no limits of duration, but muſt bee imagined without end or beginning; why ſhould it content it ſelfe with limits of extenſion? ſeeing duration is but a kinde of extenſion, ſeeing motion, magnitude, and time, by their rules in other caſes, hold exact proportion. Things cauſed (as induction manifeſteth) are alwayes limited and moulded in their proper cauſes. Nor are there two cauſes (much leſſe two cauſalities,) one of their being, another of their limitation or reſtraint to this or that ſet kinde of *being*. For whatſoever gives being to any thing, gives it the *beginning* of being. As *Sophroniſcus* was the true cauſe why *Socrates* was in that age wherein he lived, not before or after; why he was a man not a beaſt, an Athenian not a Barbarian. *Quicquid dat formam, dat omnia conſequentia formam: whatſoever gives forme of being to any thing, gives all the appurtenances of the forme:* is a Phyſicall Maxime which ſuppoſeth another Metaphyſicall, *Quicquid dat eſſe, dat proprietates eſſe:* That which gives being unto any thing, gives likewiſe the properties of ſuch being as it hath. Now limits of being, are eſſentiall properties of that eſſence or being, wherin they are found. And diſtinct bounds or limits are included in the diſtinct *forme* of *being*, which every thing hath from its cauſe. Actuall eſſence or exiſtence it ſelfe, is diſtributed to every thing that hath cauſe of being, as it were ſealed up in its proper *forme* or *kinde* of being. It is as poſſible to put a new faſhion upon *nothing*, as for any thing that is, to take limits or ſet *forme* of being from *nothing*.

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thing. That which hath nothing to give it *being*, can have nothing to give it limits or bounds of being. And as no entity can take its *being*, or beginning of *being* from it selfe; so neither can it take bounds or limits from it selfe, but must have them from some other. The prime essence or first cause of all things that are, as it hath no precedent cause of *existence*, nor can it be cause of *existence* to it self; so neither can it have any cause of limits without it selfe, nor can it be any cause of limits to it selfe. It remaines then, that it must be an *essence* illimited, and thus to be without bounds or limits, is the *formall* effect or consequence of *being* it *selfe*, or of *that* which *truly is*, without any cause precedent to give it *being*, or make it what *it is*.

6 So essentially is the *conceipt* of *being without bounds or limits*, included in our *conceipt* of being without cause precedent, that if we should, by way of supposition, give any imaginary entity leave to take beginning or possession of being from it selfe, without the warrant of any cause precedent to appoint or measure it out some distinct portion or *forme* of *being*: thus much being once by imagination granted, wee could not (by any imagination possible) debarre this entity from absolute necessity of being for ever after whatsoever it listed to be, or from being all things, rather than any one thing.

Of the Heathens, many did hold an uncreated *Chaos* præexistent to the *frame* of this Vniverse: and Philosophers, to this day, maintaine an ingenerable matter, which actually is not any body, but indifferent to be made every body. Let us but suppose

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poſe; Firſt the one, or other of them to be as *Homogeneall* in it ſelfe, as the ayre or water: Secondly, to be able to *actuate*, or *Proteus-like* to transforme it ſelfe into a better ſtate than now it hath, without the helpe of any agent or efficient; and then, as it could have no cauſe, ſo can there be no reaſon given, to reſtraine it from taking all bodily perfection *poſsible* to it ſelfe. And if it bee true, which ſome teach, that this prime *matter* hath neither proper quantity nor quality, what ſhould hinder it to take both without meaſure, ſuppoſing it might be its owne *carver* of thoſe endowments? Or imagine there were ſuch a vacuity, where the world now is, as we Chriſtians beleeve there was before it was made, and onely one of *Democritus* caſuall *Atoms*, or ſome meere *poſsibility* or *appetite* of the *matter*, left free, *venire in vacuum*, to give it ſelfe full and perfect *act* without curbe or reſtraint of any ſuperiour power or ſharer to cry *halfe mine* with it, or make claime to the nature of any actuall entity loſt; *it* being ſuppoſed to be able to take any one nature upon it, what ſhould either hinder or further it, to aſſume the nature of earth, rather than of water, or of theſe two, rather than of any other Element, or of any ſimple bodies, rather than of mixt or compounded ſubſtances, or of bodily ſubſtances, rather than ſpirituall, or of all theſe, rather than of their metaphyſicall *eminences*, and *perfections*? Or whilſt we imagine *it*, without cauſe of exiſtence or beginning, no reaſon imaginable could confine *it* to any ſet place of reſidence or extenſion: no cauſe could be alledged why it ſhould take poſſeſſion of the

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center, rather than of the circumference of this Vniverſe, as now it ſtands, or of both theſe rather than of the whole ſphere, or of the whole ſphere rather than of all extenſive ſpace imaginable. Only the very ſuppoſition of taking beginning though without cauſe, doth put a limit to its duration; becauſe this kinde of beginning, being but imaginary, depends upon our imagination, as upon its true cauſe. And yet even thus conſidered, me thinks it ſhould extend its exiſtence both wayes, and draw a circular duration to the inſtant where it beginnes. Or (not imagining the beginning) let us imagine it onely to have true preſent being without any cauſe precedent to puſh it forward, or ſuperiour guide to appoint it a ſet courſe; and it is not within the compaſſe of imagination, why the duration of it ſhould not reach as farre the one way as the other, as farre beyond all imagination of time paſt, as of time to come, why it ſhould not comprehend all duration imaginable by way of preſent poſſeſſion, or ſupereminent permanency, without admiſſion of any defluxe, diviſion, or ſucceſſion, for continuation of its exiſtence.

7 If it be objected, that any thing may follow from ſuppoſition or imagination of impoſſibilities, the reply is eaſie. The objection is either falſe, or true in a ſenſe, which no way impeacheth, but rather approves this kinde of arguing. True it is, there is almoſt nothing in nature ſo impoſſible, as it may not be the poſſible conſequent of ſome impoſſibilitie ſuppoſed or granted: but of every particular impoſſibility ſuppoſed or imagined, the poſſible

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sible * consequences are not infinite; neither such nor so many as we list to make them; they are determinate by nature. Now we cannot conceive it to be in nature more impossible for a meere logicall possibility, really and truly to take beginning of actuall being only from it selfe, then it is for that which is supposed and imagined thus to take beginning, to be restrained either to any determinate kind or part of being, or to be confined to any set place or residence. Or if any mislike these imaginary models, let him (now he hath given us leave to make them, and vouchsafed to looke upon them) utterly cancell or deface them. The everlasting edifice to "whose erection they are destinated, is this; Such as "we cannot conceive that not to be, which we con- "ceive to take beginning of *being* from it selfe "without any cause precedent; such of necessity "must we conceive and beleeve *him* to be indeed, "who neither tooke beginning from himselfe, nor "had it given by any, but is the *beginning* of being, "the sole maker of all things that be, being him- "selfe without beginning, without dependance of "any cause, without subordination to any guide, to "appoint his kinde, to limit his place, or prescribe "his time of *being*. He is in all these, and whatso- ever branch or portion of *being* imaginable, truly and really infinite, the quintessence or excellency

* *Qui scholas regũt, iã id nobis exploratũ reliquerũt: si de esse conditionalis propositionis naturam siue conditionem, ut existente falso quod antecedit, & etiam quod subsequitur, possit remanere vera conditionalis. Pasq. c. 1. ad Rõ fol 65* Though it were impossible for an Angell from heaven to preach any other Gospell than *Paul* had preached, and impossible likewise for any Angell of heaven to be accursed, yet S. *Pauls* conditionall proposition was true; If an Angell from heaven should preach any other Gospell, he should be accursed. In like manner this supposition or conditionall [If any thing could take beginning from it selfe, it should be infinite] is true: although both these positions be false; First, that any thing can take beginning from it selfe: Secondly, that any thing which hath beginning can be infinite. And this only is absolutely true, That which truly is without all beginning, is absolutely infinite.

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Of infinitie in Being, or of absolute infinitie: and the right definition of it by the ancient Philosophers.

1 Were the question proposed in formall termes [*An inter nihil & aliquid detur medium,*] *Whether something or nothing may admit a meane or middle nature:* few answerers in the Schooles would make choice of the affirmative: If any did, hee might easily bee thus opposed: Every meane betwixt two is either by participation of both extreames, (as *lukewarme* is neither hot nor cold, but a mixture of both;) or a meane by abnegation, as being capable of neither. So a stone, though it be not blinde, yet cannot see; and is therefore such a meane as we now speake of, (i) *medium abnegationis,* betwixt sight and blindnesse. That which is not (so is nothing) can communicate no kinde of being (for it hath none,) unto any thing; therefore it is impossible there should be any meane of participation betwixt *nothing* and *something*. And to finde a meane betwixt them, by *abnegation,* that is, any thing which is neither something nor nothing, is as hard, as to assigne a space or *vacancy* betweene a line and the point that *terminates* it. What name soever

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soever we propose, unlesse it have some degree or portion of entity answering to it, we may justly say, it is *just* nothing. These reasons notwithstanding though they firmely hold in secular disputes of predicament all or numerable Entities, yet the infinite Essence comes not within the lists of this division. Is he then a *meane* betweene *something* and *nothing*, rather an *excellency* too transcendent, to be comprehended under the *name* of *something*, or of *any thing*; for this were to make *him* a * *numerable* part of *being*. On the other side, we should avouch as much under our hand, as the foole said in his heart, if we did cõprehend him under the other extream. To say there is no God, or that *God* is *nothing*, are speeches altogether equivolent, both equally false, and alike blasphemous. Fully contradictory to their falshood, and in direct opposition to their blasphemie, we may more safely say and thinke, that God is *one*, yet no one thing. And if wee avouch him to be *all*, our meaning is, he is a great deale more than all things. The Latine *ens*, which universally taken, directly answers to our English *every thing*, or *any thing*; (as * *Mirandula* well-obserues) *faciem concreti habet*, it beares the face or image of a concrete. And every *concrete* takes its name from that *nature*, whereof it participates; which *nature*, notwithstanding by reason of its *simple*, *pure*, and perfect *essence*, cannot brooke the same *name* which it bestowes on others. Nothing is truly tearmed *hot*, or *white*, but

* *Idem absolutum, quod et Deum dicimus, non cadit in numero cum omni alio, ut quod Deus et cœlum, sint plura, aut duo, aut alia, et diversa; sicut nec cœlum est idem absolutum, ut cœlum quod est aliud à terra. Et quia idem absolutum est actus omnis formæ formabilis forma, non potest forma esse extra idem. Quo enim res est eadem sibi ipsi, forma agit, quod autem est alteri alias est, quia non est idem absolutum, hoc est omnis formæ forma. Est igitur idem absolutum, principium, medium, et finis, omnis formæ, et actus absolutus omnis potentiæ.* Cusan. de Genes. dialog. pag. 128. * *Lib. de ente et uno.*

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from participation of heat or whiteneſſe; yet to ſay heat is *hot*, or whiteneſſe *white*, is a ſpeech as improper and unnaturall, as it would bee to ſtyle the Kings Majeſtie, Lord Preſident, chiefe Iuſtice of ſome Court, or with ſome other inferiour title, meerely dependent on ſupreame Majeſty. *Heat* then is that from which things are called, as by participation of it, they truly are, *hot*; *Whiteneſſe*, that, from whoſe participation, things are termed *white*. This ſhall we ſpeake of God, ſo we ſpeake of him as beſt befits his ſupreame Majeſtie, that he is no *one* thing, but rather *one*, from whoſe moſt pure and perfect *being*, all things are ſaid to bee, what they are. That man is one thing, and the earth another, that any thing is ſaid to be, what it is, includes a participation of *his* being, whoſe proper name is * *I am*: whoſe eſſence is the very quinteſſence, the incomprehenſible and indiminiſhable fulneſſe of *that*, without which, wee can neither affirme or deny ought of that which *is* τὸ ἐν the onely *foundation* of every thing, that can bee named alone, the onely bond of all things that can bee combined or linckt together. Say * we then not onely, that *He is* one, but that *he* onely *is*: And that in *him* the eminent totality or perfection of every thing, to whom this *title*, *Is*, can be imparted, is contained. Angels and immortall ſpirits are, but they are not *Being* it ſelfe, that is, they are what they are, by participation of his Eſſence, who onely *Is*, who alone comprehends all things.

2 Of the greateſt Angell which he hath created, or of the moſt noble intelligent Spirit which the Philo-

* Ex. 3. 14.

* *Cum primum ingreſſus Academiam fueris, occurret tibi Parmenides, qui unicum demonſtrabit Deum eſſe rerum omnium ideas, id eſt, exemplaria rationeſq; eminentiſſimè continentem vel producentem. Occurret Meliſſus & Zeno, qui ſolum Deum revera eſſe demonſtrent, cætera vero videri, Marcil. Ficin. Epiſt. 8. pag. 866.*

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Philoſophers imagined, were he preſent, or did we know the place of his reſidence, we might without wrong ſay, *This* Angel, or *yonder Intelligence*; or ſpeake of either, as of a numerable part, though a principall one of this univerſe. For though his *nature* be much more perfect than ours is, and *hee* according to the perfection of his nature, much more excellent than his fellow Angels are: his perfections nevertheleſſe have their bounds and limits, not uncapable of theſe demonſtrative ſignes, *This, Here*, or *Yonder*, *&c.* He neither containes the ſpecificall perfection of our nature, nor the *numericall* of his Fellowes, within the meaſure of his perfection. In his kind then *he* is moſt perfect, yet is he not that *perfection* which he hath in him, but the receptacle of it; And if he have perfection onely in him, without being himſelfe perfection, *Quid habet quod non accepit? All* hee hath muſt bee *participated or borrowed* from perfection it ſelfe. And of his borrowed perfections, *one* neither properly is *another*, nor are all or any of them, what he is. His power is not the ſame that his wiſedome is; his wiſedome is not his goodneſſe, nor his goodneſſe his life. Sathan and his Angels have life, though they have loſt their goodneſſe; and their power to practiſe, is leſſe than their wit to plot miſchiefe and villany. The beſt, the wiſeſt, or mightieſt of thoſe immortall Spirits, which kept their ſtations, is not able, either by his meere power to give being to things that are not, or life to liveleſſe creatures; his wiſedome cannot inſpire wiſedome into creatures endued with life; his goodneſſe is no fountaine whence grace may be

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3 By the ſame analogy of ſpeech that wee ſay a *ſtatue*, or *picture*, though made after life, is, no true man; we are bound to ſay, and thinke, that no creature (the beſt of which is but the image of God; his being, at the beſt, but participated) truly is. It is their chiefe grace to be true ſhadowes of true *being*. Or as it is uſuall with Divines to enſtyle Chriſt, the *true Samuel, David himſelfe*, the *right Salomon*, the *onely Sampſon*: not that they thinke the ſtories of thoſe mens lives, were onely faigned legends for good example, (or that no ſuch perſons had ever truly beene,) but becauſe they did foreſhadow one far more excellent, than themſelves, in whom that was really and fully exhibited, which was only prefigured in them, So we ſay God *alone* Is, becauſe the totality and fulneſſe of that being is in him, whoſe repreſentation is in his creatures. Thus much is included in all thoſe ſacred paſſages, wherein he ſaith of himſelfe, *I am He, I am God, and there is none beſides*. Thus much many comments yet extant in the Ancient Philoſophy of the Heathens, being compared with theſe texts, would fully informe us.

4 The Stoicks appropriate the name of *eſſence* unto God,

God, & unto the *matter*, which they foolishly conceive to be coeternall with him, able to overmatch the benignity of his active power, by its passive untowardlinesse. How ever, they held nothing worthy the title of Essence, which was not ἀυτογενες *independently everlastingly*. *Plotines* Philosophy was more divine, unlesse perhaps hee gave too much to his *Demoniacall* or Angelicall spirits, as many others, not conceiving any creation but out of the matter præexistent, seeme to allot a kinde of independent *Being* to immateriall substances. An error easie to have beene checkt, had the favourers of it beene put in mind, that these their *demi gods* by necessary consequence of this opinion, must have beene acknowledged infinite in Being. Whereas the true notion of such infinitie, by the apparent grounds of true Philosophy, is onely proper, onely possible unto One; because it entirely includeth *all* that can bee; and, All, absolutely excludes all plurality. From this principle rightly founded, did *Plato* deny things sensible truly to be, or (as *Seneca* paraphrases upon his Text) they make a *shew* onely, or put on a countenance of being for a time, being uncapable of the stability or solidity of true *being*. So far was this divine Philosopher fr̃ō their heresie, which acknowledged an independent *being* in immateriall substances, that (to the Aristotelicall Christian his shame) * hee derives their immortality, not from the *immaterialitie* or excellency of their nature, but from the speciall grant or Charter of their Maker; as if dissolution or finall expiration were due to them as they are creatures; albeit the exe-

Cap. 3. *Vide Senecam p. 58. & Muretum in annot.*

* *Dijs à se factis promisit Deus non factus immortalitatem; quod impossibile est, se dixit esse facturum. Sic enim eum locutum narrat Plato, &c. vide Aug. lib. 22 de civ. Dei cap. 26. Et Sotum in 4. senten. distin. 43 q. 1. art. 2. Et Platonem ipsum in Timeo. p. 41*

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execution of it were everlastingly differed from their first creation. These termes of *being*, *is*, or *are* &c. which are so common to al things, that without them, we can neither make enquiry after any thing, nor distinguish it from nothing, are attributed by the same Philosopher to this eternall Maker of all things, after such an eminent and soveraigne manner, as may not be communicated to any other. So the name of Poet (to use * *Seneca* his comment upon *Plato* his dialect) *absolutely* or demonstratively taken, was *Homers* peculiar title throughout *Greece*, albeit the name of Poet was common in that time to all versifiers. The Poet *Homer* was a tautologie amongst the Græcians, but Poet *Æschylus*, or Poet *Euripides* none. A greater tautologie or solæcisme it had beene in *Platoes* Divinity, to have said of God, as wee doe of our selves or of Angels, he *is* something, every thing, or the most excellent thing. Enough it was to have said he is *One*, or He is *All*, although he should have hit his or the Ancient Philosophers meaning best, that had said, he is, ὁ ὤν, *He that is*. Or as the Apostle comments upon Gods name revealed to *Moses*, *He which was, is, and which is to come*, ὁ παντοκράτωρ.

5 *Parmenides* much more ancient than *Plato*, did not deny (unlesse *Simplicius* one of *Aristotles* followers double with us) all distinction, either numericall or specificall, or more generall, betweene the visible or intelligible parts of this universe. Any member of which division, being granted, multitude and division would necessarily follow. But how many or great soever, the parts of multitude were, in his

* *Secundum ex his quæ sunt, ponit* Plato, *quod eminet et exuperat omnia. Hoc ait per excellentiam esse, ut Poeta communiter dicitur: omnibus enim versus facientibus hoc nomen est: Sed iam apud Græcos in unius notam cessit. Homerum intelligas cum audieris* poetam. *Quid ergo hoc est? Deus scilicet maior ac potentior cunctis.* Seneca ep. 58. *Quid per Ideas intelligat Plato, vide ibid. et apud Muretum in annotat.*

* *Iehovah*] This is the chiefest

his opinion, they *truly were not*, in respect of that unitie, whence they had their originall. That speech of this sage Philosopher, *Omnia unum sunt*, which *Aristotle*, in the first entry into his new Philosophy, stumbles at as a Paradoxe, was an orthodoxall principle of true Divinitie. *Parmenides* meant the same that *Plato* did, (perhaps better) although he expresst his meaning in a poeticall manner, more apt to bee mistaken, though rightly taken, more magnificent and much apter to occasion admiration. The speech it selfe will naturally beare this construction, Multitude of things visible, is but the multiplyed shadow of invisible independent unitie: things sensible, or by imagination numerable, are but so many severall representations of his incomprehensible being, who *is one*; not as one is part of multi.

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name of the eternall and most blessed God, so called of his Essence, being, or existence, which is simply *one*, *Deut.* 6.4. The force of this name, the holy Ghost openeth by *He that is, that was, and that will bee*, or is to come, *Rev* 1.4 8. & 4 8. & 11.17. & 16.5. And the forme of the Hebrew name implyeth so much, *Ie* being a signe of the time to come, *Iehveh*, hee will bee; *Hé*, of the time present, *Hoveh*, he that is, and *Vah* of the time past, *Havah*, he was. It importeth that God is, and hath his being of himselfe from before all works: [*Isa* 44 6.] that hee giveth being or existence unto all things, and in him all are and doe consist, [*Acts* 17.25.] That he giveth being unto his word, effecting whatsoever hee hath spoken, whether promises, [*Exod.* 6.3. *Esay* 45.2, 3.] or threatnings, [*Ezek* 5.17. and 7.27.] It is in effect the same that *Ehieh, I will be, or I am*, as God calleth himselfe, *Exod.* 3.14. Of this the Gentiles named the greateſt God *Iove* and *Iupiter*, that is *Iah*-Father, of the shorter name *Iah*, mentioned *Psal.* 68.5. And *Varro* the learnedst of the Romanes, thought *Jove* to bee the God of the Iewes. *August. lib.* 1. *de consens. Evan. cap.* 22. Hereof also in Greeke writers hee is called *Iao* *Diodor. Sicul. lib.* 2. *cap.* 5. *Clem. Alexand. Strom. lib.* 5. *Macrob. lib.* 1. *Saturnal. cap.* 18. But in the Greeke tongue the name *Iehovah* cannot rightly bee pronounced, and for it the Greeke Bibles have *Lord*, which the new Testament followeth, as *Mark.* 12.29. from *Deut.* 6.4. and elsewhere usually; and the Hebrew Text sometime putteth *Adonai* Lord, or *Elohim* God, for *Iehovah*, as *Psalme* 57.10. compared with *Psalme* 108.4. 2 *Chron.* 25.24. with 2 *Kings* 14.14. *Ainsworth* upon *Psal.* 83.19.

Sect. 1. tude, yet moſt truly One, becauſe indiviſible and unmultipliable, as wanting nothing, as moſt entirely poſſeſſing *all* that can accrue by multiplication: moſt truly One, becauſe He onely is, and unto his being nought can be added, nought detracted from it, by the increaſe or diminution of other beings. Or in *Parmenides* meaning, He ſo *is*, that if al things numerable ſhould loſe that being which they have, or be annihilated, all might be found againe in *him*, and be reſtored with *Iobs* reſtitution, to their wonted eſtate, without diminution of his ſoveraigne *being*. For whatſoever now is, heretofore hath been, or can be extant, beſides *Him*; hath a more excellent manner of being, treaſured up in his eternall and infinite Eſſence, than may with ſafety be committed to its owne charge or cuſtody.

6 Happy had it beene for *Ariſtotle* himſelfe, and not amiſſe for us, if *he* had imployed his extraordinary talent of wit, in ſetting forth that infinite treaſure of wiſdome, whence he received it; or ſpent his daies in contẽplation of that unity, whẽce all things whereof he wrote, had their beginning, rather thã in decyphering their ſeverall natures and perfections, altogether omitting the eſſentiall references, or dependencies, which they had from him; unleſſe this mirror of nature, had bin of their number, who infatuated (as the Apoſtle ſpeakes) by divine wiſedome, became vaine in their imaginations; he might have perceived his owne definition of ſuch infinity as he imagined in the diviſibility of Magnitude or ſucceſſion of time, to have beene (as *Plato* ſpeakes of Time it ſelfe) but a moveable image of that true and

and solid *infinity*, whose definition, being well assigned by others, was censoriously rejected by him; or such a floating shadow of it swimming in his braine, as the Sun or Starres imprint in a swift running streame. A perfect definition should bee so fitted to the entire nature of the thing defined, or to the thing it selfe absolutely considered, as the barke is to the tree, or other visible surfaces to the bodies which they environ: To expresse some particular properties or branches, much lesse some references or considerations of it, is not enough. The question then being absolutely proposed, *Quid est infinitum?* What is infinity? or what is it to be infinite? The definitive and satisfactory answer must be such, as shall expresse not the nature of infinity in succession only or in division, not in this or that respect only, or according to some particular abstraction or consideration; but the nature of infinity simply and absolutely considered. That only is absolutely and properly *infinite*, which is *infinite* not according to one conceipt or kinde of *infinity*, but that which is *infinite* in *Being*. This was that infinity which the Ancients well defined, when they said, *Infinitum est extra quod nihil est*: Infinity is that without which nothing is, or can be. For as infinity in longitude, includes all length conceiveable, and infinitie in solid magnitudes, all dimensions imaginable; so must *infinite being* include all Being possible; and it is impossible for any thing to be *without* or besides that, wherein all *being* possible is contained. Thus did these ancient Heathens *feele after and seeke*, and in a manner find, *that Lord* Cap. 3.

Sect. 1. under the notion of *unum* and *infinitum*, *in whom*, as S. *Paul* ſaith, (*Act.* 17.28.) *we live, and move, and have our being*. His words will beare or rather preſuppoſe that improvement, which is neceſſarily included in the *Ancients* definition of abſolute infinitie. *It is impoſſible that any thing living ſhould have life, that any thing moveable ſhould move, that life or motion ſhould have the leaſt degree of being, ſave only in Him, who onely is.* For as the ſame Apoſtle there ſaith, verſ. 25. *He giveth to all, life and breath, and all things.* The very firſt beginnings, the firſt and laſt degrees of ſuch being as they have. *Ariſtotle* then came farre ſhort of the truth in ſaying, *Infinitum eſt extra quod ſemper aliquid eſt*, That is infinite, which never hath ſo much, but it is alwaies getting more. The truth is, *Ariſtotle* did not, could not deny the definition aſſigned by the Ancients, to be a true and perfect definition of abſolute infinitie, or of infiniry in being. Wherein then, or upon what grounds did he diſſent from them? Either in that he did not acknowledge any ſuch abſolute infinity or infinite being, as the Ancients beleeved; or elſe did ſuppoſe, that they held this viſible world or ſome bodily magnitude to be ſo actually and abſolutely infinite, as the former definition doth import. Concerning this latter ſort of infinitie, whatſoever the ancient Philoſophers did, we Chriſtians doe not diſſent from *Ariſtotle*: for we deny any bodily magnitude actually infinite. But that there is an abſolute infinity, or an Eſſence actually and abſolutely infinite, may be neceſſarily inferred from thoſe branches of that *infinitie* which conſiſts not

in

in *act*, but in *possibility*, or succession, which *Aristotle* rightly acknowledged, and well defined. For, whence should al the parts of this visible world possibly get any new portion of time, any succession or addition to their present being or duration, which now they have not; save onely from his infinite and inexhaustible store, who, before all times had so much of being in every kind, as he could not possibly either get any more, or lose a dramme of what he had; albeit through every moment of duration divisible, he furnished all things, that are (as he could doe more) with as much perfection, as they are capable of, that is, all of them with perfection or being in it selfe finite, but in some of them without limit of duration. But are all things in *him?* or such only as include perfection? or shall wee say perfections are in him, rather than in the things themselves? And if so, whether shall we say he is one perfection, or all perfections? Cap. 4.

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There is no plurality of perfections in the infinite Essence, albeit the perfection of all things be in Him. Of the absolute identity of the Divine Essence and Attributes.

1 HEE argued like himselfe that said, We must either allow the Gods to have bodies, or deny them sense; because sense is never found without a body. What was it then in his

Sect. 1. his Philosophy, which framed the organs of bodily sense? a body already organized and indued with sense? or a *spirit* (*virtus formatrix*) which rather is in the body, than is a body it selfe? And if this spirit frame the organs by its owne skill, *Epicurus* should in reason have afforded it both sense and reason in greater measure then hee had himselfe; who, out of the same matter, could not make so much as one haire white or blacke; much lesse the most exquisite instruments of sense. But if this *spirit*, by which, in Philosophers opinions, our bodies are produced, work not by art, but is only set on work by the supreame Artificer; seeing *he* can make it to do more without sense & reason, than *Epicurus* could doe, by all his art or philosophicall skill: we must needs grant sense (& reason) to be in *Him*, yet such, or in such a sort, as befits his Majesty, not such as **Epicurus* tooke delight in. Our argument is grounded on the Psalmists Philosophy. *Vnderstand yee bruitish among the people, and ye fooles when will yee be wise? He that planted the eare shall he not heare? He that formed the eyes, shall hee not see? Hee that chastiseth the Heathen, shall not he correct? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know? Psal.* 94. 8, 9, 10. Yet as we say that *He* onely *is*, and all things numerable are but meere shadowes of *His being*; so we must hold, that *hearing*, *sight*, and *reason* are in him, according to their idæall paternes or perfections, not according to those imperfect pictures, which communicated to men and beasts, distinguish them from vegetables or liveleſſe creatures; whose perfections likewise are in him. But some-

* *Vide Lactant. lib.* 1. *de ira Dei. Et Betuleum in com.*

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some things perhaps there be, which have no portion of perfection, as the prime *matter*, or some like dead or dull masse. For how shall that, which is but a body, be in him that hath no body? That Maxime, *Idem est non esse, & non apparere*, is not so true in matters of civill proofe or allegation, as the other stemme of the same root, *Idem est non esse, & non operari*, is in nature. To bee without efficacie or operation, or to serve unto no use, is all one, as not to be at all. Or, rather, so to be, hath the same proportion to simple *non-being*, as *nihil agere*, to *otiosum esse*. To *be* without use or operation is more remote from true *being*, and worse in nature, than simply not to be. If any such things there be, how should we say they are in God, in whom is nothing but perfection? Yet of things without proper use or operation, there might be some peculiar end best knowne to their Maker; if it were but to commend the perfection which other creatures borrow from him, and to stirre up our thankfulnesse, that we neither are such dull masses our selves, nor are troubled with harbouring or supporting them. But even these, if any such there were, could not be existent or *extra causas*, unlesse they truly were in Him. What is it then for all things that are, or their perfections to be in Him?

2 For all things to be in Him, is no more then that He alone can produce them without seed or matter precedent. All things, not extant only, but *possible*, are in his wisedome, as the Edifice is in the Artificers head: all things againe are in his power, as strength or force to move our limbes, is

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in our sinewes or motive faculty. The perfections of all things are truly said to bee in Him, in as much as whatsoever is, or can bee done by their efficacy or vertue, Hee alone can doe without them. Hee could feed all the beasts of the field without grasse, heale every disease, without herbe, metall, or other matter of medicine, by his sole word not uttered by breathing, or any other kinde of motion; not distinct from his life or essence. He is life it selfe; yet is not his life supported by any corporeall masse, or præexistent nature, nor clothed with such sense as ours is: for sense, in as much as it cannot be without a corporeall organ, is an imperfect kind of knowledge. Paine he cannot feele as we doe, because that tendeth to destruction, which is the period of imperfection: yet whatsoever paine any sensible or materiall object can inflict upon us, Hee alone can inflict the same in an higher degree. The measure of paine, likewise, which we feele by sense, He knowes much better without sense or feeling of it. But when we say all things are in *Him*, after a more excellent manner, than they are or can bee in themselves: Wee must not conceipt a multitude or diversity of excellencies in his *Essence*, answering to the severall natures of things created: We must not imagine one excellency futable to *elementary bodies*, another to *mixt*, a third to *vegetables*, a fourth to *sense*, &c. one to the humane nature, another to the Angelicall. And if * *Plato* meant there

* *Tertium genus est eorũ quæ propriè sunt: innumerabilia hæc sunt, sed, extra nostrum posita conspectũ. Quæ sunt, interrogas? Propria Platonis supellex est. Ideas vocat, ex quibus quæcunq; videmus, omnia fiunt, & ad quas cuncta formantur. Hæ immortales, immutabiles, inviolabiles sunt. Quid sit Idea, id est, quid* Platoni *esse videatur, audi. Idea est eorũ quæ naturâ fiunt exemplar æternum. Sen. ep. 58.*

Plato *in* Timæo *ait Ideas nunquam fieri, semper esse: corporea autem omnia nunquam esse, semper fieri. Vide Cusan. Dialog. de Genesi, quomodo* idem, identificando, *pluralitatem producit.*

were

were as many ſeverall *Idæa's* eternally extant, whether in the firſt cauſe of things, or without *Him*, as there were ſubſtances ſpecifically diſtinct one from another; his opinion may neither be followed, nor approved by any Chriſtian. In all theſe, Divine Excellency, as one face in many glaſſes of different frame, is diverſly repreſented, being in it ſelfe more truly one than any other entity, that is termed one, or then any bond of union betweene things united. Of natures extant, ſome, to our capacity, repreſent Him better, ſome worſe; not the meaneſt or baſeſt, but is in ſome ſort like Him; not the moſt excellent creature that is, not all the excellencies of all, can ſo fully repreſent his nature, as an Apes ſhadow doth a Mans body. But what in other caſes would ſeeme moſt ſtrange, infinite variety beſt ſers forth the admirable excellency of his indiviſible unity. Cap. 4.

3 Touching the queſtion propoſed, Whether he were one *excellency* or all *excellencies*? whether he were one *perfection*, or all *perfections*, *Reſpondent ultima primis*. The anſwer is in a manner given in the beginning of this Diſcourſe. Though hee that ſaith *God is all perfections*, excepts none, yet hee includes onely perfections numerable and participated: And to ſay *He* were only *one perfection*, implyes onely *perfection* limited, and therefore *perfection* borrowed, not independent. Or admitting there be a *meane* betweene *all*, or ſome *perfections*, and one *perfection*, which may fitly be expreſſed by all *perfection*: yet he that ſhould thus ſay [God is the *univerſall* unity or *totality* of perfection] had need

Sect. 1. to distinguish acurately of *universality* and totality, and define *Vniversale ante rem* more exquisitely than the Platonickes doe; that hee may acquit his meaning, from suspition of such *totality*, or *universality*, as ariseth not onely by aggregation of parts, but whose extent is no more than equall to all its parts. For every other *universall* or *whole*, is fully equalized by all the parts taken together; whereas the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds all particular natures or perfections possible, though in number they could be infinite. It is then (if any man list so to speake) such a *totality* or *universality*, as cannot bee augmented, much lesse made up by multiplication of any other perfection, though prosecuted *in infinitum*; neither diminishable or exhaustible by multiplicity or division of particulars derived from it. But whether wee consider this *His* infinite Essence in it selfe, or, as it eminently containes all things possible; the incomprehensibility of it is in both respects more fully intimated (expresst it cannot be) by indefinite formes of speech, than by addition of any definite termes, whether of *singularity*, *universality*, or *totality*. Hee speakes more fully and more safely, that saith, *God is being it selfe, or perfection it selfe*; than he that saith, he is the onely *being*, or all *being*, the onely *perfection*, or all *perfection*, the totality of *being* and of *perfection*. So all *plurality* be excluded, we expresse his *being* and *perfection* best, by leaving them, as they truly are, without all quantity.

4 That all *pluralitie*, not onely of Idæall perfections answering to the natures of things numerable

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rable or created, but of *internall* perfections, whose different titles necessarily breed plurality of conceits in us; must be excluded from the true, orthodoxall intellectuall apprehension of the illimited Essence, may from the former maine principle bee thus euinced. In that Hee is without beginning, without end, without all cause of being, without dependance; we cannot imagine, or at least our understanding must correct our imaginations, if they shall suggest, his *power* to bee as the stemme, *wisedome*, *goodnesse*, and other like attributes, as branches growing from his being or essence, as from the Root. For if his Being or Essence be absolutely independent, it is absolutely illimited; and being such, what could limit or restraine it from being life, from being power, from being wisedome, from being goodnesse, from being infinitely, whatsoever any thing that hath being is? * Hee that affirmes any of these attributes to bee what another is not, or divine Essence not to bee identically what all those are, must grant aswell the Attributes, as the Essence to be finite and limited. If *power* in God have a *being* distinct from wisedome, and wisdome another *being* distinct from *goodnesse*, one must needs want so much of infinite *being*, as another hath of proper being distinct from it, and, at the best, they can bee but infinite *secundùm quid*, or in their ranke. Againe if any of them be, what Essence

* *Deus verò multipliciter dicitur, magnus, bonus, sapiens, beatus, verus, et quicquid aliud non indignè Dei videtur. Sed eadem magnitudo eius est, quæ sapientia: non enim mole magnus est, sed virtute. Et eadem bonitas quæ sapientia, & magnitudo, & eadem veritas, quæ illa omnia. Et non est ibi aliud beatum esse, & aliud magnum, aut sapientem, aut verum, aut bonum esse, aut omnino ipsum esse. Nec quoniam Trinitas est, ideo triplex putandus est: alioqui minor erit, Pater solus, aut Filius solus, quam simul Pater et Filius. August. de Trinitate lib. 6. cap. 7.*

Sect. 1. identically is not; Essence cannot bee infinite, because *wisedome, power* and *being* have their severall beings distinct from it. And the nearer these come (whether severally or joyntly considered) to the nature of true infinity, the more naked and impotent they leave their mother-Essence, if we once grant Essence and them to bee distinct, as Parents and children, or as roote and branch: or to what use should powerlesse Essence serve? to support these branches of infinity? this it could not doe without infinite power. And those branches, if they need a root or supportance, their being must needs bee dependent, and therefore limited.

5 From the former definition of absolute infinity, [*Infinitum est extra quod nihil est*] We may conclude, that unlesse all *power*, unlesse all *wisedome*, unlesse all *goodnesse*, unlesse *all* that truly is, or can possibly be supposed to have true being, bee identically contained in Gods Essence; Hee could not be absolutely Infinite or illimited in beeing. Whatsoever is uncapable of limit, is uncapable of division or numericall difference: For whereseever it can be truly said, This is one, and that another, or *This* is, and *is* not *That*, each hath distinct limits. But seeing our imagination or phantasie is divisible, and our purest intellectuall conceipts of infinitie, but finite; we cannot thinke of God as *infinite* in *power*, *infinite* in *wisedome* and in *Essence*; but wee must frame a conceit of *power* distinct from our conceit of Essence, and a *conceit* of wisedome distinct from both. And this pluralitie of conceipts in us, usually brings forth a conceit of plurality betwixt his Essence,

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Essence, and his Attributes; unlesse our understandings be vigilant and attentive to correct our phantasies, by this following, and the like knowne Philosophicall truth. As wee cannot contemplate incorporeall substances without imagination of some corporeall forme, and yet the understanding constantly denyes them to bee like their pictures presented to it by the phantasie, or to have any such corporeall forme as it doth paint them in: so in this case, notwithstanding the pluralitie of our imperfect conceipts, or multiplicitie of *perfections* imagined by us, in our contemplations of the Godhead; we must stedfastly beleeve, and acknowledge, that He *infinitely is*, what all these severall representations intimate: not by composition, or mixture of *perfections* severally infinite, but by indivisible unitie of independent and illimited *Being*. And as it is a maxime most infallible in naturall philosophie [*Vis unita fortior*] Force, otherwise the same, is alwayes greater united, than being scattered or diffused: so is the metaphysicall extract of it, more eminently true in Divinity. The indivisible unitie of illimited *being* or *perfection*, is, in every respect imaginable, more excellent and soveraigne than all infinite *perfections*, by imagination possibly could be, so they were, though never so strictly, but united. From this fundamentall truth of Gods absolute infinity by indivisible unitie, wee may inferre, He is *powerfull* above all conceit of infinite power, rooted in the same Essence with infinite wisdome, and partaker of all her fruits, but not identically the same with her. *Wise He is*, beyond all conceit of infinite

Sect. 1. finite wiſedome, though ſworne confederate with infinite power, or linked with it, or with other perfectiõs, in any other bond, but not in abſolute identity. *Good* likewiſe *He is* above all poſſible conceit of infinite goodneſſe, though indiſſolubly matched with all other perfections that can bee conceived, vnleſſe they be conceived (as we muſt beleeve in Him they are) different onely in name or mans conceit, but indiviſibly agreeing with it in the internall unity and identity of nature and Eſſence. Laſtly, the immenſitie of his Majeſtie, and infinity of duration, common to his Eſſence and all his Attributes, infinitely exceede all conceit of *infinite* ſucceſſion or extenſion, whoſe parts cannot be actually and indiviſibly the ſame, one with another, or with the whole.

This is the bottomleſſe and boundleſſe Ocean of admiration, wherein contemplative wits may bath themſelves with great delight, but whereinto they cannot dive, without great danger; That the totality of every conceiveable excellency and perfection, ſhould bee contained, after a manner farre more excellent in unity indiviſible, then if their natures, which they hold thus in common, were layd out in ſeverall, without any bounds preſcribed, beſides infinities proper to each kind.

6 But ſeeing our imaginations, have a more ſenſible apprehenſion of greatneſſe, expreſt under the notion of totality or diviſible *infinitie*, then under the conceipt of indiviſible *unitie*; and ſeeing every whole, ſeemes much greater, when it is reſolved into parts, (as a mile by land, whoſe ſeverall quarters

ters or lesse portions, are distinctly represented to our eyes, seemes much longer than two miles by water, whose levell surface affords no distinct representation of parts, or diversity of aspect) it will bee very behoovefull to unfold some principall branches of *being* or *perfection*, whose *infinitie* or totality is eminently contayned in the unity of infinite Being. For being thus sorted by imagination into their severall rancks, like so many numbers in a table ready for addition, the understanding may with admiration guesse at the product, like an Arithmetician, which had gone so farre in Geometricall progression, that he could not number the last and compleat summe; yet acknowledgeth that the progresse in nature, can admit no end or limit. Or though we could thus proceed by addition or multiplication of perfections *in infinitum*, we were still to allow the understanding to use the improovement of the former rule, *Vis unita fortior*: Or to admit the Platonickes conceipt, concerning the *masculine* force of unity in respect of *pluralities* effeminate weakenesse, to be in this point more Orthodoxall than in any.

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Sect. II.

Of the ſeverall branches of abſolute infinitie; or of the infinitie of the Divine Attributes, as they are ſeverally apprehended by us.

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Of divine Immenſitie, or of that branch of abſolute infinitie, whereof infinity in magnitude, or ſpace imaginary is the ſhadow.

1 ORder of nature leads us firſt to explicate two branches of *perfection infinite*, that anſwere unto a kind of *infinitie*, ſo frequent and obvious to our thoughts, that our imaginations will hardly ſuffer it to be ſevered from thoſe ſubjects, which our underſtandings by light of reaſon may, and by the eye of faith, muſt confeſſe to bee finite, to wit, time and place. The cauſe of this difficultie in abſtraction, was ſignified * before to be this. No event there is obſerved by ſenſe, but is husked in the circumſtance of *place* and *time*, whence it is, that theſe two accompany many Phantaſmes, after they be

* Inthe 5. Booke. Section 2.

be winnowed from all the reſt, into the cloſet of the underſtanding. The conceit of mathematicall or metaphyſicall ſpace, is ſo naturally annexed to our imagination of *time* & *place* phyſicall; that albeit reaſon, aſwell as Scripture demõſtrate the world to be, for Phyſicall magnitude, finite; yet our Phantaſies cannot be curbed from running into imaginary locall diſtance, beyond the utmoſt ſurface of this goodly viſible worke of God, yea beyond the heaven of heavens. The Philoſopher, which thought all place or locall diſtance to bee contained within the utmoſt ſphere, it beeing contained in nothing elſe (for *extra cœlum nihil eſt*, was his ſaying) might in congruity have granted, a like termination, or circumſcription of ſucceſſion or time; unto which notwithſtanding our imaginations will not eaſily ſubſcribe. For though our underſtanding oft refute their errour, which deny the beginning of Time; yet our ſenſes ſtill nurſe an imaginary ſucceſſive duration much longer before the creation of this viſible world, than the continuance of it hath beene. And (which is much to bee admired) ſome Schoole-braines have beene ſo puzled in paſſing this unſoundable gulfe, as to ſuſpect that God, which is now in every place of the world created by *Him*, was as truly in theſe imaginary *diſtances* of place and time, before the creation was attempted. Thus have they made *place* commenſurable to his *immenſitie*, and ſucceſſion, or time coequall to his *eternitie*. But what could they anſwere us, if wee ſhould demand, whether this duration, or locall diſtance, wherein they imagine God to have beene

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before the Creation, were created by *Him*, or not? whether they were truly ſomething, or meerely nothing? If they held them to be meerly *nothing*, they ſhould have told us, that they had a reall imagination of an infinite ſpace, which really was not: and therefore could not be truly tearmed imaginary ſpace before the world was created. For it is one thing to imagine an *infinite* ſpace, and another to avouch there was an *infinite* imaginarie ſpace before they could have any imagination of it. Hee that made the world and all that is in it, is not much beholding to thoſe men, for building him an infinite Caſtle, not in the Ayre (which had no being before the Creation) but in *that* which neither then was, nor ſince hath had any being, ſave onely in the vaniſhing imaginations of men which have periſhed. For if this imaginary ſpace were any more than a meere imagination, it was ſurely created by God. Had then this imaginary ſpace another ſpace or diſtance locall, or this imaginary *time* or ſucceſſive *duration*, another *duration*, wherein to be produced? or doe they make this imaginary time or place fully commenſurable to eternitie or immenſitie? If God from eternity had been in any other *infinity* beſides himſelfe, hee could not be ſaid to be incomprehenſible. By this imaginary ſpace no realty can bee truly meant beſides God himſelfe, whom the * Hebrewes enſtyle by the name of *place*, to wit, *infinite*.

* *Axioma hic proponit R. David. Tu reples omnem locum, & comprehendis, & nullo loco comprehenderis, nec ullus te locus complecti, & contineri poteſt. Hinc Hebræi etiã Deum indigitant vocabulo* מָקוֹם *locum, quum dicunt, Benedictus locus* בָּרוּךְ הַמָּקוֹם *Cuius appellationis R. Elias in Tisbite adfert duplicẽ rationem. Quia Deus inſtar loci omnia complectitur, Ipſe autem à nullo comprehenditur.*

Qui autẽ hodie contendunt Deũ eſſe corpus cælo incluſum, minùs rectè ſentiunt, quam Iudæorum Rabbini. Dolendum eſt iſta contraria errata hodie defendi. Quidam diſputant et aſſerunt corpus Chriſti eſſe ubiq; : et tamen negant eſſe ſpiritum præſertim immenſum & infinitum Alij negantes Deum eſſe ſpiritum ſimplicem, faciunt corporeum, & loco circumſcribunt. Coppen in Pſal. 139. ver. 7. Quo ibo à ſpiritu tuo.

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2 But what ſhall wee anſwer unto theſe or the like captious demands of the Atheiſt: If the world, if time, if place, which now are, had not been from everlaſting? where was your God when theſe were not, ſome where, or no where? If nowhere, *Hee* and *Nothing* might be fellow reſidents. In reſpect of eternity or immenſity, no creature, no poſitive eſſence, no numerable part of this Vniverſe is ſo like unto *Him*, as this negation of all things, which we deſcribe by the name of *Nothing*. It hath no beginning or end of dayes. Nothing or the negation of all things, as it is the object of our poſitive conceit, is more like unto *Him* than any *one thing*, in that no diſtinct or proper place of reſidence can bee aſſigned to nothing, or to the negation of all things: Yet moſt *unlike* him, in that it is truly and abſolutely no where, not in it ſelfe. *Non entis, non eſt actio, non eſt qualitas, non conditio,* That which is not can have no capacity to accept any condition of *being*, it can have no right or title to bee termed it ſelfe. We may truly ſay ſome objective conceipts are nothing: but we cannot rightly conceive, that *nothing* ſhould have any degree or kinde of *being*; and want of *being* is the worſt kinde of barrenneſſe that can be imagined. We cannot imagine it ſhould bring forth any degree or ranke of being. It cannot be mother to that which poſſibly may bee; it cannot be nurſe to that which is. But of God wee cannot abſolutely ſay, He was no where, before the world was made; we muſt uſe this limitation [*Hee was no where ſave in Himſelfe:*] But ſuch and ſo in Himſelfe, that He was more than all things, longer

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3 Had the evaporations of proud phantaſticke melancholy, eclipſed the luſtre of his glorious preſence, in that late prodigious Queſtioniſts braine, which would bring us out of the ſunne-ſhine of the Goſpell into old Ægyptian darkneſſe: For as ſome well conjecture, this error of incloſing God in the heavens, and excluding his eſſentiall preſence from this inferiour world, was firſt brought forth in Ægypt, but ſo ill *taken*, as it could not be propagated to many Nations; entertained by few Philoſophers of better ſort, *Ariſtotle* or the Author of the book *de mundo ad Alexandrum*, excepted; from whoſe opinion *Vorſtius* did herein diſſent, that hee held God to be everywhere by his power, and immediate providence: His error notwithſtanding, is exceeding groſſe and unſufferable, in that hee makes his infinite *power*, *wiſedome*, and *goodneſſe*, in whoſe ſweet harmony Divine Providence eſpecially conſiſts,

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ſiſts, but as Agents or Ambaſſadors to his infinite Majeſty: as if his infinite Majeſty only were full *compere* to his Eſſence, unfitting to bee imployed abroad, or to keepe reſidence any where, ſave in the Court of Heaven. Or if his power and wiſedome be joynt aſſeſſors with his Eſſence in the heavens, and yet reach withall unto the earth, unto everie thing within this *Canopy*, which is ſpred betwixt us and his glorious preſence: His *power*, his *wiſedome*, &c. may in ſome ſort be held more infinite than his Eſſence, as being in many places where it is not. But for God to be everywhere here on earth, or in the region under the earth, by his wiſedome, by his power, or by his goodneſſe, is perhaps in his language no more, than that the effects of theſe Attributes are everywhere, that all things as well in earth as in heaven, are eſſentially ſubject to that eternall Law, which he hath appointed them; that every creature doth as conſtantly fulfill his will, and obey his power, in his abſence, as if it were penetrated by his preſence; that the eye of his knowledge pierceth every corner of the world, and ſeeth the ſecrets of mens hearts, as clearly, as if it were reſident in their centers. And in part, unto this purpoſe, ſome great Schoolemen diſtinguiſh the manner of Gods being in all things, by his *eſſence*, by his *power*, by his *preſence*. Let us take it as poſſible to ſuppoſition or imagination, (what by the habit of Chriſtian faith, we are fully perſwaded to bee in it ſelfe impoſſible) what by light of reaſon might bee demonſtrated to imply a manifeſt contradiction to any well-ſettled underſtanding, *viz.* [*That infinite*

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Eſſence or Being it ſelfe ſhould not be every-where eſſentially preſent, or that infinite power ſhould not bee able to reach every poßible effect:] yet ſhould al things that are, be preſent to him, whoſe name, whoſe beſt deſcription is [*I am.*] Nothing could bee done or ſaid without his preſence, that is, without his perfect notice. And in this ſenſe perhaps it hath beene rightly avouched by ſome good Authors, whoſe meaning hath beene much miſtaken, or wilfully perverted by others, *That all things as well future as paſt, are alike preſent to Him, who was every where* (before there was any diſtinction of times;) becauſe nothing can bee ſaid or done, without his perfect knowledge or juſt notice. Nothing can be begun, continued, or finiſhed, without his expreſſe warrant or intuitive permiſſion. He hath a vigilant eye over all things that are, or poſſibly can bee. Or taking it againe as not impoſſible to imagination, that divine knowledge were not ſo truly infinite as we beleeve it is; yet admitting his power to bee truly *infinite*, nothing could be done, ſaid, or intended, without its concourſe, operation, or *aßiſtance.* So that he might be everywhere by his infinite power, albeit his knowledge were not *infinite*; or everywhere by his infinite knowledge, albeit his power were but finite. But by the infallible conſequence of theſe indemonſtrable principles, it will neceſſarily follow, That his Eſſence, being as was ſhewed before, truly *infinite*, nor world, nor time, not place, nor power, nor wiſedome, nor any thing poſſible can be where it is not, it muſt needs be, where any thing is, or poſſibly may be. He is in every center

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of bodily or materiall substances, in every point imaginable of this visible Vniverse, as an essentiall root, whence all and every part of what is besides him spring, without waste or diffusion of his substance, without nutriment or sustentation from any other root or element. The conservation of immateriall or *illocall* substances, is from the benefit of his essentiall presence. Materialls are daily made and renewed by the transient efficacy of his creative power.

4 Doe we make these collections onely, or doth not the Scripture teach this Philosophy also? *Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God farre off? Ier.*23.23. Nothing is, nothing can be without the reach of his power, his omnipotency cannot be confined within the places that are: for his hand hath made them all, not as Prisons to inclose his Essence, not as manicles to hinder the exercise of of his mighty arme. *Can any hide himselfe in secret places, that I shall not see him?* saith the Lord, *Ibid. ver.* 24. This is a formall demand of our assent unto the *infinitie* of his knowledge. These are two speciall, but not the onely wayes of his being every where, which the Scripture teacheth: for there followes a third, which after the manner of our understanding, is the root or foundation of all the rest; *that* indeed, from which the two former branches are most necessarily inferred, *Doe not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord.* Doth He fill heaven and earth by his power, or by his knowledge only? Nay but most properly and in the first place by his essentiall presence. For his *Essence* is infinitely po-

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werfull, infinitely wise.

His filling the earth as well as heaven, by his essentiall presence, cannot be denyed but from one of these two reasons following.

Either, That his *Essence* is altogether uncapable of intimate coexistence, with such grosse and base creatures, as the parts of this inferiour world:

Or else, Because it is his will, to abstract or withhold his essentiall presence from them.

To affirme the former part, to wit, That his nature is uncapable of intimate coexistence with any nature created by Him, is to deny his *omnipotency*; as all, by necessary consequence, doe, which grant not the immensity of his Essence. For what can withstand or withdraw his Essence from piercing the earth, as well as heaven? Not the hardnesse of it, not the loathsomnesse of the vile bodies contained in it. If either of these qualities, or ought besides, could deny the admission of his essentiall presence, he were not omnipotent, because not able to place his Essence in that locall space, in which, were it filled with more subtill or more glorious bodies, it might as well reside, as in the heavens. Suppose he should (as no doubt he is able) annihilate the earth, and create a new heaven in the space wherein it now is, or demolish his present heavenly seat, or turne it into a baser masse then this earth is; were it not possible for him to be in this new heaven by his essentiall presence, or should he be neither in it, nor in the new earth? If hee could not be here, he were in this respect more impotent than the Angels, who can change their mansions when they mislike them.

5 Shall

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5 Shall wee then take the latter part of the former division, and say, It is his will and pleasure to withdraw his Essence from this lower roome of his own Edifice, whiles it remaines so ill garnished, as now it is? If he have made heaven his habitation by choice, not by necessity of his immensity, with which all places, as wee contend, must necessarily be filled; hee might relinquish it by the like free choice of some other mansion, which he could make for himselfe as pleasant and beautifull: yea He might by the like freedome of will, come and dwell with us here on earth. So that in conclusion, he which admitteth Gods will to be free, but denies the absolute immensity of his Essence, makes him capable of locall motion or migration from place to place. And such motion necessarily includeth mutability, which is altogether incompatible with infinity. Reason grounded on Scripture, will warrant us to conclude from the former principle, that hee which hath no cause of being, can have no limits of being, no bounds beyond which it cannot be. Essence or *being* illimited cannot possibly bee distinguished by severalties of internall perfections, though united: much lesse can it bee distinguished or limited by any place, whether reall or imaginarie. In that he is the authorlesse Author of all *being*, it is altogether as impossible for Him not to be in every thing that is, as it is for any thing to be without Him. The indivisible unity of his infinite *Essence* is the center and supporter of all things, the conservation of place, and that which holdeth things divisible from resolving into nothing.

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6 *Dominus ipse est Deus in cœlo sursum & in terra deorsum: The Lord* (saith *Moses*) *hee is God in heaven above, and in the earth below, Deut.* 4. 39. yet saith *Salomon*, 1 *King.* 8 27. *Behold the heavens, and the heavens of heavens are not able to containe thee.* May we say then, Hee is as truly without the heavens, as he is in them? or that he is where nothing is with Him? surely, he was when nothing was, and then hee was where nothing was besides himselfe. Or peradventure before the creation of all things numerable, there neither was *when* nor *where*, but only an incomprehensible perfection of indivisible immensity and eternity; which would still be the same, though neither heaven nor earth, nor any thing in them should any more *be*. We may not so place him without the heavens, as to cloath him with any imaginary space, or give the checke to his immensity by any parallell distance locall. But hee is said to be without the heavens, in as much as his infinite *Essence* cannot be contained in them, but necessarily containes them. Hee is so without them, or if you will, beyond them, that albeit a thousand more Worlds were stowed by His powerfull hand each above other, and all above this; Hee should by vertue of His infinite *Essence*, not by free choyce of will, or mutation of place, bee as intimately coexistent to every part of them, as Hee now is to any part of this Heaven and Earth which wee see. This attribute of Divine *immensitie* was acknowledged, and excellently expressed by many of the Ancient Philosophers, but most pithily

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thily by some of the Ancient Fathers. Before all things, saith * *Tertullian*, God was alone, and hee was to himselfe, *world, place*, and all things. The manner of his coexistence with the world, * *Philo* the Iew well expressed: God filleth all things, yet is contained in none, containing all. The vicinity of His Essence preserveth their Essences more truly than the Symbolizing qualities of their naturall places doe. And even this efficacy of symbolizing or preserving qualities, flowes as immediately from his essentiall presence, as the passive aptitude of bodies preserved by them, doth. The more the places are through which bodies naturall swiftly move, the lesse properly they are in them. In analogie to this condition of naturall bodies, the more capable man is of all knowledge, the more lyable his capacity is to distraction, as consisting rather in united perfections, than in firme or indivisible unitie of *perfection*. And therefore it is often said of most pregnant wits, *qui ubiq; est, nusquam est*, He that is every where, is no where. Or he that ingageth himselfe to all courses of life, goeth through with none. But of God, who is perfection it selfe, not by aggregation, but by absolute unity of Essence; that of Saint *Bernard* is most admirably verefied, *Nusquam est, & ubiq; est*, He is no where, because no place whether reall or imaginary can comprehend or containe him: He is every where, because no body, no space, or spirituall substance can exclude his presence, or avoyd the penetration of his Essence. But Saint *Gregories* Character of Gods ubiquitarie presence and immensity, is more

* *Ante omnia enim Deus erat solus, ipse sibi & mundus & locus, & omnia. Solus autem, quia nihil aliud extrinsecus praeter illum. Caeterum ne tunc quidem solus: habebat enim secum quam habebat in semetipso, rationem suæ scilicet. Tertul. adversus Praxean. cap. 5.*

* *De confusione linguarum.*

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lively and full. *Deus eſt intra omnia non incluſus, extra omnia non excluſus, ſupra omnia non elatus*; God is within all things, yet not ſhut up, or incloſed in them; he is without all things, yet not excluded from them; he is above all things, yet not elevated or exalted by them; hee is below all things, yet not burdened or depreſſed by them. *Greg. in Pſal.* 139.

7 *Anſelmus* notwithſtanding (had not long cuſtome or generall conſent preſcribed too ſtrōgly againſt him) would have reformed this kinde of ſpeech, *Deus eſt in omni loco*, God is in every place, by changing one particle, *Deus eſt cum omni loco*, God is with every place. This Criticiſme of his, though well approved by ſome good writers, whileſt they diſpute againſt ſuch as ſay God was every where, before any place was, yet (in my opinion) the uſe of it, were it as common as the other, which he ſought by this to correct, would conceale much matter of admiration, (which the deſcription of immenſitie uſed by Saint *Bernard* and others promptly ſuggeſts) if not occaſion or ſuggeſt an erroneous imagination of coextenſion in the Divine Eſſence. The bodies which are contained in places, are truly ſaid to be with the places which containe them, and the places with them; and wee may diſtributively averre, that every body is with every place, and every bodily ſubſtance is with its mathematicall dimenſions, in the ſame place with it. But ſo to be in every place, in every leaſt part of every body, as not to bee contained in any or all of them, though we ſhould multiply them *in infinitū*,

doth

doth exclude all conceipt or coextension with thē, and much better notifie the indivisible unitie of Gods immensity, & the incōprehensiblenes of his essentiall presence, than if wee should say hee were with every place. But as no Characters of the incomprehensible Essences ubiquitary presence doe so well befit it, as these that intimate more to our cogitations than we can in words expresse: So of this kinde I have found none, from which I have received so full instruction, or reaped the like fruits of admiration, as from that of *Trismegist, Deus est sphæra, cujus Centrum est ubiq;, cujus peripheria nusquam,* God is a sphere, whose Center is everywhere, whose circumference is no where. Not the least particle of this universall Globe or sphere, but is supported by the indivisible unity of his Essence, as by an internall Center. And yet neither the utmost circumference of this visible world, nor any circumference conceiveable, can so circumscribe or comprehend his essentiall presence, that it might be said, thus farre it reacheth and no further. For albeit hee would crowne the convexity of these Heavens with others, so much higher and more spacious, than these Heavens, as these are than the Earth, and continue this course unto the worlds end: yet all should be comprehended in his Essence; it could not be comprehended in any. Their circumference should still be some where, whereas his Essence, though still inlarging (by this supposed daily exercise of his power) the bounds of its actuall coexistence with these new creatures, is in it selfe altogether boundlesse. Omnipotencie it selfe, cannot Cap. 5.

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8 Two points notwithstanding in the former resemblance seeme difficult to mens conceips; but more difficult it is fully to expresse what may rightly be conceived concerning them. The former difficulty is, how a Center should bee conceived to bee every where: the second, how the indivisibility of Gods presence in every place, should bee compared unto a Center. To the former it may be sayd, That as the divine Essence by reason of its absolute *infinitie*, hath an absolute necessity of coexistence with space or magnitude infinite: so were it possible there should bee (as some Divines hold it possible there may bee) a magnitude or materiall sphere actually infinite; this magnitude could have no set point for its Center, but of every point designable in it, wee might avouch this is the Center as well as that. Every point should have the negative properties of a sphæricall Center; there could be no inequality betweene the distances of severall points from the circumference of that which is infinite, and hath no bounds of magnitude. To the second difficultie it may bee said, The manner of divine presence or coexistence to every place or parcell of bodies visible, is rightly compared unto a

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Center, in that it hath no diverſitie of parts, but is indiviſibly preſent to all and every part of things diviſible. His *preſence* againe is herein like to magnitude actually *infinite*, in that it can have no circumference. But whether the divine Eſſence may have as perfect actuall coexiſtence to every point or Center, as it hath to every leaſt portion of magnitudes diviſible, cannot ſo cleerely bee inferred from the indiviſibility of divine immenſity, becauſe the indiviſibility of Centers or points, and of ſpirituall ſubſtances are Heterogeneall, and Heterogenealls are oft-times *aſſymmetrall*, that is, not exactly commenſurable. Hence the moſt ſubtill Schoolemen or metaphyſicall Divines, as well ancient as moderne, reſolve it as a point irreſoluble by humane wit, whether a mathematicall point or Center can be the compleat and *definitive* place of an Angell; albeit they hold the Angelicall natures to be as truly indiviſible, as points or Centers are. But it is one thing for an immateriall or ſpirituall Eſſence to have true coexiſtence with every Center, another to be confined to a Center, or to have a definitive place or coexiſtence in it. And whatſoever may bee thought of Angells; of the Divine Eſſence we may ſay, that he is as properly in every Center as in every place, ſeeing wee acknowledge *Him* to be alike incomprehenſibly and indiviſibly in both. The manner of his indiviſibility wee conceive by his coexiſtence to a Center. His incomprehenſibleneſſe, by his coexiſtence to all ſpaces or places imaginable, without coextenſion to any, without comprehenſion in all. We may in no caſe

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imagine, that there is more of God, or that God is more fully in a great space than in a little; in the whole world, than in a man or little world. For this once granted, an Asses head should participate the essentiall presence of the Deity in greater measure than a mans heart doth. But in what respects God is said to bee more specially present in one place than in another, or to be present with some, and absent from others: hereafter.

9 The absolute perfection of this Attribute, in whose right apprehension or conceipt many other divine perfections, according to our manner of conceiving them, are as it were couched or lodged, may best be gathered by opposition to the imperfections of bodies or materiall magnitudes. A body though of Homogeneall nature, suppose a Pole or stone fixed in the earth, invironed *above* with water and the ayre, can have no coexistence with these divers bodies, otherwise than according to the diversity of its owne parts: that part of it which hath coexistence with the ayre, can have no coexistence with the earth or water. Farre otherwise it is in God, whose absolute infinity in that it is not composed of parts, but consists in perfect unity, cannot bee coexistent to any place after any other manner than *He* is coexistent to all, that is, by indivisible unity or identity. Whersoever *Hee* is (and *Hee* is every where,) *He* is *unity* it selfe, *infinity* it selfe, *immensitie* it selfe, *perfection* it selfe, *power* it selfe. All these branches of quantity, in which we seeke to ingraffe so many sorts of *infinities*, thereby to expresse or resemble *His* incomprehensible nature,

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doe flow from participation of his infinite preſence. Vnleſſe *Hee* were *infinitie* or *immenſitie* it ſelfe, there could bee no magnitude, no meaſure quantitative, by whoſe multiplication we could in any ſort gather or gueſſe what *immenſitie* or *infinitie* meant. That imaginary *infinitie* which wee conceive by ſucceſſion or compoſition of parts (for their ſeverall extenſions finite, though in number infinite) is but a tranſient raye or beame of that actuall and ſtable infiniteneſſe, which *He* poſſeſſeth in perfect unitie, without any imaginary diverſity of parts united. Had his *immenſity* any diverſity of parts, there ſhould be more power in many parts, thã in one, or few: unto the ful exerciſe of his whole power or force, there ſhould be a concurrence of all parts required: & this concurrence of parts in number *infinite*, would perhaps bee impoſſible. *Infinitũ tranſire non poteſt.* At the leaſt, were divine power ſo lodged in divine immenſitie, as ſtrength or power is in our bodily faculties, it could not bee ſo omnipotent, as we beleeve it is. Our ſtrength or force is alwaies increaſed by unition or contraction of ſeveral parts: His power can receive no increaſe ſeeing his immenſitie excludes all diviſion, & doth not ſo properly include, but rather properly is, Vnity it ſelfe. Cap. 5.

10 The Prophets and other holy men in their patheticall expreſſions ſometime ſpeake of God as farre abſent, becauſe his powerfull preſence is not manifeſted in ſuch ſort as they could wiſh. *Oh that thou wouldſt rend the Heavens* (ſaith the Prophet *Eſay*, *c.* 64. 1) *that thou wouldeſt come downe, that the mountaines might flow down at thy preſence: As when*

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the melting fire burneth, the fire causeth the waters to boile : to make thy name knowne to thine adversaries, that the Nations may tremble at thy presence. When thou diddest terrible things which wee looked not for, thou camest downe, the mountaines flowed downe at thy presence. But to indoctrinate us, that this description of his powerfull presence did include no dogmaticall assertion of his locall descent, no denyal of his being everywhere, or filling every place by his essentiall presence: the same Prophet elsewhere pictures out his *immensity* to us under the shape of a Gyant able to squeeze the whole Globe of Heaven, Earth and waters; *Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand? and meted out heaven with his span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in his three fingers* (after such a manner as men take up dust or sand) *and weighed the mountaines in scales, and the hills in a ballance?* Esay 40.12. *Behold, the Nations are as a drop of a Bucket, and are counted as the small dust of the Ballance. Behold, he taketh up the Isles as a very little thing. All Nations before him are as nothing, and they are accounted to him lesse than nothing and vanity*, ver. 15.17. Thus hee linketh his essentiall presence with his power and knowledge. *Why sayest thou O Iacob, and speakest O Israel; My way is hid from the Lord, and my Iudgement is passed over from my God? Hast thou not knowne? hast thou not heard, that the everlasting God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the Earth fainteth not, neither is wearie? there is no searching of his understanding.* vers. 27, 28. Yet Iob in his anguish had almost said as *Iacob* did; *O that*

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I knew where I might find him! that I might come even to his ſeat! I would know the words which he would anſwer me, & underſtand what he would ſay unto me. Behold, I go forward but he is not there, and backward but I cannot perceive him: On the left hand where he doth worke, but I cannot behold him: he hideth himſelfe on the right hand, that I cannot ſee him. Iob 23. 3, 5, 8, 9. But though he might hide himſelfe from *Iob*, yet could not *Iob* hide himſelfe or his wayes from him: for ſo he confeſſeth in the next words, *He knoweth the way which I take.* verſ. 10. *Whither ſhall I goe* (ſaith the Pſalmiſt) *from thy Spirit? or whither ſhall I flye from thy preſence? If I aſcend up into Heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in Hell, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermoſt parts of the Sea; even there ſhall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand ſhall hold me, &c. Pſal.* 139. *verſ.* 7, 8, 9, 10. *Thou haſt poſſeſt my reines; thou haſt covered me in my mothers wombe.* Theſe and the like ſtraines of other godly men, argue a ſympathy of Gods eſſentiall preſence, not onely invironing their bodies, but penetrating their ſoules, and diffuſed through their hearts. His coexiſtence with all, his eſſentiall preſence or inhabitation in all, is the ſame, although the worldly minded take no notice of it. And when it is ſaid, that he *beholdeth* or *knoweth* the ungodly *afarre off*, this language fitly expreſſeth their conceit of him, and of his eſſence. They conſider not, that hee is alwayes neere unto them, alwayes about them, alwayes within them, but in heaven onely, whither their thoughts ſeldome aſcend. And according to

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Of Eternitie, or of that branch of absolute infinity, whereof succesive duration or the imaginarie infinity of time is the modell.

1  Hatsoever hath beene, or rightly may be conceived of divine immensity, will in proportion as well suit unto eternity. And unto this Divine Attribute is that of *Tertullian* as applyable: [*Ante omnia Deus erat solus, & erat sibi tempus, mundus, & omnia:*] *Before all things were, God was, and he was unto himselfe time, the world, and all things else.* We cannot properly say, He was in time before he made the world. For as Saint *Augustine* acutely collects, if he which alwayes is, and was, and is to come, had alwayes beene in time; hee could not have beene before all times, nor could he be, as we beleeve he is, as truly before all times future, as before all times past. His eternity then, is the inexhaustible fountain or infinit Ocean, from which time or duratiõ succesive (in what finite substances soever they be seated,) with all their severall branches or appurtenances, do perpetually flow; and unto eternity, they have if not the same proportion,

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tion, yet the ſame references, the ſame dependances on it, which finite and created magnitudes have to Divine immenſitie. *As there was from all eternity a poſſibility for us to bee before we were; ſo our actuall being or exiſtence, whileſt it laſteth, is compoſed of a *capacity* to be what wee are, and of the *actuation* or filling of this capacity. Life (ſenſitive eſpecially) is but the motion or progreſſe of this capacity towards that which fills it, or as it were a continuall ſucking in of preſent exiſtence, or continuation of actuall being, from ſomewhat præexiſtent. Vnleſſe the vegetables, by which our life is continued, had exiſtence before they become our nutriment, they could not poſſibly nouriſh us, or continue us in that eſtate of being which we have. Nor could theſe vegetables themſelves exiſt, unleſſe they did draw their exiſtence or continuation of their being, from that which did every way exiſt before them; and unto which they doe by motion or continuation of their being approch. So that future times, and all things contained in time it ſelfe, preſuppoſe a fountaine of life, as truly præexiſtent to their future terminations or motions, as it was to their beginnings. That deſcription of time [*tempus edax rerum*,] *as if it were the devourer of all things which are ſubject to alteration*, did relliſh more of poeticall wit, than of any metaphyſicall truth. For if time did devoure all things which are brought forth in time, what is it that could poſſibly nouriſh them, or continue their *being* from their beginning to their end? whileſt the time appointed for them laſts, they cannot poſſibly be conſumed

* *Vide Tertul. in Apologet. cap.* 48

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ſumed or periſh. Nothing there is that doth or can deſire its owne deſtruction, nor long after the preſence or fruition of that, which doth devoure or deſtroy it. All things naturally deſire the continuation of ſuch being, as they have; which notwithſtanding things temporall cannot have, but from the continuation or fruition of time. Time then it is not, but their owne motions or endeavors to injoy or entertaine time approching, which doth waſt or conſume things temporall. We naturally ſeeke to catch time, and it is the nature of time, though continually caught, not to be held by us. This nimbleneſſe of time, is ſo like unto the ſwift progreſſe of motion, that ſome acknowledge no difference at all betweene them. Whereas in true Philoſophy, the length of time paſſing by us, is onely notified by motion. Motion in true obſervation goes one way, and drives time another, as the ſtreame which runnes Eaſtward, turnes the wheele Weſtward. Our actuall being or exiſtence ſlides from us with time, and our capacity of being, continuing ſtill the ſame, runnes on ſtill, being alwayes internally moved with deſire of *actuation* or *repleniſhment*. And this repleniſhment cannot otherwiſe bee gotten, than by gaining a new coexiſtence with time approaching, whoſe office, deſigned by *Eternity*, it is to repaire the ruines which motions preſent or paſt have wrought in our corruptible ſubſtances. The beſt of our life, the very being of things generable (as * *Plotinus* excellently obſerves) is but as a continuall draught or *receipt* of *being* from the inexhauſtible fountaine of life. Nature, ſaith he, (meaning

* *A rebus generalibus ſi abſtuleris ipſum erit*;

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ning the nature of things generable) haſtens unto that being which is to come, nor can it reſt, ſeeing it drawes or ſuckes in that being which it hath by doing now this and now that, being moved as it were in a circle with deſire of Eſſence or of Being what it is. Nor are we men, or any creatures (ſpecially generable) permitted to draw or ſuck ſo much of our proper being from the fountaine of *Eternity*, at once, or in any one point of time, as wee liſt. We have our portions of life or ſelfe-fruition diſtributed piece-meale and ſparingly unto us, leſt too much put into our hands at once, might make us prodigall of the whole ſtocke. As many yonglings by their parents too much bounty towards them, whileſt their experience is ſmall, overthrow themſelves and their poſterity. And nimbleſt wits, for the moſt part, runne through largeſt fortunes in leaſt time; uſually ſhortning their dayes by taking up pleaſures (due in their ſeaſon) beforehand, ſeeking as it were to enjoy the fruits of many yeeres duration all at once. Whereas fruition of delights and pleaſures ſhould be meaſured by the capacity of our eſtate or condition; as wiſe men fit their expences according to the tenour of their revennues.

2 Albeit the conſtant motion of the *Sunne* and *Moone* be appointed by the Creator as a common ſtandard for the meaſuring of all times: yet every thing temporall, or endowed with duration mea-

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cum in perpetuâ acquiſitione verſentur, ſubitò non eſſe contingit. Rebus autem, quæ non ſunt tales, ſi ipſum erit adiunxeris, accidit à ſede ipſius eſſe labi. Manifeſtum enim ex hoc fuerit, ipſum eſſe non eſſe illis innatum, ſi fiat ex eo quod futurum ſit, & factum fuerit, & ſit in poſterum faciendum. Videtur enim in rebus generabilibus id potiſſimum eſſentia eſſe, ſcilicet tractus quidam ab ipſo eſſe ex genera-

tionis initio, quouſque ad temporis extrema perveniat, quando non ſit ulterius, idque ipſum quod dicitur, eſt in eis exiſtere, ac ſi quis quicquam ex hoc ductu circumcidat, vitæ cõminui. Quapropter & eſſe diminui, & univerſo quidẽ eſſe eiuſmodi oportet, quouſq; ſic erit. Quemobrẽ ad ipſum eſſe futurum natura feſtinat, neq; vult quieſcere, quippe cum eſſe ſibi hauriat, dum aliud quiddã atq; aliud agit, moveturq; in orbem quodã eſſentiæ deſiderio. Plot. Emead. 3. p. 328.

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surable by the motion of the heavens, hath its proper time, which in all of them is no other than a participation of eternity. And hee should define the severall branches of time most exactly, that could number or decipher the several *actuations, draughts* or *repleniſhments*, which are derived from the infinite fountaine of life and being, to fill the capacities, or satiate the internall desires of things temporall. And albeit the motion of the heavens bee constant and uniforme; yet the duration of things temporall or sublunary (though measured by their constant motion) is capable of internall contraction and dilatation. Some things have a kinde of a double duration, and runne a course of time as it were indented. Life, albeit in it selfe most sweet, yet in us is often charged with so * great a measure of sowre occurrences, that were it at all or most times, as some whiles it is, the fruition of it could not quit the paines we are put to in preserving it. And the worse our estate is, the longer it seemeth to bee such, because vitall existence or duration, through distraction of minde, or vehement motion, seemeth divided into more parts, then without such impulsions it could take notice of. In griefe or paine wee strive to thrust time present apace from us, that some other may come better attended. In delight or pleasure wee seeke to arrest it, and wish to have our joyfull moments fixed, or to have them still to returne and goe, so that wee might prolong our dayes by living the same times over and over again, as men often walke longer in pleasant gardens, then in vast fields, by often resuming the same short walkes.

*See Ecclesiasticus 41.2.

walkes. Were it poſſible for us to ſtay thoſe grate-full parcels of time, till new ones come with like ſupply; the current of pleaſure, thus damnd vp, would ſwell; and our fruition of ſuch imperfect exiſtence as we have, would be much more perfect and entire. But ſeeing the pleaſure of borrowed life, is to the identity of being, but as water to the pipe, through which it runnes; all the remedy we have againſt welcome times departing from us, is to regaine the like, and make up the unity of our exiſtence or ſelfe-fruition by equivalency. The gluts or guſhes of pleaſure, may at one time be much greater than at another, yet ſtill tranſient, never conſiſtent. The fruition of them cannot poſſibly be entire: begotten and dying in every moment; they are, and they are not in a manner, both at once; ſo that we loſe them as we gaine them. Cap. 6.

3 The Angelicall natures, albeit they account not the continuation of their duration, nor number the portions of their participation of eternity, by the motion of the heavens, as being not fed with expectance of that time or ſucceſſion, whoſe opportunities wee watchfully attend: yet their deſires (more fervent by much then we have any) to continue what they are, witneſs they have not all that in preſent poſſeſſion, wch is allotted to their compleat duration. *Nothing*, being the foundation as well of angelicall excellẽcies, as of our mediocrities, makes them uncapable of that entire ſelfe-fruition, which is eſſentiall to him which made thẽ of *nothing*, being made of none. He, as he is of himſelfe without beginning, ſo is he entirely in himſelfe, & can acquire

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tion of plurality, from things decreed. As Hee is said Everlasting with reference to the perpetuity of succession, which still supposeth his interminate existence, as present to the whole and every part of it. Consider *him* in himselfe, and He is every way indivisibly infinite, and interminable; not onely because Hee had no beginning, nor shall have ending: For so might time or motion bee held terminable, could the Heavens have beene created from Everlasting; whose revolutions nevertheless or successive parts of motion, should have beene truly numerable, and therefore terminable; whence whatsoever had beene contained within their circuit, should still have gotten somewhat which before it had not, either addition of duration, or (which is all one) continuance of their first existence, or some new Acts of life, of sense, or reason. But unto Essence infinite, none of these can accrue. If they could, as yet He should not bee, nor ever could He be actually eternall, but everlasting onely by succession. For Eternity, as *Boetius* hath well defined it, *is the entire or totall possession of interminable life, all at once or together.* Howbeit these termes of totall fruition or possession, may seeme to include some parts, though not in the life possessed, yet in the possession of it; which (I take it) was farre from this good Authors meaning. What meant he then to use such tearmes? onely to exclude succession, which hath a totality of Being, but not altogether, or all at once. As the next houre, and whatsoever shall have successive duration in it, shall bee wholly and fully existent; but so as one part shall Cap. 6.

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goe before, another come after. So is not that duration which is interminable. But in what ſenſe *totalitie* is attributed to *eſſence* or *duration infinite*, will better appeare in the iſſue of theſe explications. This definition of *Boetius*, though conceived in ſuch tearmes as might miniſter occaſion of wrangling in ſubtile diſputes; doth notwithſtanding imprint a more lively character or notion of the Everliving God his infinite happineſſe, than *Aquinas* definition doth, though very artificiall: [*Æternitas eſt duratio manens, uniformis, ſine principio, et fine, menſurâ carens,*] *Eternitie, is a duration uniforme, and permanent, without beginning or end, uncapable of meaſure.*

4 But * *Plotin* (in mine opinion) gives a more deepe and full apprehenſion of it in fewer tearmes; [*Æternitas eſt vita infinita*] *Eternitie is infinitie of life.* And ſuch we gather it to bee; becauſe it is the univerſity or totality of life, and can loſe nothing, in that nothing of it is paſt, nothing to come. He addes withall, that theſe termes of *Being, All, whole,* or *loſing nothing*, are added onely for explication of that, which is ſufficiently contained in theſe words, *Infinite life.* In the ſame Treatiſe he excellently obſerves, when we ſay, *That is Eternal*, which *alwayes is:* (as the Greeke αἰὼν *verbatim* ſignifies) this * *alway*, is added for declaration ſake, and yet being aſſumed to expreſſe the uncorruptibleneſſe,

* *Ac ſi quis æternitatem ita deſcripſerit, ſcilicet vitam iam infinitam ex eo quod ſit univerſa; nihilq; amittat, cum nihil vel præterierit, vel ſit futurum; alioquin iam tota non eſſet: is profectò proximè ad definitionem eius accedet. Quod enim deinceps ſubditur, ſcilicet totã eſſe, nihilq; amittere, expoſitio quædam eſt eius, quod dicebatur, ſcilicet (vita iam infinita) Plotin. Emead. 3. lib. 7. cap. 4. p. 329.*

* *Non aliud quiddam eſt ens, aliud vero ſemper ens, ſicut neq; aliud eſt Philoſophus aliud vero Philoſophus verus. Verumtamen quia nonnulli Philoſophiam ſimulant adiunctim eſt Philoſophus verus. Sic et enti ipſum ſemper et ipſi ſemper adiungitur Ens, adeò ut dicatur αεὶ ον .i. ſemper ens, unde dicitur æon .i. ævum. Quapropter ſic accipiendum eſt ipſum ſemper tum ente, ut vere ens nobis ſignificet. Plotin. Emead. 3. lib. 7. cap. 4. p. 329.*

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or indeficiency of that which is *Eternall*; it breeds a wandring imagination of plurality or diuisibility of duration. The best medicine, by his prescription, for purging our braines of this erroneous fancy, were to enstyle *Eternity* onely with the name of *Entitie* or *Being*. But as *being* is a name sufficient to expresse *Essence*, and *Essence* it selfe, or *essence* independent a full expression of *Eternity*: yet because some Philosophers comprise generation, or the *being* of things generable under the name of Essence, it was behoovefull for our better instruction, to say, *that is Eternall*, which alwayes is, & cannot cease to be. Whereas in true Philosophicall contemplation, it is not one thing, *truly* to bee, and alwaies to *Be*. There is no greater difference betwixt these two, than to be a Philosopher, and to be a true Philosopher. Now there can be no truth in saying, he is a Philosopher, who is no true Philosopher, for [*ens & verum convertuntur*] *The Entity of every thing necessarily includes the truth of every thing*. Notwithstanding because some doe counterfeit Philosophy, or falsly usurpe the name of Philosophers; we give the title with an addition to such as wel deserue it, & enstyle them, by way of *difference* frō the others, *true Philosophers*. And in like manner, when we say, *That is eternall*, which alwayes is; we seeke to notifie no more by this universall note, *Alwaies*, then that it hath a true and no counterfeit, no second-hand or dependent *Being*.

An other secondarie and subordinate use of the universall signe, *alwayes*, added to *entity*, is, to intimate the interminable, indistinguishable *and indi-*

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viſible power, which needeth nothing beſides that which it actually and for the preſent hath. Now it hath *All*, that is or can bee, in that it truly *Is*: for true *entitie* is abſolute *totality*, and unto totalitie, nothing is wanting. But that which is in time comprehended, how perfect or totall ſoever it may bee in its kinde, beſides other wants, alway needs ſomewhat to come, never fully beſped of time. On the contrary that which ſo is, as it needs no after *being*, and cannot be brought within the liſts of time, either determinate or in ſucceſſion infinite, but now hath whatſoever is expedient to bee had: this is that, which our notion of Eternity hunteth after. That which thus is, hath not its Eſſence or Being delivered unto it enwrapt in quantity; but is precedent to all quantity or menſuration. Farre otherwiſe have things generable their *being*, as it were ſpun out from diviſibility. The very firſt being which they have ſuppoſeth quantity, and as much as is cut off from the *draught* or extenſion of their duration, ſo much they loſe of their being or perfection.

5 Ignorance of this Plotinicall Philoſophie hath much perplext ſome Logitians, queſtioning *whether Socrates* in the inſtant of his diſſolution or corruption, be a man, or corps, or both. To be both implyes a contradiction; theſe two Negative propoſitions being ſimply convertible, No corps can be a man, no man can be a corps. And yet there is as much reaſon, that he ſhould in this inſtant bee both as either. For true reſolution we are to ſay, He was a man, and ſhall be a corps, or he ceaſeth to bee the

the one, and begins to be the other. But the Being or existence of both being mensurable by time, must needs bee divisible, and for this reason, not comprehensible by an *instant* which is indivisible. But *Plotins* conclusion is, whilest wee seeke to fit that which truly is, with any portion of measure or degree of quantity, the life of it being thus divided by us, loseth its indivisible nature; Wee must then leave it (as it is) *indivisible*, aswell in life or operation, as in Essence, and yet infinite in both. Cap. 6.

Of time, no part truly is, but the present, which is never the same; and as one questioned (in that age wherein the Art of Navigation was imperfect) whether Navigators were to be reckoned amongst the dead or the living: so is it more doubtfull then determinable, whether time participate more of being, or of not being; yet as is time, such is the nature of things brought forth in time. But *Eternity* (being the duration of *Him* who onely *Is*, being made of none, but Maker of all things, and the dispenser of time it selfe into its portions) as * *Ficinus* describes it, is a fixed instant or permanent Center, which needes no succession for supply; *all-sufficient* to support it selfe, and all things else. The same writer not unfitly compares *Eternitie* to a Center in a Circle; and time to the points or extremities of the lines in the Circumference, alwayes so moving about the Center, that were it an *eye*, it might view them all at once. Yet must we not hold *Eternity* to bee indivisible, after the same manner that points or Centers are. These are indivisible, because they want the perfection of that

* *Ad 7 Plotin lib. Ennead. 3.*

Sect. 2. quantity, whoſe parts they couple. *Eternitie* is indiviſible by poſitive *infinitie*, as containing all the parts or perfections poſſible of ſucceſſion in a more eminent manner, than they can be contained in time it ſelfe, which (as *Plato* wittily obſerves) is a moveable image of *Eternity*. This difference betwixt the indiviſibility of an inſtant or moment, and Eternity, may perhaps make the ſolution of that ſeeming contradiction leſſe difficult then it is to ſome great Schoolemens apprehenſions: [*Petrus in æternitate ægrotat, Et, Petrus in æternitate nõ ægrotat,*] *Peter is ſicke in eternity, Peter is not ſicke in eternity*. This affirmation & denyall, in one and the ſame indiviſible inſtant or limited portion of time, would inferre an indiviſible contradiction, which in Eternity they doe not. And yet is Eternity more indiviſible than an inſtant, but indiviſible after another manner.

6 But I know not how it comes to paſſe, that the true ſhadow of perfection it ſelfe, is oft-times more apparant in things moſt imperfect. Natures more perfect (by a borrowed perfection) hold the meane betwene them; Out of both wee may ſpell more than we can put together, for right expreſſing the nature of perfectiõ it ſelfe. The prime matter, though of things created moſt imperfect, is of creatures ſublunary, moſt like unto the Creator, in being ingenerable and incorruptible; in that it is the *Alpha* whence all things generable ſpring, and the *Omega* into which they are reſolved: Yet is the prime matter moſt contrary to its Maker, in that wherein it doth reſemble Him. It is in a ſort or man-

manner, all things generable, but perfectly nothing, as wanting the true unity of Entity, or determinate Being. The Creator or Eſſence it ſelfe, is the incomprehenſible perfection of all things, without participation of their imperfections. The earth againe is like the Eternall Founder in permanency and immobility, but this it hath from its naturall dulneſſe; whereas the perfection of this ſhadow is in Him from the infinite vigour of his vitality. The ſwift motions of the Heavens, or motion as ſwift as we may imagine, is as a middle tearme of proportion between the Earths immobility, and the ſupermotion, or more then infinite mobility of the Deitie, which we tearme the infinite vigour of his vitality. *Inſtants* in this are moſt like *Eternity*, in that an infinite number of them added together, yeelds no increaſe of quantity: Nor doth Eternity receive addition from ſucceſſion infinite, which moſt unlike it in being diviſible, doth yet better expreſſe the poſitive infinity of it, then *inſtants* can doe. Eternity againe, is like a fixed Center, becauſe indiviſibly immutable; yet withall moſt like a circle. And *Triſmegiſts* deſcription of the Deity, *commutatis commutandis*, as well exemplifies the Eternity, as the immenſity of his nature. Eternity is a circular duration, whoſe *inſtants* are, *alwaies*, whoſe *terminations* or *extremities* never *were*, never *ſhall be*: It is coexiſtent to every parcell of time, but not circumſcriptible by any: ſucceſſion infinite cannot be coequall to it. For albeit the motion of the Heavens, or other notifications of duration diviſible, ſhould continue the ſame, without interruption or End: Cap. 6.

Sect. 2. yet every period and draught of time, we can imagine, ſhall ſtill fall within Eternity, now totally exiſtent; and which hath beene, is, and ever will be unto every minute or ſcruple of time, that hath beene, is, or ſhall be, alike everlaſtingly coexiſtent, not by acquiſition of any new ſucceſsive parts, but by indiviſible and interminable unity.

7 We cannot perhaps properly ſay, that God ſhall be after all times or durations to come; for duration muſt flow from *His Everlaſting Being* without end. And what can be after that which hath no end? And here we ſuppoſe, that albeit time or duration ſucceſsive had their actuall beginning wth the creatures: yet there ſhal be, or may be, if not a time, yet ſome duration ſucceſſively infinite. And that onely is after this manner, infinite, unto which ſomewhat of the ſame kinde may ſtill bee added. Thus, as in the continued and diviſible quantities, [*non datur minimum*]. There is no fraction ſo little, but may be leſſe; and as in numbers [*non datur maximum*] There is no number ſo great, but it may bee made greater by addition: ſo in ſucceſſive duration [*non datur ultimum.*] It may be truly ſaid to laſt for ever, becauſe it can have no laſt portion. But howſoever we cannot properly, or without expoſing our ſpeech to captious exceptions, ſay, that *eternity* ſhal be after all time or duration ſucceſsive; (ſeeing this may ſeeme to import, that duration or ſucceſsion ſhall finally ceaſe:) yet that *eternity* (being *duration*, actually, interminably and indiviſibly, not ſucceſsively, *infinite*) now is, and ever was, as infinitely præexiſtent or precedent to all ages, or

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ſucceſſions comming towards us, one way; as it is and was to the worlds nativity, or the firſt out-goings of time, the other way. This is a point which we muſt beleeve, if we rightly beleeve God to bee Eternall, or know what Eternity is. A point, which would to God they had ſeriouſly and in heart conſidered, which have had Gods eternall decree and the awards of it, moſt frequently in their mouthes and pens. As he is no Chriſtian that would deny whatſoever is by God decreed, was ſo decreed before all worlds: So is he no Chriſtian Philoſopher, much leſſe a true Chriſtian *Divine*, that ſhall refer or retract the tenor of this ſpeech [*Before all worlds*] to that onely which is paſt, before the world began. Whatſoever can be more properly ſaid or conceived to be paſt, then to be yet to come, or to bee in every moment of time deſignable, can have no propertie of Eternity. For that onely is Eternall which alwayes is, and ſo alwayes is, that it hath precedence or præexiſtence infinite to all ſucceſſions, which way ſoever wee looke upon them, or take their beginning, whether backwards or forwards. It was a great overſight (or rather want of inſight into the nature of this great Sphere or viſible world) in *Lactantius*, (otherwiſe a learned Chriſtian) not onely to deny there were any Antipodes, but to cenſure the Philoſophers (which had gone before him) of groſſe ignorance or infatuation, for avouching this truth, now manifeſted to meaner Scholars, or more illiterate Chriſtians, than any which *Lactantius* taught. A greater ignorance it would be in us which acknowledge this truth, to

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ſay theſe Antipodes were under the earth, and the inhabitants of *Europe* and *Africa* onely above it; or that the Heavens were as farre under our Antipodes, as they are above us. For whoſoever walks on the earth, whether in this Region or that, whether at the halfe or full Antipodes, is above the earth. And every part of the Heavens unto which the lookes of men are erected, as well the *Nadir* as the *Zenith*, as well the *South-pole* as the *North-pole* is above the Earth. And as the Heavens are every way above the Earth, ſo is *Eternity* every way before all worlds, before all times. As we beleeve this viſible world and all things in it, had a beginning; ſo we expect it ſhall have an end: Now the eye of Eternall Providence lookes through the world, through all the ſeverall ages, ſucceſſions, or durations in the world; as well from the laſt end to their firſt beginning, as from their firſt beginning to their laſt end. There is no period of time to us imaginable, which is not ſo invironed by eternity, as the Earth or Center is with the Heavens; ſave onely that the Heavens are finite, and Eternity infinite. So that the Heavens though farre every way, are no way infinitely above the Earth; whereas Eternity or Gods *eternall* decree, are every way infinitely before all worlds, before all times. In this ſenſe, were it poſſible, the world might have beene created, or motions continued from everlaſting; the *eternall*, notwithſtanding, ſhould have beene everlaſtingly before them. For that period of motion which muſt terminate the next million of yeares, ſhall have coexiſtence with Eternity now exiſtent; whoſe

whoſe *infinity* doth not grow with ſucceſſion, nor extend it ſelfe with motion; but ſtands immovable with times preſent, being eternally before times future, as well in reſpect of any ſet draught or point, whence we imagine time future to come towards us, as in reſpect of the firſt revolution of the Heavens, whence time tooke beginning. Or, to ſpeake as we thinke, it is impoſſible to conceive any duration to be without beginning and ending, without conceiving it circular, and altogether voyd of ſucceſſion. Notwithſtanding, if any liſt to imagine time both wayes everlaſting; the continuity of it may bee beſt conceived by the uninterrupted fluxe of an *inſtant*, and the ſtability of eternity, by the retraction of ſuch a perpetuall *fluxe* into one durable or permanent inſtant. Cap. 6.

8 Or, not to ſuffer the remembrance of childiſh ſports altogether to paſſe without any uſe or obſervation, if not for compoſing ſome greateſt controverſies amongſt learned men, yet for facilitating contemplation in one of the greateſt difficulties, that Philoſophy, whether ſacred or humane, affords to the conceipt of the moſt curious: The difficulty is, how eternity being permanent and indiviſible, ſhould have coexiſtence with ſucceſſion or motion. We have ſeene a Top turne ſo ſwiftly upon the ſame center, in a manner, that it ſeemed rather to ſleepe or reſt, than to move. And whileſt it thus ſwiftly moved, any bright marke or conſpicuous ſpot, how little ſoever, ſeemed to be turned into an entire and permanent circle. Seeing motion thus ſwift, may be procured by a weake arme, it will bee

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Every Star in the eighth ſphere, every point ſhould be converted into a permanent circle; and ſo in one circle there ſhould be circles for number infinite, as many circles as there bee points or diviſibilities in the Ecliptique circle. Thus in Him that is eternall, are *Beings* infinite, and in *Eternity* are actually contained durations in ſucceſſion infinite. The former ſuppoſition admitted, we could not ſay that the inferiour Orbes, moving as now they doe, did move after the eighth Sphere, but that the times of their motion were eminently contained in it. For the eighth Sphere, being moved in an inſtant, ſhould loſe the diviſibility of time, and the nature of motion with all the properties that accompany them, not by defect, (as if it no way compriſed them,) but by ſwallowing up time or diviſion ſucceſſively or potentially infinite, into an actuall permanency. By this ſuppoſition of paſſive motion made infinitely ſwift, by the ſtrength of the mover, and improved into a kinde of actuall indiviſible permanency, we may conceive of the firſt Movers Eternity, as Mathematicians conceive the true nature of a Sphere, by imagining it to be produced by the motion of a *ſemicircle* upon the Axis. For let the *Eternall* be but thus imagined to bee an intellectuall ſphere, capable of momentary motion or revolution throughout this world; and the indiviſible coexiſtence of his infinitie, to every part of time and place, will be very conceivable. Yet as Mathematicians perſwade not themſelves, their figures are produced by motion, but rightly conceive their nature to be ſuch without any production, as if they

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were so produced: so let eternall duration bee esteemed more indivisible, than the unity of motion conceived as infinitely swift, yet not made indivisible by such swiftnesse of motion, but indivisible onely of it selfe, and by the infinite vigour of his vitall essence, wherein all the perfection of motion or rest, are (if I may so speake) indivisibly tempered, or (lest I should bee mistaken) eminently contained. The same proportion which motion contracted into stability hath unto succession, hath divine Essence to all other Essences, *eminently* containing all, no one kinde *formally*. This divine Essence whose essentiall property we conceive Eternity to be, is truly the *totality* of being; *a totality not *aggregated* of parts, but rather (as *Plotine* intimates) producing all other parts or kindes of *being*. *Eternity* likewise is a totality of duration, not aggregated of parts, nor capable of accesse or addition; but rather a totality from which all durations or successions flow, without resolution or diminution of its infinite integrity. As if a body should cast many shadowes of divers shapes in a running streame, the shadowes vanish and are repayred in every moment, without any diminution of the bodie.

*De hac duplice totalitate, vide Marsil. Ficinum, ad 7. Plotin. lib. Enneadis. 3.

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Of the infinity of Divine Power.

1  The circumstances of time and place are presupposed, the one as spectator, the other as stage to all things, which wanting place or time, or being it selfe, present themselves anew in their proper shape and forme. But of things so presented, operation or power in their kinde is the native and immediate property. Nothing that hath any proper seat or existence numerable in this spacious *Amphitheatre*, but is fitted for acting some part or other usefull for the maintenance of the whole. Now all operation or power, which (according to the variety of things created) is manifold and diverse, doth give but such a shadow of that infinite power, which is eminently contained in the union of infinite Essence, as time and place did of his immensity and eternity. The force and vertue of some things may perhaps more properly be termed strength or power passive, then operation. Howbeit even in the earth and earthly bodies, by nature most dull, there is a power or strength to sustaine waights laid upon them; a power to resist contrary impulsions, which perhaps essentially includes an active force or operation; a power of swaying to the center, which is no more passive than active, but a

Sect. 2. meane betwixt both. Even in the dulleſt body that is, there is a ſecret force or ſlow activity to aſſimilate other things to themſelves, or to preſerve ſymbolizing natures. In bodies leſſe groſſe and more unapt to reſiſt violence offered, as in the windes, vapours, or exhalations, or in the ſpirits or influences which guide our bodies, we may perceive an active force or power motive fully anſwerable to the greateſt paſſive ſtrength or reſiſtance. Other Elements or mixt bodies, are indued with an operative power of producing the like, or deſtroying contraries. Celeſtiall bodies, the Sunne eſpecially, have a productive force to bring forth plants out of their roots, to nouriſh and continue life in al things. It is perhaps impoſſible, for any thing, that hath not being of it ſelfe, to receive infinity of being in any kind from another, though infinite. Impoſſible for the fire, becauſe the ſubſtance of it is finite, to be infinitely hot; but were it ſuch, it would be infinite in operation.

2 As the Author or firſt ſetter forth of all things operative, who alone truly *is*, ſurpaſſeth all conceit of any diſtinct or numerable branch of *being*: ſo is his power more eminently infinite in every kinde, than all the united powers of ſeverall natures, each ſuppoſed infinitely operative in its owne kinde, and for number likewiſe infinite, can bee conceived to be. Now what was generally obſerved before, that things by nature moſt imperfect, doe oftentimes beſt ſhadow divine perfections, hath place againe in this particular. Gods infinite power is clearelieſt manifeſted in creatures which ſeem leaſt powerful.

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Where waſt thou (ſaid God to *Iob*) *when I layed the foundations of the Earth? declare if thou haſt underſtanding. Who hath laid the meaſures thereof, if thou knowſt? Or who hath ſtretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof faſtned? or who layed the corner ſtone thereof?* The excellent maieſtie of this ſpeech, ſufficiently teſtifies it was uttered by God himſelfe, though taken from his mouth, by the pen of man. But ſetting aſide the majeſticke phraſe or reſemblance, farre ſurmounting all reſemblance all obſervance of poeticall *decorum*; What cleerer fountaine of deeper admiration, can the eye of mans underſtanding looke into, then this, that not onely every corner ſtone in the world with its full but then, but all the mighty buildings or erections, which are ſeene upon the whole ſurface of the earth; yea the whole earth it ſelfe, with all the mountaines and rocks upon it, with all the mettalls or maſſie ſubſtance that are within it, ſhould be borne up by that which is leſſe than any corner ſtone, by that which indeed is no body or ſubſtance, not ſo much as a meere angle or corner. Yet ſo it hath pleaſed *Him*, by whoſe wiſedome the foundations of the earth were layd, to make that little point or indiviſible Center; which is fartheſt removed from our ſight, the moſt conſpicuous place and ſeate of that indiviſible power which is infinite. Let Mathematicians imagine what rules or reaſons of equipendence they liſt, their laſt reſolution of all ſupportance into the Center, muſt ſuppoſe the ſame truth which the Ægyptian Magicians confeſſed, [*Hic digitus*

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Dei est] *The finger of God is here.* Impossible it were for *that,* which in it selfe is matter of nothing, impregnably to support al things supportable; unlesse it were supported by the finger of God. And yet if wee conceive of *Him*, as *Isaias* describes *Him*, all the strength and power that is manifested in the supportance of the whole earth, and all therein, is not the strength of his little finger. Yea though we should imagine, that as the weight of solids amounts according to their masse or quantity: so the sustentative force, which is chambered up in the Center, should be multiplyed according to the the severall portions or divisibilities of magnitude successively immensurable: yet this imagination of force so multiplyed, it being divisible, could not equalize that true and all conceipt of force divine, which ariseth from consideration, that it is indivisibly seated, throughout immensity. To uphold earths innumerable much weightier and massier than this is, which borne by him, beareth all things; would be no burthen to his power sustentative: (so from the effects, his power, though in it selfe one, must receive from us plurality of denominations.) And yet fully commensurable to this power sustentative, is his active strength or power motive. Hee that spans the Heavens with his fist, could tosse this Vniverse with greater ease, than a Gyant doth a Tennis Ball, throughout the boundlesse Courts of immensity. Rocks of Adamant would sooner dissolve with the least fillep of his finger, than bubbles of water with the breath of Canons.

3 Our admiration of this his active power, which

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which we conceive as incomprehenſible, and altogether uncapable of increaſe, may bee raiſed by calculating the imaginary degrees of active powers increaſe in creatures diviſible, as well in quantity, as operation. Though powder converted into ſmoake, be the common mother of all force, which iſſueth from the terrible mouth of the Gunne: yet the Canon ſends forth his bullet (though more apt to reſiſt externall motion) with greater violence than the *Sachar*: and every *ordinance* exceeds other in force of battery, according to the quantity of the charge or length of barrell. But were it poſſible for the ſame quantity of ſteele or iron, to bee as ſpeedily converted into ſuch a fiery vapour, as gunpowder is: the blow would bee ten times more irreſiſtible then any, that Gunpowder out of the ſame cloſe concavity, can make. The reaſon is plaine; the more ſolid or maſſie the ſubſtance to be diſſolved, is, the greater quantity would it yeeld of fire, or other rarer ſubſtance, into which it were diſſolved. And the greater the quantity, the more violent is the contraction of it into the ſame narrow roome: and the more violent the contraction is, the more vehement is the eruption, and the ejaculation ſwifter. Thus from vapours rarified or generated in greater quantity, than the concavities of the earth, wherein they are impriſoned without vent, is naturally capable of; doe Earthquakes become ſo terrible; Theſe and the like experiments bring forth this generall rule, *The active ſtrength of bodies multiplieth, according to the manner of contraction or cloſe unition of parts concurring to the impulſion*

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pulsion or eruption: So doth the active force or vigour of motion, alwayes increase, according to the degrees of celerity which it accumulates. Now though the most active and powerfull essence cannot be encompassed with walls of brass, nor chambred up in vaults of steele, albeit much wider than the heavens; yet doth it every where more strictly gird it selfe with strength then the least or weakest body can be girt. For what bonds can we prescribe so strict, so close or firme, as is the bond of indivisible unity, which cannot possibly burst or admit eruption, wherein notwithstanding infinite power doth as intirely and totally encampe it selfe, as in immensity. How incomparably then doth His active strength exceed all conceipt or comparison? The vehemency of his motive power, whose infinite Essence swallowes up the infinite degrees of succession in a fixed instant, and of motion in vigorous rest; cannot bee expresst by motion so swift and strong, as would beare levell from the Sunne setting in the West, to the Moone rising in the East. To cast the fixed Starres downe to the Center, or hoyse the Earth up to the Heavens, within the twinkling of an eye, or to send both in a moment beyond the extremities of this visible world, into the wombe of vacuity whence they issued, would not strayne his power motive. For, all this we suppose to be lesse then to bring nothing unto something, or something to such perfection, as some of his creatures enjoy. Howbeit even such as take the fullest measure of perfection from his immensity, must derive their pedigree by the mothers side,

ſide, from meere nothing or vacuity. *Homo*, ſaith S. *Auſtine, terræ filius, nihili nepos*; Man is the ſon of the earth, and the grandchilde of nothing. And when he ſhall come unto the height of his glory, he cannot forget, he muſt remember, that the worme was his ſiſter, and the creeping thing the ſonne of his mother. To produce as many worlds out of nothing as the Sunne each yeere doth Herbes or Plants out of the moiſtned Earth, would breed no cumbrance to his power or force productive. To maintaine, repaire, or continue all theſe in the ſame ſtate, whileſt he makes as many moe, would neither exhauſt nor hinder his conſervative vertue. Multiplicity or variety greater than wee can imagine of workes moſt wonderfull, all managed at one and the ſame time, could worke no diſtraction in his thoughts, no defatigation in his *Eſſence*. From the unity of theſe and the like branches of power, all in Him moſt eminently infinite, doth the *attribute* of Omnipotency take its denomination, whoſe contents, ſo farre as they concerne the ſtrengthning of our faith, ſhall hereafter bee unfoulded. Cap. 7.

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Of the infinity of Divine Wisedome. That it is as impossible for any thing to fall out without Gods knowledge, as to have existence without his power or essentiall presence.

1  But power in every kinde thus eminently infinite, could not be so omnipotent, as we must beleeve it; did it not in this absolute unity of all variety possesse other branches of being, according to the like eminency or infinity of perfection. Strength or power, if meerely naturall or destitute of correspondent wisedome, to comprehend, manage, and direct it, might bring forth effects in their kinde truly infinite, whose *ill* forecast or untowardly combinations, nevertheless, would in the issue argue lamentable impotency, rather then *omnipotency*. And hard it would be to give instance almost in any subject, wherein a double portion of wit matched with halfe the strength, would not effect more, or more to the purpose, then a triple portion of strength, with halfe so much wit. *Archimedes* did not come so farre short of *Polyphemus* in strength or bulk of body, as the wonderfull works wrought by his Mathematicall skill, did exceed any that the Gyant could attempt.

2 Every choice is better or worse accordingly as it more or lesse participates of true wisedome: And

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And most unwise should that choice justly be esteemed, which would not give wisedome prehemineence to power. Knowledge then, might wise men choose their owne endowments, would be desired in greater measure then strength. *Wisedome*, saith the *Wiseman, is the beginning of the wayes of God.* And shall not that branch of *being*, by which all things were made, by which every created essence hath its bounds and limits, be possest by Him, (who gave them *being* and set them bounds,) without all bounds or limits! above all measure? Yes, whatsoever branch of *being* we could rightly desire or make choice of before others: the inexhaustible fountaine of *being* hath not chosen, but is naturally possest of, as the better. And therefore if we may so speake, though both bee absolutely infinite; his wisedome is greater then his power, to which it serves as guide or guardian. And as the excellency of the Artificers skill often recompences the defect of stuffe or matter: so the infinity of wisedome or knowledge seemes, in a manner, to evacuate the necessity of power or force distinct from it. Howbeit I will not in this place, or in our native dialect, enter that nice dispute, which some Schoolemen have done; *Whether Gods Essence and Knowledge be formally his Power.* But whilest we conceive *Power* and *Wisedome* as two attributes formally distinct, (at least, to ordinary conceipts,) we may conceive *Wisedome* to be the father, and *Power* the mother of all his workes of *wonder.* As for *Philo* and other *Platonicks* that make Knowledge the mother of all Gods workes, it is probable they dreamed of a crea-

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ted *Knowledge*, or perhaps under these termes, they cover some transformed *Notion* of the second person in Trinity, who is the *Wisedome* of the Father, by whom also he created all things: who as hee is the onely begotten Sonne from eternity, so is hee likewise a joynt *Parent* of all things created in time by the Father; as *Eve* was in some sort *Adams* daughter, and yet a true mother of all that call him father. But here we speake not of that wisedome of God, which is personall; but of the wisedome of the Godhead, as it is essentially and indivisibly infinite in the whole Trinity.

3 Wisedome, as all agree, is the excellency of knowledge, from which it differs not, save only in the dignity or usefulnesse of matters knowne, or in the more perfect maner of knowing them. Though no man bee wise without much knowledge, yet a man may know many things, and not be very wise. But if wee speake of Knowledge divine, not as restrained in our conceipt to this or that particular, but simply, as it comprehends all things, the name of Wisedome in every respect best befits it: for though many things knowne by him, whilest compared with others more notable, seeme base and contemptible; yet not the meanest, but may be an object of divine contemplation to a Christian, that considers not the meere matter or forme, or physicall properties, but the Creators power, or skill manifested in it. How much more may the vilest creatures, whilest he lookes upon his owne worke in it, and the use whereto he appointed it, be rightly reputed excellent? He knowes as much of every Crea-

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Creature, as can be knowne of it, and much more than man possibly can know: and thus he knoweth not onely all things that are, but all that possibly may bee. This argues wisedome truly infinite; whose right conceipt must be framed by those broken conceipts which we have of the modell of it.

4 Of *wisedome* then or usefull knowledge, the parts or offices are two: The one stedfastly to propose a right end: The other, to make and prosequute a right choice of meanes for effecting it. Humane wisedome is oft-times blinde in both, and usually lame in the latter. Neither can we clearely discerne true good from apparent; nor doe our consultations alwayes carry even, to the mistaken markes whereat we ayme; but be the end proposed good or bad, so it be much affected, the lesse choice of meanes is left, the more eagerly wee apply our selves unto their use, and strive as it were, to straine out successe by close embraceing them. And for this reason, ignorance or want of reason to forecast variety of meanes for bringing about our much desired ends, is the mother of selfe-will and impatience. For what is selfe-will, if a man should define it, but a stiffe adherence to some one, or few particular meanes, neither onely nor chiefly necessary to the maine point? And wits conscious of their owne weakneſse, for conquering what they eagerly desire, presently call in power, wrath or violence, as partiall or mercenary seconds to assist them. Whereas he that out of fertility of invention, can furnish himselfe beforehand with store of likely meanes for accomplishing his purpose, cannot much esteeme

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the losse or miscariage of some one or two. Howbeit, as mans wit in this case is but finite, so his patience cannot be compleat. Even the wisest will be moved to wrath or violence, or other foule play, if the game whereat he shoots be faire and good, and most of his strings already broken. Nor can he bee absolutely secure of good successe, so long as the issue is subject to contingency, and may fall without the Horizon of his foresight and contrivance. But wisedome infinite doth compleatly arme the Omnipotent Majesty (if I may so speake) with infinite patience and long-suffering, towards such as every minute of their lives violently thwart and crosse some or other particular meanes, which he had ordained for his glory and their good. *Hee is light*, saith the Apostle, *and in him is no darkenesse*. He distinguisheth the fruits of *light* from fruits of *darkenesse*, before they are, even before he gave them possibility of *being*. As impossible it is for his will to decline from that which he discernes to be truly good, as for his infinite Essence to shrinke in *being*. Many things may (as every thing that is evill doth) fall out against his will, but nothing without his knowledge, or besides his expectation. That which in its owne nature (as being made such by his unalterable decree) is absolutely contingent, is not casuall in respect of his providence or eternall wisedome. In that he fully comprehends the number of all meanes possible, and can mixe the severall possibilities of their miscariage, in what degree or proportion he list: he may, and oft-times doth, inevitably forecast the full accomplishment of his pro-

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proposed ends, by multiplicity of meanes, in themselves not inevitable, but contingent. So that, successe is onely necessary to the last, yet not absolutely necessary unto it. All the necessity it hath is oftimes gotten by casuall miscariage of the possibilities bestowed upon the former: as if hee ordained the apprehension of a Traytor, or of a Malefactor, by an hundred meanes, all by the immutable decree alike possible, and equally propable; if ninety and nine doe misse, the hundreth and last, by the rules of Eternall Wisedome, must of necessity take. But in that it was possible for the former to have *taken*, successe falls to this last, not by absolute necessity, but as it were by lott; for it might have beene prevented by the former, by supposall onely of whose miscariage it is now necessary. And yet successe it selfe, or the accomplishment of the end proposed by infinite wisedome, was absolutely necessary and immutable.

5 There is a fallacy, though the simplest one that ever was set to catch any wise man, wherein many excellent wits of these latter ages, with some of the former, have beene pittifully entangled. The snare, wherein it were not possible for any besides themselves to catch them, they thus frame or set, *Whatsoever God hath decreed, must of necessity come to passe: But God hath decreed every thing that is; Therefore every thing that is, comes to passe of necessity. All things are necessary at least in respect of Gods decree.* The extract or corrallary whereof, in briefe, is this: *It is impossible for ought, that is not, to bee: for ought that hath beene, not to have been, for ought that*

Sect. 2. *that is, not to bee; impossible for ought to be hereafter, that shall not be.* But if it be (as here I suppose) very consonant to infinite wisedome; altogether necessary to infinite goodnesse; and no way impossible for infinite power, to decree conting ncy as well as necessity; or that some effects should bee as truly contingent, as others are necessarie; a conclusion quite contradictory to that late inferred, wil be the onely lawfull issue of the former Maxime, or majer proposition matched with a minor of our chooſing. Let the major proposition stand as it did before, [*Whatsoever God hath decreed must of necessity come to passe*] with this additionall, *Nothing can come to passe otherwise than God hath decreed it shall or may come to passe.* The minor proposition, which (if our choyce may stand) shall be consort to the major, is this, *But God hath decreed contingency as well as necesity*, or, *that some effects should bee as truly contingent, as others are necessary; Therefore of necesity there must be contingency, or effects contingent.* The immediate consequence whereof is this, *There is an absolute necesity, that some things which have not beene, might have been; That some things which have beene, might not have beene. That some things which are not, might be; That some things which are, might not be: That some things which shall not be hereafter, might bee; That some things which shall be hereafter, might not be.* But as ill weeds grow apace, so the late mentioned errour once conceived, was quickly delivered of a second, which derived the infallible certainty of Gods fore-knowing things future, from an infallible necessity (as they

they conceived it)layd upon them(before they had being) by his immutable decree. But every wise decree presupposeth wisedome, and wisedome essentially includeth knowledge: shall we then grant that Gods Knowledge is antecedent, and his foreknowledge consequent to his decrees? or shall we say he did inevitably decree the obliquity of Iewish blasphemy against his Sonne, because he did most certainly foreknow it? or, that hee did therefore certainly foreknow it, because hee had irresistably decreed it? Most certaine it is, that he did as perfectly foresee or foreknow all the obliquities of their malice and blasphemy against Christ,as he did their very acts or doings: if those could bee distinguished from their acts or doings. Briefly, to admit the former conclusion; *That the Eternall foreknowes all things, because he decrees them; or, that they are absolutely necessary in respect of his decree*; were to imprison his infinite wisedome,in his selfe-fettered *power*; to restraine the Eternall Majesty from using such liberty in his everlasting decrees, as some earthly Monarchs usurpe in causes temporall or civill: For, *Papa nunquam ligat sibi manus; The Pope* (as they say) *never tyeth his owne hands, by any Grant or Patents:* which is a fault in him; onely because he is otherwise very faulty, and unsufficient to support or weild so high a prerogative with upright constancy. But, in that *Holy* and mighty *One*, the reservation of such liberty(as anon we intimate) is a point of high perfection. Cap. 8.

6 That to be able to decree an absolute contingency as well as necessity, is an essentiall branch of

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Omnipotency or power infinite, shall (by the assistance of this Power) bee clearly demonstrated in the Article of Creation. That God did omnipotently decree a contingency in humane actions, that the execution of this decree is a necessary consequent of his communicative goodnesse, (a consequent so necessary, that unlesse this be granted, we cannot acknowledge him to bee truly good, much lesse infinitely good,) shall (by the favour of this his Goodnes) be fully declared in the Treatise of mans fall, and of sinnes entrance into the World by it. That which in this place wee take as granted, is,

" That Gods wisedome is no lesse infinite than his " power; that he perfectly foreknowes, whatsoe- " ver by his *omnipotency* can be done; that his po- " wer and wisedome are fully commensurable to " his immensity and eternity; that all these rules " following, are exactly parallell in true Divinity.

" Gods Presence is not circumscriptible by the " coexistence of his creatures; He is in every one " of them as a Center, and all of them are in Him as " in a circumference capable not of them only but " of all that possibly can be; onely uncapable of " Circumscription or Equality.

" His Eternity is more than commensurable to " time or any duration of created Entities: It is in " every duration as a permanent instant; and all " durations are contained in it, as a fluent instant " in a set time, or as noonetide in the whole day.

" His Power likewise may not be confined to ef- " fects that are, have beene, or shall bee: the pro- " duction of every thing out of nothing, argues it

to

" to be truly infinite; and yet the production of all, Cap. 8.
" is to the infinity of it, not so much as a beame of
" light which is strained through a needles eye, is
" to the body of the Sunne, or to all the light dif-
" fused throughout the world.

Least of all may his infinite *wisedome* be comprehended within those effects which by his power have been produced, or which it now doth or hereafter shall produce. But look how farre his *immensity* exceeds all reall or compleate space, or his *Eternity* succession, or the duration of things created, or his *Power* all things already reduced from possibility to actuall existence; so farre doth his infinite *Wisedome* surmount the most exact knowledge that can be imagined of all things already created and their actions. Nothing that is, could have borne any part in the world, without the light or direction of his Knowledge: and yet that measure of his Knowledge which can bee gathered from the full harmony of this Vniverse, is lesse in respect of it absolutely considered, then skill to number digits, is to the entire or exact knowledge of all proportions or other arithmeticall rules or affections, that can arise from their multiplications or divisions. The causes, properties, and hidden vertues of each thing created, are better knowne to *Him*, than so much of them as wee see or perceive by any other sense, is to us: and yet He knowes whatsoever by infinite power possibly might have beene, but now is not, whatsoever hereafter may be, though it never shall be; as perfectly as he doth the things which at this instant are, heretofore have been, or hereafter must be.

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7 The *subject* wherein this his incomprehensible *wisedome* exhibits the most lively and sureſt apprehensions, for drawing our hearts after it in admiration; is the harmony or mixture of contingency with necessity. And this, most conspicuous in moderating the free thoughts of Men or Angells, and ordaining them to the certaine and necessary accomplishment of his glory. The contingent means which by his permission and donation, these creatures may use for attaining their severall ends, or private good, may bee successively infinite. And yet, albeit the utmost possibilities of their varieties and inconstancies, were reduced to act, the *ends* notwithstanding, which his infinite wisedome hath forecast in their creation, should by any course of many thousands, which they may take, be as inevitably brought to passe, as if no choice or freedome had beene left them; or as if every succeeding thought had been drawne on by the former, and all linked to that which he first inspired, or by his irresistible power produced, with indissoluble chains of Adamantine Fate. Wee would esteeme it great wisedome or cunning (to use S. *Austines* illustration) in a *Fowler* to be able to catch againe all the Birds, w^ch^ he had formerly caught, after he had permitted every one of them to take wings and flye which way they listed. God hath nets, every where spred, for catching such as his wisedome suffers to flye fartheſt from him, or most to decline the wayes which in his goodnesse he had appointed for them: and (which is most of all to bee admired) the very freedome or variety of mens thoughts, so they bee per-

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permitted to imploy them according to their owne liking, becomes their moſt inevitable, aud moſt inextricable ſnare. For all their thoughts are actually numbred in his infinite wiſedome, and the award of every thought determinately meaſured, or defined by his Eternall Decree. So farre is freedome of choyce or contingency from being incompatible with the immutability of Gods will, that without this infinite variety of choyce or freedome of thought in man and Angells, wee cannot rightly conceive him to bee as infinitely wiſe, as his decree is immutable.

8 Free it was for mee to have thought or done ſomewhat in every minute of the laſt yeare, whereby the whole frame of my cogitations or actions for this yeare following might have beene altered: and yet ſhould God have beene as true and principall a cauſe of this alteration, and of every thought and deed thus altered, as he is of thoſe that *de facto* are paſt, or of that which I now thinke or doe. Nor ſhould his will or pleaſure (as ſome object) depend on mine, but mine though contingently free, neceſſarily ſubject unto his. For unto every cogitation poſſible to man or Angel, hee hath everlaſtingly decreed a proportionate end: to every antecedent poſſible, a correſpondent conſequent; which needs no other cauſe or meanes to produce it, but onely the reducing of *poſsibility* (granted by his decree) into Act. For what way ſoever (of many equally poſſible) mans will doth encline, Gods decree is a like neceſſary cauſe of all the good or evill that befalls him for it. Did we that which we

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9 The generall reason, why most Christian writers

writers are more able and apt both to conceive right, and to ſpeake more conſequently to what they rightly conceive, concerning other branches of divine abſolute *infiniteneſſe*, than concerning his infinite knowledge, is, becauſe all creatures without exception, are true participants of Gods other Attributes, beſides his wiſedome or knowledge. For even the meaneſt creature, the worme or gnat, hath a portion of that being, of that power, of that duration, which in him are infinite: and that portion of theſe attributes which they have, or that quantity of being which they have, is a participation of his immenſity. But of his knowledge or wiſedome, men and Angels (the manner of whoſe knowledge is to men for the moſt part unknowne) are of all his creatures the onely participants. And (as hath been obſerved before) thoſe rules are alwayes the moſt cleare and certaine, and moſt eaſily gathered; which are gathered from an uniforme identity of particulars, in variety of ſubjects. Thoſe univerſall rules (on the contrary) are hardly gathered, or (without accurate obſervation) are leſſe certaine, which can be experienced onely in ſome one or fewer ſubjects. Another ſpeciall reaſon why we doe not conceive ſo magnificently or ſo orthodoxally of Gods knowledge, as were fitting; is, becauſe we want fit tearmes to expreſſe them in. For ſeeing words are taken as the proper veſture of our thoughts & conceipts; and ſeeing moſt men are apt to conceive or judge rather according to the veſture or outward appearance of things, than according to the inward truth: it is almoſt impoſſible for us not to tranſforme

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forme the manner of Gods knowledge or decrees, into the similitude of our owne conceipts, conjectures or resolutions; so long as we put no other vesture or expressions upon Gods decree or knowledge, than were fitted for our owne. To salve this inconvenience, or to prevent the occasion of this errour, * Saint *Gregory* moves this doubt: How wee can say there is any præscience or foreknowledge in God, seeing onely those things can be properly said to be foreknowne, which are to come: whereas we know, that nothing is future unto God, before whose eye, no things are past; things present doe not passe by *Him*, things future doe not come upon *Him*. Whatsoever hath beene to us, is yet in his view; and whatsoever is present, may rather bee said to be *knowne* than *foreknowne*. To the same purpose Saint *Austine* would have Gods knowledge of things which are to come, to bee tearmed rather *science* than *præscience* or foresight; seeing all all things are present to God. But these two great lights of the Latine Church, with some others that follow these for their guides, have not in this argument expresst themselves so clearly or so accurately as that their expressions can passe without question or exception in the Schooles. We may not say (nor did Saint *Austine* or Saint *Gregory*, as I presume, thinke) that God doth not see or know a distinction betweene times past, present, or to come, more

* *Quomodo est præscius, dum nulla nisi quæ futura sunt, præsciatur? Et scimus quia Deo futurum nihil est, ante cuius oculos præterita nulla sunt, præsentia non transeunt, futura non veniunt: quippe quia omne quod nobis fuit & erit, in eius prospectu præsto est; et omne quod præsens est, scire potest potius quam præscire.* Greg. lib. 20 in Iob. cap. 22. Et paulo post, *In illo nec præterita nec futura reperiri queunt, sed cuncta mutabilia immutabiliter durant; & quæ in seipsis simul existere non possunt, illi simul omnia assistunt, nihilq; in illo præterit quod transit: quia in æternitate eius modo quodam incomprehensibili, cuncta volumina seculorum transeuntia manent, currentia stant.* Vide Petrum Damianum in ep. 4. de omnipotentia, & Ludovicum Ballaster Hierologiæ, cap. 3.

cleerely

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cleerely than we doe. If then he diſtinguiſh times preſent from times paſt or future, how is it ſaid by Saint *Gregory*, that nothing to him is future, nothing paſt? If theſe differences of time or of ſucceſſion be reall, the *Eternall* knowes theſe differences much better than we doe. And if hee know a difference between things preſent, paſt and to come; *to be preſent, paſt, or to come,* is not all one in reſpect of his *Eternall knowledge*. If God, as all grant, bee before all worlds; his knowledge being coeternall to his being, muſt needs be before all worlds. And Saint *Auſtine* himſelfe grants a *ſcientia*, a *ſcience* or *knowledge* in God moſt infallible, of all things that have beene, are, or ſhall be; before they are, were, or could be; for they could not bee coeternall to him, who is before all worlds, the *beginning* of the world it ſelfe, and of all things in it. Now all knowledge of things not yet preſent, but to come, is foreknowledge: to determine or decree things future, is to predetermine or foredecree them. And ſeeing God from Eternity hath both knowne and decreed the things that then were not; he is ſaid to have foreknowne and foredecreed them. So then God foreknowes, and man foreknowes; God hath decreed, and man hath decreed. But the difference betweene the manner of their foreknowing and decreeing, being not oft-times well expreſſed by learned writers or teachers, and ſeldome duely conſidered by their Readers or hearers; the identity of words wherewith we expreſſe our own foreknowledge and Gods foreknowledge, begets a ſimilitude of conceipt, or will hardly ſuffer us rightly to con-

Sect. 2. ceive the true difference betweene the nature and manner of *humane wisedome*, and *wisedome divine*. And this hath beene the fertile nurſery of many errours in this Argument, which now and hereafter we ſhall endeavour to diſplant: imitating the Heralds, who are often enforced to give the ſame Coat to divers parties; but alwayes with ſome difference, remarkable to ſuch as are converſant in the myſteries of their Art.

10 Our knowledge of things to come is many wayes imperfect; (and foreknowledge onely) becauſe, the duration neither of our knowledge, nor of our ſelves, as yet can reach unto that point of time, wherein things ſo knowne, get firſt exiſtence. We looke on them as on things afarre off, which wee expected to meet; for as things paſt reſemble moueables going from us, ſo things future ſeeme to come upon us. And whiles they get being, which before they had not; wee get continuance of being, and of knowledge, which before we had not; that is, wee gaine a reall coexiſtence with them: For if the daies, or thred of our life ſhold be cut off, before the things foreknowne by us come to paſſe, or get actuall being; wee could not poſſibly have coexiſtence with them. Such being or duration as they have, is too ſhort the one way, & our exiſtence too ſhort the other way; to make up this knot or bond of mutuall relation, which wee call *coexiſtence*: There muſt be on our part, a continuatiõ or lengthning of that exiſtence which we have; and on their part, a growth into that actuall being, which whileſt they are meerely future, they have not; before

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fore we and they can be truly ſaid to exiſt together. Now if wee ſhall *mold* the manner of Gods foreknowledge of things future in our owne *conceipt* or *foreknowledge* of them, we ſhall erroneouſly collect; that, ſeeing wee cannot infallibly foreknow future *Contingents*, ſo neither could they be infallibly foreknowne by God; if to him or in reſpect of his decree, they were contingents, and not neceſſarily predetermined.

And ſome there be, which puſh our proneneſſe to this errour forward, by another; not diſtinguiſhing betweene contingency and uncertainty, they argue thus;

That which is in it ſelfe uncertaine, cannot certainly be knowne:

Every future contingent is in it ſelfe uncertaine:

Ergo, *It is not poſſible, that a future contingent ſhould certainly be knowne.*

But they conſider not that there is a twofold uncertainty: one formally relative: another onely denominative or fundamentall. That which is relatively uncertaine, cannot be certainly knowne; for ſo it ſhould bee certaine to him, to whom it is uncertaine. But a future contingent, as it is contingent, doth not neceſſarily or formally include this relative uncertainty; although it uſually bee in part the foundation or Cofounder of it. For relative uncertainty, or that uncertainty which is ſo termed with relation unto knowledge, reſults partly from the nature of the object, ſuppoſe a future Contingent or Event mutable; partly and more principally, from the imperfection of the knowledge, in re-

Sect. 2. ſpect of which it is ſaid uncertaine. But the ſame effect or event, which is in part the *foundation of uncertaintie*, with reſpect to finite or unperfect knowledge, may bee the diſtinct and proper object of knowledge in it ſelfe infallible, or of knowledge infinite. Now if we grant, that there is any knowledge in it ſelfe infallible, wee cannot imagine that any thing poſſible (yet is every future Contingent, though we conſider it as contingently future, poſſible) ſhould bee uncertaine unto ſuch knowledge. Wee ſhould againe conſider, that the *Eternall Providence*, doth neither know or foreknow Contingents future, by interpoſed or expiring Acts; but by interminable and Eternall Knowledge, in which there is no ſucceſſion, nothing future, nothing paſt. And without the interpoſitiõ of ſome determining or expiring Acts, there can bee no errour in men; no man erres while hee is in the ſearch of truth or whileſt hee ſuſpends his Iudgement. Take then away the imperfection of our knowledge or iudgement, whileſt it is in ſuſpenſe; which is ignorance, rather than errour; and it better reſembles divine knowledge, than our actuall reſolutions or determinations doe.

11 The beſt knowledge which wee can have of things contingent, is but conjecturall: and of things meerly caſuall, we cannot have ſo much as a true conjecturall knowledge; for, thoſe things we tearme caſuall, w^ch^ are without the reach or ſphere of our forecaſt or conjecture. And hence it is, that the actuall exhibition of any event, whether caſuall or contingent, doth alwayes *actuate, increaſe* or *perfect*

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fect our knowledge. The true reaſon why wee cannot certainly foreknow events contingent, is becauſe our *Eſſence & Knowledge* are but finite: ſo that things contingent are not ſo contained in us, that if we could perfectly know our ſelves, wee might perfectly know them. But in the Divine Eſſence all reall effects, all events poſsible, whether neceſſarie, caſuall, or contingent, are *eminently* contained, the perfect knowledge of his owne Eſſence, neceſſarily includes the perfect knowledge not onely of all things that have beene, are, or ſhall bee, but of all things that might have beene, or poſſibly may be. For as Gods Eſſence is preſent in every place, as it were an ubiquitary center; ſo is his Eternity or infinite duration indiviſibly coexiſtent to every part of ſucceſſion; and yet withall is *round* about it. He it is, that drives things future upon us, being from Eternity as well beyond them, as on this ſide of them. Though he ſhould create other creatures without the circumference of this world, they ſhould be all within his preſence; without which, it is impoſſible ought beſides him, ſhould have any exiſtence: yet ſhould he not properly gaine any new exiſtence in them, but onely take a denomination of coexiſtence with them; becauſe they have exiſtence in Him, which before they had not. Thus, admitting the branches of Contingency or indifferent poſſibilities never reduced to act, to be in our apprehenſion numberleſſe; yet whenſoever any thing comes to paſſe, which might not have beene, it cannot fall without the ſphere of Gods actuall knowledge,

Sect. 2. which is fully commensurable to *Eternity* and *Immensity*; and therefore is not onely coexistent to every successive act, but doth environ whole succession. And whether of such things as possibly may be, more or fewer be reduced to act; nothing accrewes to Eternall Knowledge, no new act can bee produced in it, by the casuall event; but only that which was eternally knowne, having now gotten actuall coexistence with Eternity, bestowes this extrinsecall denomination upon the Eternall Creator, *It was foreknowne from eternity*; that is, in plain language, knowne, when it was not, by Him that more properly alwayes indivisibly *is*, then *was* before it. And being such, his knowledge of things, which, in respect of us are onely future and foreknowne, doth as truly resemble or rather containe our knowledge of things past or present, as of things to come. Now for us to apprehend a thing past, under the nature of a thing contingent, is not impossible. And though we certainly know it to bee already past, yet this certainty of our knowledge, doth not perswade us, that it came to passe certainly, or inevitably; but is very compatible with our conceipt of its contingency or casuall production, whilest it was present. Our knowledge of such things past or present, is necessary; but the event it selfe is not therefore necessary, nor to bee termed necessary in respect of our knowledge. Much lesse may we say, either that contingent effects are necessary, or that no effects are not necessary, in respect of Gods decree or foreknowledge of them. For if we beleeve that Gods foreknowledge of all events

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to come, be they of what kinde they possibly may be, is more cleare and more infallible than our best knowledge of things past or present; the necessary infallibility of his knowledge, can neither adde any degree of necessity to the nature of the events foreknowne, nor take one jot of contingency from them. God should not be absolutely infinite either in Essence or in Knowledge, if the absolute *infallibility* of his foreknowledge, or the impossibility of his not erring in his predictions, were in it selfe grounded upon, or to bee inferred by us, from the absolute necessity of the event, rather than from the absolute *infinity* of his wisedome. For those effects which being otherwise in their nature *contingent*, it is in our power (by Gods permission, by circumspection and forecast) to alter by laying a necessity upon them, which before they had not; we are able (after this necessity layd upon them by our selves) infallibly to foreknow and foretell, albeit our knowledge still remaine but finite. Now, that some events, which are to day, in themselves and by Gods decree, truly contingent, may by our industry and circumspection, become to morrow truly necessary, no intelligent Christian Divine will (I hope) deny; or if any doe deny it, wee shall be able (by Gods assistance) positively to demonstrate the truth of this our assertion, and withall demonstrate the dangerous inconveniences of the contradictory opinion, in the Treatise of *Divine providence*. In the meane time, to finish this principall stemme of *Divine providence*, to wit, his infinite *Wisedome*, and the dependance which things

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Sect. 2. temporall have upon his eternall knowledge: Succession we imagine as a scrole containing severall *columnes* of *contingency* or indifferent possibilities; of which onely so many, or so much of any, as in revolution of time, take inke, and are unfoulded, become visible to Men and Angels. But the Almighty looketh on all things, as well from that end of time which is to come, as from that which is past: his infinite and eternall wisedome, doth not onely encompasse all things that come to passe, as the Circumference doth the Center; but penetrates the whole scrole of succession from end to end, and from corner to corner, more clearly then the Suns brightnesse doth the perspicuous or purified Ayre. Those Columnes of meere possibilities never actuated, which his finger from Eternity hath drawne in Characters secret and invisible to his Creatures, are alike distinct and legible to his glorious eye, as those others whose first draught, being as secretly and invisibly fashioned by him, man or other second causes by his concourse, fill with actuall or sensible existence; as the Embroyderer doth the Drawers obscure patterne, with conspicuous branches of silke, gold, or silver.

12 But lest we may be thought to reade the Ancients with no greater reverence, than we doe some moderne Writers from whom wee freely dissent, without any impulsion of envy or vaineglory, let us for conclusion of this long discourse, a little reflect upon the testimonies before avouched out of S. *Austine*, and out of S. *Gregory*. The truth then at which these two learned Fathers aimed, and which,

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in the charitable conſtruction of ſuch as reade them with reverence, they did not miſſe, may bee fully compriſed in theſe obſervations following, which are but neceſſary extracts of what hath hitherto beene delivered. Whereas S. *Gregory* ſaith, *Vnto God nothing is paſt, nothing to come*; the true conſtruction of his meaning is, that in Gods knowledge of things paſt, preſent, or to come, there is *nihil futurum, nihil præteritum*, no ſuch difference of time or duration, as we expreſſe by theſe words, *future* or *paſt*: for it alwaies is, and ſo perfectly alwaies is, that nothing can be added to it by ſucceſsion or variety of events, be they neceſſary, caſuall, or contingent. But as his Eternall Knowledge of all things, doth not make all things, which he knowes, to be eternall (no not in reſpect of his Eternall Decree or Knowledge, for he eternally decrees and knowes things temporall and mutable:) ſo neither doth the immutable or abſolute certainty of his knowledge, make all things ſo knowne by him, to be immutable or abſolutely neceſſary, either in themſelves or in reſpect of his Eternall Knowledge. Onely this we are bound to beleeve, and this is all that we may in this argument ſafely ſay: [Gods knowledge of things mutable and unneceſſary, is abſolutely neceſſary, becauſe abſolutely infinite.] Againe, it is moſt true which S. *Gregory* ſaith; that things future doe not come upon God as they doe upon us; that things preſent do not paſſe by him, or from him, as they do from us. Whileſt things *preſent* paſſe from us, we likewiſe paſſe from them: for we continually loſe that portion of duration or coexiſtence which

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we had with them; alwayes gaining, whilest our glasse is in running, a new *erit* or link of coexistence with that which is next to come. Nothing, in this sense, can passe by God or from God, because He alwayes is, and the manner of his duration is indivisible: He cannot lose any existence by antiquity, nor gaine any new portion of duration, by everlasting continuance. Times passing exonerate themselves into the Ocean of his infinite duration, without inlarging it; times comming incessantly flow from it, without diminution of it. Times *future* againe, are said to come upon us, or to meet us; because our duration or existence cannot reach to future things, whilest they are future: the very Angels are not of so long standing or duration to day, as they shall be to morrow: unlesse things future did come towards them, and as it were meet them, they should have no coexistence with them. In this sense, times future cannot bee said to come upon God, because he alwayes is, and exists every way before them. His *duration* is *yesterday, to day, to morrow*, the same for ever; and every way the same without addition of quantity, without alteration of nature or quality: and in it are all things that are. So much of being as things *future* can bee said to have, they have it in *him* and from *him*: so much of being as there remaines of things *past*, remaineth in Him, and things *present*, even *presence* it selfe, cannot for a moment subsist, without Him.

CHAP.

Chap. 9.

Of Divine Immutability.

1  Ith these stemmes of Divine perfection hitherto expresst, another presents it selfe to our contemplation, which some Schoole-men have moulded in the same *conceipt* with *Eternity*; of which, others conceive it to bee the off-spring. Vs it sufficeth, that the true explication of the former, confirmes the truth of this attribute, whose briefe explication we now seeke. And perhaps, if I should speake properly, the Knowledge of it, is the Off-spring of our right knowledge of the former. The attribute it selfe, whose truth in former disputes hath beene supposed, is *Divine Immutability*; which may be thus demonstrated.

2 All mutation supposeth a defect or imperfection, either in respect of the *terme*, whence, or into which, the change is made; and therefore can have no place in absolute or abstract perfection, or in Essence infinite. More particularly, all mutation or change, is either in essence, in quantity, in place, or in quality; under which we comprehend all vitall endeavors, all acts of the Will or Vnderstanding. In essence or nature, it is impossible the totality and fountaine of Essence should admit any change, as impossible for him which hath no author of being,

Sect. 2. not to bee alwayes what hee is; as for that which now is not, to take his being to it ſelfe: unto infinit perfection (for ſuch hee is) what can accrew? On the other ſide, nothing can fall from it, but muſt fall into him; ſeeing, He is in being infinite. And in that he filleth every place by his eſſentiall preſence, it is impoſſible hee ſhould move from place to place, or be carryed by any circular motion, being indiviſibly and totally in every ſpace that can be imagined. And as his *Immenſity* could not bee extended or contracted by extenſion of new magnitudes, or by diminution or annihilation of the *old*; ſo neither can his *Eternity*, bee ſhortned or lengthned by continuation of ſucceſſion, or expiration of time or motion. *Power*, in like ſort, truly infinite, can admit no intenſion or remiſſion in endeavours; but moveth all things without motion, and worketh all things without labour or toyle inherent: For all things are made, and brought to nothing, by his ſole will or word. Nor ſpeakes hee ought, which from Eternity hee hath not ſpoken; albeit ſucceeding ages have ſtill new meſſengers of his eternall will and word, *All fleſh is as graſſe, and all the glory of man as the power of the graſſe; the graſs withereth, and the flower thereof falleth away. But the word of the Lord endureth for ever.* And yet this was that word of the Goſpell, which ſeemed then firſt to be preached unto them.

3 All the difficulty wherewith fleſh and blood in this article are uſually aſſaulted, or ſeeme to themſelves to be beſet, is, how his *will* or *counſaile* ſhould be eternally immutable, and yet everlaſtingly free: but

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but ſuppoſing, what we often promiſe, and once for all (by his aſſiſtance) ſhall undoubtedly prove; that abſolute contingency or *poſſibilities æquipendent* betwixt many effects, may as truly be the object of his Eternall decree, as neceſſity in other works of nature: I ſee not what appearance of difficultie can preſent it ſelfe, to ſuch, as beare the two former principles before mentioned *levell* in their minds and thoughts; the one, that *God is abſolute infinite in Being*; the other, that *Hee is abſolutely perfect*, according to all the branches of *Being* or perfection by us conceiveable; or, more than all theſe, *Perfection it ſelfe.* Now in things that have any better portion of Being, wherein they can truly delight; it is, to our apprehenſion, a degree or portion of perfection to have an immutable ſtate of ſuch *Being*; an imperfection, to bee ſubject to alteration or change. But, whether their eſtate bee mutable or immutable, it is a greater perfection to be free in their operations, than to bee reſtrained to ſome one or few particulars, without any choyce or variety of ſubjects, wherein they may exerciſe their operative faculties. Bruitiſh, or meerly ſenſitive creatures have a delectable kind of *Being*, whoſe continuance they deſire; but without all variety of choyce, or deſire of any better being although the beſt being they have be ſubject to alteration or change. Men are free in their operations; but mutable and ſubject to alteration, as well in their nature, as in their operations, or in the objects of their freedome; and yet are more excellent than the viſible Heavens, which are not obnoxious

Sect. 2. to alteration or corruption. So that, if the Heavens, or other incorruptible substances, had their freedome of choyce, which men have; they would bee more perfect and excellent creatures than man is: Or, if man were as immortall as they are, he would bee incomparably more perfect than they can bee, without the *freedome* of choyce or will; which (as we now suppose) is the inseparable consequent, or companion of *reason* or *intellectuall knowledge*. But, though freedome bee in it selfe a great perfection; yet to be free to doe evill, is a branch of imperfection, w^ch^ springs frō the mutability of the creatures freedome. And this their mutablity, though in it selfe an imperfection, yet is an imperfection necessarily prærequired, or præsupposed to the perfection of the creature. For no creature can bee truly perfect by nature, but by the will and pleasure of the Creator. And it is his will and pleasure, to make them mutable, before they bee immutably happy. But the Creator of all things, in that *He* is absolutely perfect, even Perfection it selfe, is essentially immutable, essentially free, and immutably happy; because infinitely good. Yet if we compare these attributes amongst themselves, *immutability* is the ground or supporter, not the Crowne or perfection of *free dome*, but freedome rather the perfection of immutability. Yet were freedome in it selfe, how perfect and compleat soever it were, no absolute perfection, unlesse it were immutably wedded unto goodnesse. Absolute *immutabilitie* and absolute *freedome*, may very well stand together, even in our conceipts; so they be rightly joyned, or sorted. To be

be freely immutable, implyes a contradiction; if not unto the nature of immutability, yet unto the nature of absolute perfection, or to our true conceipt of infinite Being. To be freely immutable, is a branch of imperfection or impotency; which might put all those perfections, which are contained in that nature which is no otherwise than freely immutable upon the hazard. If the divine Essence were freely immutable, or free in respect of his immutability, whether of nature or goodnesse; it were possible for him to put off these two attributes, and to cloath himselfe with mutability, which is alwayes charged with possibility of doing amisse. But to be immutably free, is no point of imperfection, but rather the period of perfection; and necessarily inferres this perfection (which wee call freedome) to be as unchangeable as the Attributes of power, of wisedome, of eternity, or goodnesse are. The excellency of his nature and Essence necessarily includes an Eternall libertie or freedome in the exercise of his omnipotent power, and in the influence or communication of his goodnesse; Free it is for him, from Everlasting to Everlasting, omnipotently to decree as well a mutability in the actions of some things created, as a necessity or immutability in the course or operation of nature inanimate: That, the course of mans life, or the finall doome awarded to every man (though that must be awarded unto all according to the diversity of their courses,) should be immutable; becaus they are foreset by an immutable omnipotent decree; hath no more colour of truth, than to say the Omnipotent Cap. 9.

Sect. 2. nipotent Creator, must needs be *blacke* becauſe he made the Crowes and Ebony blacke; or white, becauſe hee made the Snow and Swannes white; or greene and yellow, becauſe hee made the Gold yellow, and the Popinjayes greene: Or that hee ſhould be of all colours, becauſe the Rainebowe is his creature. Let vs beleeve then, that *He* is everlaſtingly and immutably free, to make creatures of what kinde it pleaſeth *Him*, that hee hath printed a reſemblance of his freedome in the mutabilitie of this inferiour world, and hath left a modell of his immutability in the celeſtiall and immortall ſubſtances. But the more immutable *Hee* is, the more irreſiſtible wee conceive his power to bee: or the greater his wiſedome is, the leſſe preventable the contrivances of it are: the worſe it would be with ſuch as have to deale with *Him*, were not his goodneſſe (which is the rule of his Eternall Decree) immutably as great, as *He* himſelfe, or his other Attributes are.

Chap. 10.

Of the Eternall and immutable Decree.



From all, or moſt of the former ſpeculations, concerning the ſeverall branches of the divine Attributes or perfections, ſomwhat may bee gathered, not unuſefull for rectifying or bettering our apprehenſions of Gods *abſolute and omnipotent Decree.*

cree. A point, though in all ages most difficult, yet in this age become so common, and so farre extended, that no Divine can adventure upon any other service profitable for the present estate of Christs Militant Church, but he shall be enforced either to make his passage through it, or come so nigh unto it, that he must, in good manners, dõe homage unto it. That this Decree is for its tenour, immutable, (if wee take it in the abstract, or as it is in God) is cleare from the attribute last handled; that the same Decree, is irresistible in its executions, or that the things decreed are inevitable, is evident from the attribute of Gods infinite Power or Omnipotency. That this immutable irresistible Decree, is Eternall, or before all Times, no man questions. Yet is it not agreed upon by all, either what a *Decree* is, or what it is to be *Eternall.* At least the most part doe not perfectly beare in minde, the true importances of an *Eternall Decree.* To this purpose have the former speculations concerning *Eternity*, and Gods infinite *wisedome* beene præmised; Lest, by the incogitant use of these and the like Scripture Phrases, [*God foreknowes* or hath *decreed* all things from *Eternity*;] that, slumber might creepe upon the unvigilant or unattentive Reader; with whose dreames many deceived, have thought and spoken of Gods Decree or predetermination of things to come, as of Acts already *irrevocably* finished and accomplished; And by a consequent errour, resolve that it is as impossible, for any thing to be otherwise than it is, will be, or hath beene; as it is to recall that againe, which is already past. In cap. 10.

Sect. 2. which conceipt, though they doe not expreſſely ſpeake or thinke it, they neceſſarily involve thus much [That God by his Eternall and powerfull Decree, did ſet the courſe of nature a going with an irreſiſtible, and unretractible *ſwindge*; and ſince onely lookes upon it, with an awfull eye, as Maſters ſometimes watch their ſervants, whether they goe the way they are commanded.] But it is a rule in Divinity, not contradicted, (for ought I know) by any Chriſtian, that there is altogether as great need and uſe of *power* and *wiſedome* infinite, to manage the world, as there was at firſt to make it, *Pater meus operatur adhuc* (ſaith the *Wiſedome of God) *et ego operor. My Father worketh hitherto, and I worke.* And as hee ceaſeth not to worke, ſo doth he never ceaſe to decree. *Omnia *operatur ſecundum conſilium voluntatis ſuæ. Hee worketh all things according the counſell of his Will.* So that albeit the Counſell of his Will, by which hee worketh, be Eternall; yet all things are not yet wrought by it. Shall we ſay then, he hath not decreed whatſoever doth or ſhall befall us? Yes, in this ſenſe wee may, [He doth not now firſt begin to decree thē:] but in as much as his Decrees have no end, wee ſhould remember withall, that hee now decrees them. And it were much safer for every man in particular to looke on Gods Decree concerning himſelfe, as preſent or coexiſtent to his whole courſe of life; rather than on it, as it was before the world, or in *Adam*: for ſo we ſhall thinke of it, as of an Act paſt and finiſhed, which hath denounced ſentence upon vs, more irrevocable than

* Ioh. 5. 17

* Epheſ. 1. 11.

than the Lawes of the *Medes* and *Perſians*. How-beit even theſe lawes, whiles they were in making, ſuppoſe that Liberty in their Makers, which they utterly tooke from them being once enacted. Cap. 10

2 Gods Decrees are like theirs, in that they are in themſelves unalterable: but not in that they make ſome evills, which befall others, inevitable; or ſome caſuall inconveniences, unamendable. No wiſedome, but that which is infinite, and an Eternall Law in it ſelfe, foreſeeing all things that poſſibly can bee, hath juſt warrant to make Decrees for men, everlaſtingly immutable. Too ſtrict obligement unto Lawes poſitive, or Decrees unalterable, deprives both Lawgivers and others of their native Liberty and opportunity of doing good. Were the *Popes* wiſedome and integrity parallell to that ſupereminent dignity, which hee challengeth; it were not amiſſe for the body whereof hee is the lawfull head, if hee exerciſed the ſame power over his Grants or Acts, that hee doth over his breath: alwayes reſerving a liberty to ſend them forth, or call them in, to enlarge, contract, or invert them, according to exigences or occaſions preſent. To alter his opinion of men, as they doe theirs in points of uſefull doctrine, or their demeanours in matters of life; curbing him this yeare, whom hee priviledged the laſt yeare; now puniſhing where he lately rewarded; and, ſhortly after, rewarding where now he puniſheth; would argue no mutability of mind, or unſetled fickle diſpoſition, but rather immoveable conſtancy; if ſo in all theſe changes he truly obſerved the rule of Iuſtice, which

Sect. 2. becauſe it is alwayes one and the ſame, and never varies, muſt needs afford different meaſures to different deſerts, and fit contrary diſpoſitions with contrary recompences. But ſeeing Princes and Governours, are made of the ſame corrupted mold with thoſe, whom they governe; oft-times expoſed by height of place to greater blaſts of mutabilility, and inconſtancy, than their inferiours; Publicke Lawes have beene ſought out by moſt Nations, to run like a ſtraight line, betwixt two diſtorted and crooked ones; and to bee as a firme, or barre, betweene the tumultuous and raging paſſions of Princes and ſubjects, which every foot (as we ſay) would fall foule were they not thus *fended* off, one from the other. Vpon this conſideration many Conquerours have beene content to ſheath up a great part of their illimited power (retayning ſome competent prerogatives to themſelves and their ſucceſſors) in publicke Edicts or Lawes, not altogether ſo unalterable as the Lawes of the *Medes* and *Perſians*: yet leſſe ſubject to change, then Lords purpoſes, or Princes pleaſures: and every Act wherto they paſſe their conſent, reſtraines them of ſome former liberty, and abates ſomewhat of their preſent greatneſſe; to whoſe length or continuance (as *Theopompus* obſerved) much by this meanes, is added; and it were better to live an hundred years, (as hee ſaid) with ingenuous *health* and *ſtrength* than to ſwagger it for twenty, with gyantly force, or Athleticall conſtitution. And albeit the Law (which is a common looking glaſſe to direct the Prince in commanding, and the ſubject in obeying) may

may ſometimes lay out authority, and ſomtimes *obedience*, or inflict puniſhment one while, and diſpenſe rewards another while, in meaſure greater or leſſe, than a wiſe & juſt Arbitrator, choſen for theſe particular purpoſes, would allow of; yet hath it beene thought fitteſt for all parts, rather to brooke theſe interpoſed miſchiefes, than to be perpetually ſubject to the former inconveniences of the Papacie; if the Popes (ſuch as they are) or other Princes ſhould practiſe according to the Canoniſts rule, *Papa nunquam ligat ſibi manus, The Pope never ties his owne hands.* cap. 10.

3 But the unerrable rule of everlaſting Iuſtice, who from eternity decrees, whatſoever may bee, and foreſees whatſoever will be, (becauſe Heaven and Earth may ſooner paſſe than his words or acts) *paſſeth* no act to the prejudice of his abſolute and eternall power of Iuriſdiction. What grant or promiſe ſoever he make, cannot binde the exerciſe of his everlaſting liberty, for a moment of time: they laſt no longer than *durante beneplacito:* ſeeing gracious *Equity*, and onely it, is his everlaſting pleaſure. He ever was, ever is, and ever ſhall be, alike indifferent and free to recompence every man according to his preſent wayes. And in that, hee alwaies ſearcheth the very heart and ſecret thoughts, and never ceaſeth to *decree*; his one and indiviſibly everlaſting decree, without any variety or ſhadow of change in it ſelfe; fits all the changes, ſeverall diſpoſitions, and contingent actions of Men and Angels, as exactly, as if he did conceive, and ſhape a new Law, for every one of them; and they are

Sect. 2. conceived and brought forth, as wel befitting them, as the skin doth the body, which nature hath enwrapped in it. No man living (I take it) will avouch any absolute necessity from all Eternity, that God should inevitably decree the deposition of *Elies* line from the Priesthood, or his two sonnes destructions by the Philistims: For this were to bereave him of his absolute and eternall liberty. I demand then, whether within the compass of time, or in eternity, as præexistent to *Elies* dayes, he past any act that could restraine his eternall liberty of honouring *Elies* families, as well as any others in their time? To say, He did, were impiety; because it chargeth the Almighty with impotent immutability. What shall wee say then? The deposition of his race, the sudden death and destruction of his sonnes, were not at all absolutely necessary, but necessarie only upon supposed miscariage of the possible meanes and opportunities, which hee had given them for honouring him. And that eternall decree, [*They that dishonour mee, them will I dishonour,*] as coexistent to the full measure of this their transgression, by it *shapes* their punishment.

4 To thinke of Gods eternall decree with admiration void of danger; we must conceive it, as the immediate *Axis* or Center, upon which every successive or contingent act revolves: and yet withall, *that*, wherein the whole *frame* of *succession* or *contingency* is fully comprehended, as an unconstant movable Sphere in a farre greater quiescent, or rather in such a one (as in the description of Eternity was imagined) which hath drawne all the successive

parts

parts of motion, into an indiviſible unity of duration permanent. Every part of the larger Sphere (this, ſwallowing up motion, in vigorous reſt) ſhould have coexiſtence locall with all and every part of the next movable Sphere under it, move it as ſlowly and ſwiftly, as the latitude of ſucceſſive motion can admit. Whileſt wee thus conceive of Gods eternall decree, and of his foreknowledge, (included in our conceipt of it) according to the Analogy of what we muſt beleeve, concerning the manner of his *ubiquitary preſence* or *immenſity*: we ſhall have no occaſion to ſuſpect, that his neceſſary foreknowledge of what we doe, ſhould lay a neceſſity upon our actions, or take away all poſſibility of doing otherwiſe. Rather, wee may by this ſuppoſall, beleeve that as probable, and perceive in part the manner how it is ſo, which ſhall by Gods aſſiſtance be demonſtrated to be *de facto* moſt true. As, firſt, that the Omnipotent doth eternally decree an abſolute contingency in moſt humane acts: Secondly, that this eternall act or decree (which we thus conceive to be throughout the whole ſucceſſion of time, in every place indiviſibly coexiſtent to each humane thought or action) doth not only perpetually ſupport our faculties, but withall unceſſantly inſpire them with contingency in their choice: that is, it ſo moves them, as they may without lett or incumbrance, move themſelves more wayes then one: And yet, even whileſt it ſo moves them, it withall inevitably effects the proportioned conſequents, which from everlaſting were foreordained to the choices, which we make, be they good cap. 10.

Sect. 2. good or bad; or according to the ſeverall degrees of good or evill done by us, or of our affections or deſires to doe them.

Chap. II.

Of tranſcendentall goodneſſe: and of the infinity of it in the Divine Nature.

IF in aſſigning reaſons of Maximes or proverbiall ſpeeches, wee might not bee thought to fetch light beyond the *Sunne*; we ſhould ſay, Life unto things living is therefore ſweet, becauſe it is a principall ſtemme of *being*, as ſweetneſſe likewiſe is of *goodneſſe*. However, we may reſolve this Phyſicall Axiome, into a Metaphyſicall: *Omne ens qua ens eſt bonum*; *Vnto every thing, its owne proper being is good.* Poyſon, though noyſome to man, to the Aſpe is pleaſant, ſo is venome to the Toad, and the Adder delighteth in his ſting. In things inanimate, there ſhould be no reluctance of contrary or hoſtile qualities, unleſſe each had a kinde of gratefull right or intereſt in their owne *being*, and were taught by nature to fight for it, as men doe for their lives or goods. This is that *goodneſſe* which we call *entitative* or *tranſcendentall.* A goodneſſe equally, alike truly communicated to al things that are, from his goodneſſe who onely is; but not participated equally, or according to equality, by all. For as the leaſt

leaſt veſſell that is filled to the brimme, is as full as the greateſt that can be, and yet the quantity of liquor contained in them equally full, is moſt unequall: So, albeit the entitative being of the Flye, Ant, or Worme, be unto them as good as mans being is to man: (For even the *Ant or Flye being vext*, or Wormes trod upon, will bewray their ſpleene, and labour as it were to right themſelves for the loſſe or prejudice which they ſuffer in their Entitative goodneſſe, by doing harmes to their tormentors) yet is mans *being* ſimply much better than the *being* of Ants or Wormes. And much worſe were that Man, than any Beaſt, that with *Gryllus* in the Poet, would like to change his humane nature, for a bruitiſh. This exceſſe of entitative goodneſſe, by which one creature excelleth another, accreweth partly from the excellency of the ſpecificall Nature or Entity which it accompanieth; as there is more Entitative goodneſſe in *being* a *Man* than in *being* a *Lyon*; and more in being a *Lion*, than in being ſome inferiour ignoble Beaſt: it partly accreweth according to the greater or leſſer meaſure, wherein ſeverall creatures enjoy their ſpecificall nature. Men though by nature equall, are not equally happy, either in body or minde. Bodily life in it ſelfe is ſweet, and is ſo apprehended by moſt; yet is loathſome to ſome; who (as we ſay) doe not enjoy themſelves, as none of us fully doe. Senſitive appetites may be in ſome meaſure ſatisfied by courſe, not all at once. The compleat fruition of goodneſſe incident to one, defeats another (though capable of greater pleaſure) for

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the time, of what it moſt deſires. *Venter non habet aures, The Belly pinched with hunger muſt be ſatisfied with meat,* ſo muſt the thirſty throat bee with drinke, before the eares can ſucke in the pleaſant ſound of muſicke, or the eye feed it ſelfe with freſh colours or proportions. Too much pampering bodily ſenſes, ſtarves the minde; and deepe contemplation feeds the minde, but pines the body. *Of making many Bookes* (ſaith * *Salomon*) *there is no end; and much ſtudy is a wearineſſe of the fleſh.* The more Knowledge we get, the greater capacity we leave unſatisfied; ſo that we can never ſeize upon the intire poſſeſſion of our owne ſelves: and contemplation (as the wiſe King ſpeaketh) were vanity, did we uſe the pleaſures of it any otherwiſe, than as pledges or earneſt of a better life to come. And albeit man, in this life, could poſſeſſe himſelfe as intirely as the Angels doe their Angelicall Natures, yet could not his entitative goodneſſe or felicity, be ſo great as theirs is; becauſe the proper patrimony which he poſſeſſeth, is neither ſo ample nor ſo fruitfull. God alone is *infinite*, in being *infinitely* perfect; and he alone, *infinitely* enjoyes his intire *being*, or perfection. The tenure of his *infinite* joy or happineſſe, is infinitely firme, infinitely ſecured of being alway what it is; never wanting ſo much as a moment of time, to inlarge or perfect it by continuance, uncapable of any inlargement or increaſe for the preſent. But this entitative or tranſcendentall goodneſſe, is not that which wee now ſeeke; whereto notwithſtanding it may lead us. For even amongſt viſible creatures, the better every one is in

* Eccles 12. 12.

in its kind, or according to its entitative perfection, the more good it doth to others. The trueſt meaſure of their internall or proper excellencies, is their beneficial uſe or ſervice in this great Vniverſe, whereof they are parts. What Creature is there almoſt in this whole viſible Sphere, but ſpecially in this inferiour part, which is not beholden to the Sunne; from whoſe comfortable heat, *Nothing* (as the * Pſalmiſt ſpeakes) *can be hid?* It is at leaſt, of liveleſſe or meere bodies, in it ſelfe, the beſt and faireſt; and farre the beſt to others. And God (as it ſeemes) for this purpoſe, ſends forth this his moſt conſpicuous and goodly meſſenger, every morning like a bridegroome bedeckt with light and comelineſſe, to invite our eyes to looke up unto the Hils whence commeth our Helpe: upon whoſe tops he hath pitched his glorious Throne, at whoſe right hand is fulneſſe of pleaſures everlaſting. And from the boundleſſe Ocean of his internall or tranſcendent joy and happineſſe, ſweet ſtreames of perpetuall joy and comfort, more unceſſantly iſſue, than light from the Sunne, to refreſh this vale of miſery. That of men the chiefe inhabitants of this great Vale, many are not ſo happy as they might be, the chiefe cauſes are; that, either they doe not firmly beleeve the internall *happineſſe* of their Creator, to be abſolutely infinite as his other attributes are; or elſe conſider not in their hearts, that the abſolute *infinitie* of this his internall happineſſe, is an eſſentiall cauſe of goodneſſe (in it kinde, infinite) unto all others, ſo farre as they are capable of it; and capable of it all reaſonable creatures, by creation, are: none

cap. 11.

* Pſ. 19. 6.

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but themſelves can make them uncapable of happineſſe, at leaſt, in ſucceſſion or duration, infinite. *Goodneſſe* is the *nature* of *God*; and it is the nature of goodneſſe to communicate it ſelfe unto others, unto all that are not overgrowne with evill: of which goodneſs it ſelfe can be no cauſe or author.

Chap. 12.

Of the infinitie and immutability of Divine goodneſs communicative, or as it is the patterne of morall goodneſſe in the creature.

1  He father of Epicures, wil have more than his ſonnes, to conſent with him, that imbecility and indigence, are the uſuall parents of Pitie, Bountie, Kindneſſe, or other like branches of communicative humane goodneſs. Whileſt we need not others helpe, we little thinke in what need they ſtand of ours. The Prince in his jollity, can hardly compaſſionate the beggers miſery: nor knowes the Begger how to bemone decayed Nobles: whoſe condition is more miſerable than his owne, though ſo it ſeemes not unto him; who would thinke he had fully conquered want, were hee but furniſhed with ſuch ſupplies of meat, drinke, and clothing, as theſe have alwayes ready at hand. That ſympathy, which in liveleſſe or reaſonleſſe creatures, naturally flowes from ſimilitude of internal qualities, ſeldome breaks forth

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forth in men; but either from experimentall remembrance of what lately hath, or from apprehension of what shortly may befall themselves: sight of the like afflictions in others, as wee have lately felt, revives the phantasmes or affections which were companions of our mourning; and so by pitying of our owne former plight, we pity them.

2 But albeit *Epicurus* observation may seeme in a manner universall, whilest applyed to its proper subject *Man in his corrupt state*; yet when he transcends *à genere ad genus*, from our corruptible nature to the divine nature, which is immortall; his inference is of the same stampe with those fooles inductions, that concluded in their hearts, *There was no God.* The divine nature (saith he) is not penetrable by mercy or pitie: Why so? Will you heare a bruit make *Enthymems?* Because these finde no entrance into the hearts of men, but through some breach of defect or indigence. It is well this slow-bellyed evill beast, could grant mans nature not to bee altogether so bad or cruell, as want might not tame it, and make it gentle and kinde. But would not bruit beasts, so they might speake, disclaime his conclusion; that true felicity or fulnesse of all contentment possible, should make the divine nature worse, than want and misery doth the humane? Surely, there is somewhat else amisse in that, which is made better by defect. Nor could wealth and honour make the mighty unmindfull of others, but by making them first forget themselves. The externalls whereon our desires fasten, so captivate the humane soule, that she cannot doe as she would, or

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as nature teacheth her; but these strings being cut, she followes her native sway. And in a good sense it was most true, which a Master of a better sect, than *Epicurus* founded, hath taught; *Nemo sponte malus.*

3 Lust in old Age, Pride in Beggars, and shifting in men overflowing with wealth, seeme to transcend the nature of sinnes, and are monsters in corrupted nature; because, not begotten by temptations, they in a manner beget themselves: yet scarce shall we finde an old man so prone to Lust, a rich man so delighted in shuffling, an Epicure so addicted to his pleasure, or any at all so ill affected either in himselfe or towards other; that being askt, wold not professe his desire to deserve well of others, to be liberall, to bee upright, compassionate, just and bountifull. For though continuãce in bad custome, induce in a sort, another nature; yet can it not transport any man so farre beyond himselfe, or miscarry his thoughts so much, but he shall feele some secret impulsions unto goodnesse, and some retractions from evill. But as * *Seneca* well obserues, *It is no*

* *Quod plerosq; inemendabiles facit, omnium aliarum artium peccata, artificibus pudori sunt offenduntq; : ervantem in vita peccata delectant.*

Non gaudet navigio Gubernator eversо, non gaudet ægro Medicus elato; non gaudet Orator, si patroni culpa reus cecidit. At contra omnibus crimen suum voluptati est. Lætatur ille Adulterio, in quod irritatus est ipsa difficultate: lætatur ille circumscriptione furtoq;, nec ante illi culpa, quam culpæ fortuna displicuit. Id prava consuetudine evenit. Alioqui ut scias, subesse animis, etiam in pessima abductis, boni sensum, nec ignorari turpe, sed negligi, omnes peccata dissimulant, & quamvis feliciter cesserint, fructu illorum utuntur, ipsa subducunt. At bona conscientia prædire vult, & conspici. Ipsas nequitia tenebras timet. Elegantер itaq; ab Epicuro dictum puto, Potest nocenti contingere ut lateat, latendi fides non potest. Aut si hoc modo melius hunc explicari posse iudicas sensum: Ideo non prodest latere peccantibus, quia latendi etiam si facultatem habent, si duciam non habent. Ita est, tuta scelera esse possunt: secura non possunt. Seneca Epist. 97.

marvaile

marvaile that we do not amend what we know to be amisse in our selves; seeing errors in every other mystery or profession, make the professor ashamed: Onely such as erre in matter of life & manners are delighted with their errours. The Mariner takes no delight to see his vessell overturned, nor the Physitian in sending his Patient before his time unto his grave. The Orator rejoyceth not when his Clyent is through his errour overthrowne. Contrariwise every criminous person is delighted with his crime. One solaceth himselfe in Adultery, and taketh courage to prosecute his desires from the very difficulty of accomplishing thē. Another delights in over-reaching others, and in theft; never displeased with his faultinesse, untill it prove unfortunate. All are apt to dissemble their faults, being content when they fall out fortunately, to reape the fruit of them, whilest they subduct the faults of them; but, a good conscience delighteth to set it selfe forth and to have notice taken of it, whereas naughtinesse is afraid of darkenesse it selfe. And as *Epicurus* elegantly saith, *A malefactor may have the hap, but not the assurance to be undiscovered. But* (as this Author replyes) *what availes it him not to have his naughtinesse discovered, without hope or assurance that it shall not be discovered. His conclusion is, naughtinesse may be safe, but it can never be secure.*

4 The reason why their naughtinesse can never be warranted with security, is; becaus conscience in men most vicious, still beares evidence against them, that they live not as shee would have them. For (as *Seneca* in the same place well obserues) *though bad custome may worke a delight in naughtinesse,*

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neſſe, yet even in minds drencht in the very dregges of filthineſſe, there ſtill remaines a ſenſe of goodneſſe: nor is it ſo much our want of knowledge, as of our right eſtimate of what we know to be nought, which maketh naughtineſſe to bee ſo litle abhorred. The minde of man, in that it is indued with reaſon, hath the rules of Equity imprinted in it; which it alwayes ſeekes to inſtampe upon the inferior faculties of the ſoule. But this divine light of reaſon, hath as ſmall force to kindle the love of vertue in hearts overgrowne with ſenſuall deſires, as the Sunne in a miſt, hath to ſet moiſt ſtuffe on fire. The unſetled affections of youth, ſometimes admit the impreſſion of theſe ideall characters, in actuall retired ſpeculations; ſo will the water take the ſame ſhape from the ſeale, which the waxe doth, but hold it no longer than the ſeale is held upon it. The heart, which maturity of years hath hardened with vaſt deſires, will as hardly bee wrought into a new forme; as the ſtone, which cannot take any other ſhape, but only by loſing ſome of its maſſe or ſubſtance; yet if thoſe vaſt deſires be cut off, or their hopes of ſupplyes from externalls, intercepted; the ſoule, thus freed, becomes more faſhionable unto reaſon. Affability, which is as the ſuperficiall draught of reaſon indeavouring to ſtampe the heart with reall and ſolid kindneſſe; is as naturall to the Epicure, as to another man, ſo long as the exerciſe of it is not prejudiciall to his belly. And the leſs his deſires were to ſatisfie it, the larger would the extenſion of his bowels of compaſſion be towards his brethren, or poore neighbours; ſome drops of *kindneſſe* may diſtill from him in the over-

flow

flow of plentie or ſtore ſufficient to feed both eye and appetite. But in the daies of ſcarcity, he ſuckes in cruelty as wine, and feedes upon the needy as upon delicates: Were there no more ſweet morſels in the market, than would ſerve one man; not one of this crew, but would cut them out of his Fathers throat, rather than ſuffer his owne weaſand to bee defeated of its intemperate expectations. Indigence then, though *Epicurus* could not ſee ſo much, is, upon different occaſions, the mother as well of cruelty and oppreſſion, as of bounty or pitty. cap. 12.

5 From doing to all, as we would be done unto by any, nothing doth hinder us ſo much (if ought beſides doe hinder us at all) as our conceipted or opinative want of ſomewhat, which either for the preſent we doe, or hereafter may ſtand in need off, for ſatisfying the variety or unconſtant longings of our unknowne deſires. How well ſoever they may ſpeake or proteſt, experience ſchooles us; not to truſt any that fixe their expectations upon great matters, or have one eye alwayes upon their private ends, but with this limitation; if the premiſſes they now make ſhall not croſſe their opportunities, when matters come to tryall. But if wee know a man of meanes more than competent for maintayning that eſtate wherein his conſtant reſolution hath pitcht content, one otherwiſe of temperate deſires, and compoſed affections, able to diſcerne what is fitting betwixt man and man; wee thinke him a fit rule for directing others, a patterne whereto would all conforme themſelves, nothing

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should goe amisse in Church or Common weale. No man that conceives his owne cause to bee *just* and good, but would commend it to his arbitrement before anothers. For internall moderation mixt with outward competency, is the onely supporter of true constancy. Yet cannot this mixture, in any created Essence bee so firme or permanent, but possibilities or opportunities of satisfying some internall latent capacities, by externall proffers, may dissolve it. For finite existence hath possibility of nonexistence to controll it, and possibility of nonexistence includes possibility of being otherwise than it is. And therefore it is never impossible to finite being either to lose it selfe, or change his properties. A more particular root of this contingency, or unconstancy in reasonable creatures or intelligent, is the infinite capacity of their conceipts or desires; within whose compasse their finite motions may become *excentricke* and *irregular*, as it were a star fixed in too wide a sphere. The desires of collapsed *Angells*, were once tuned by their Creator in as perfect harmony as any creatures could be: They had all cõpetency that could be desired, wherher of internall faculties, or of objects to cõtent thẽ. Howbeit, whilst the cheife Ringleader of this rebellious Rout, sought to satisfie this *infinitie* of his desire; not by participation of his joyfull presence, who was infinitely good; but by affecting that greatnesse and Majesty infinite, which he was enabled to conceive, but whereof his nature was more uncapable than a whirry of an *Argeses eyes* saile; his capacities did overcope. And his intemperate

temperate longings, while hee was in travell of this prodigious birth, hath imprinted that ugly shape upon him, which now he beares. He is become the monstrous brood of his owne monstrous and deformed desires; his mouth opening too wide to swallow that which is incomprehensible, could never since be shut; his ravenous appetite cannot be satisfied. Like the grave he feedes on rottennesse, and by continuall gnawing and devouring that which cannot satiate, he continually encreaseth his unquenchable hunger. His will is wedded unto mischiefe, and affecteth nothing but that which is by nature evill; & amongst evils that most greedily and unceassantly, which is most contrary to *infinite goodnes*. The first man by this monsters impulsion, reaching too high for that which hee could not compasse, did put himselfe from off the appointed Center of his rest and revolutions; and since continueth irregular and unconstant in all his motions, thoughts, and actions. In him, in our selves, in the whole nature (besides that part which hath firme union with the infinite Essence) wee finde the Maxime infallibly verified, *Mota facilius moventur*. By our first Parents needlesse yeelding to one temptaion, wee are not able to resist any; Our resolutions to follow that which wee acknowledge to bee good, or our adhærence unto that infinite goodnesse, from which hee divorced his will; can never in this life bee so firme and strong, but the allurements to contrary evills, may bee so great or so cunningly proposed by the great Tempter, that, without especiall grace Cap. 12

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6 That which most improoveth the force of temptations, whether suggested by want or indigence, or by other occasions or opportunities; is the inequalitie, partly of our naturall propensions, partly of meanes which minister their severall contentments or annoyances. Wealth, in some men, gets the start of Wit, and overswayes them (otherwise not much mis-inclined) unto such vanities, as usually are neither bredd nor nursed, but by abundance. Others wits over-reach their revenues; and imboldens them to stretch their projects or inventions beyond the rules of right and equity. Some mens bodies overgrow their soules; and these are easily impelled to act any boysterous mischiefe: Others being impotent of bodie, strive so much the more to furnish their minds with subtill inventions or commodious experience: and by making too much use of the common Proverbe, [*Hee that is weake had need to beewilie*,] are easily tempted to practise unlawfull

lawfull pollicy, with delight; as the onely preſervative againſt contempt, or as an inſtrument of revenge upon ſuch as they hate or feare. And it would goe much againſt the courſe of common experience, if that wilineſſe which hath weakneſſe for its foundation, ſhould not be often enforced to cover or ſhelter it ſelfe with craft and fraud. To love our owne wils, is an impotency naturall unto all. And wee love them the better, at leaſt more ſtrongly, when we perceive them ſet on that which in it ſelfe is good. Whence it is, that our deſires of doing many things which are good and commendable, often draw us to uſe meanes not ſo commendable, for their accompliſhment. Many, out of an extraordinarie good will unto the poore, thinke it no robbery to cozen the rich; or to diſpenſe with publike Lawes for gratifying ſome private friend, whoſe welfare in conſcience they are bound to tender. Vnto theſe, and many like enormities, the infinite Capacity of finite Exiſtence gave firſt poſſibility of being, and the inequality of our internall propenſions, which can never fitly match or hold juſt proportion with external occurrences, gives life and improvement. cap. 12.

7 But in the incomprehenſible Sphere, which hath Vbiquity for its Center, and Omnipotency for its *Axis*; whoſe numberleſſe *lines* are all poſſible perfections, *meaſureleſſe*; there is no place for exorbitancie. One branch of *Being*, cannot miſ-ſway or over-toppe another; all being ſo great and firme, as none can bee greater or

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8 And though theſe firſt aſſurances of his goodneſſe and loving kindneſſe, bee uſually requited on mans

mans part with unkindneſſe and deſpight: yet the greatneſſe of his Majeſty, never ſwayes him to ſudden revenge. Quite contrary to the corrupt nature of man, (whoſe *goodneſſe* uſually is ill-thriven by his over-growing *greatnes:*) the unreſiſtible ſtrength of his Almighty power, is the unmovable pillar of moderation and merciſull forbearance. The greateſt potency of man being but finite, the higher it growes, the apter it is to be overtopt with jealous impotency. The greateſt Monarch that is, may be prevented by others, (of whoſe power hee is jealous) in the exerciſe of his power or authority over him; unleſſe he carefully watch his time, and fit ſeaſons, or take opportunity when it is offered, for accompliſhing his projects. But of God, ſaith the Wiſeman, *Wiſd.* 12.18. *Thou muſtering thy power judgeſt with equity, and ordereſt, or governeſt us with great favour; for thou maiſt uſe power when thou wilt. And his will is to uſe it, when men will not beleeve that he is of full power to doe what hee will*; as the ſame Wiſeman expreſſeth, *verſe* 17. But more full unto our preſent purpoſe, are the ſayings of the ſame Wiſeman, *verſ.* 15, 16. *For ſo much then as thou art righteous thy ſelfe, thou ordereſt all things righteouſly; thinking it not agreeable with thy power to condemne him that hath not deſerved to bee puniſhed. For thy power is the beginning of righteouſneſſe, and becauſe thou art the Lord of all, it maketh thee to bee gracious to all.* Though this Author be not, yet this paſſage in him, is canonicall, and fully conſonant to Gods owne words to *Ionah*, Chap. 4. 10, 11. *Then ſaid the Lord, thou haſt had pitie on the Gourd, for the which thou*

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9 As the fountaine of bodily light cannot ſend forth darkneſſe, but uniformly diffuſeth light; and light onely throughout this viſible Sphere: ſo cannot

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not the infinite Ocean of true felicity, send forth any influence, but such as is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse; wherewith every creature capable of them, was sowne in its first creation. And, as it is the property of light propagated or diffused from the Sunne, to make such bodies as are capable of its penetration (as Glasses, Crystall, Pearle, &c.) secondary fountains of light to others: so doth the influence of divine goodnesse, inspire all that are conformable to his will, with desire of doing to others as he hath done to them; that is, of being secondary authors or instruments of good to all. But such as wilfully strive against the streame of his over-flowing goodnesse, or boysterously counterblast the sweet and placide spirations of celestiall influence, become creators of their owne woe, and raise unto themselves those storms wherin they perish. Yet so essentiall it is unto this infinite Fountaine of goodnesse, however provoked, to send forth onely streames of life; and such is the vertue of the streames which issue from him, that as well the evil and miseries which miscreants procure unto themselves, as their mischievous intentions towards others, infallibly occasion increase of joy and happinesse unto all that give free passage unto their current. And this current of life, which issueth from this infinite Ocean, never dryes up, is never wasted by diffusion: The more it is dammed or *quarued* by opposition of the sonnes of darknesse, the more plentifully it overflowes the sons of light. All the good which one refuseth or putteth from them, returnes in full measure to the other.

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But if the miſeries which wicked ſpirits, or their conſorts, either ſuffer themſelves, or intend to others, worke good to thoſe that receive the influence of infinite goodneſſe; might he not without prejudice, or imputation, inſpire theſe caſtawayes with ſuch miſchievous thoughts, or at leaſt intend their woe and miſery, as theſe are occaſions or meanes of others happineſſe, or of his glory? Wee are indeed forbid to doe evill that good may enſue; but if it bee his will to have reprobates doe or ſuffer evill for the good of his choſen, ſhall not both bee good, as willed by him, whoſe will (in that hee hath abſolute dominion over all his creatures) is the rule of goodneſſe?

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In what sense, or how Gods infinite will is said to be the rule of goodnesse.

1 

Sad was the doctrine, and worse the application or use, which *Anaxarchus* would have gathered from some Hieroglyphicall devices of Antiquity; wherein Iustice was painted as *Iupiters* assistant in his Regiment. Hereby, saith this Sophister unto *Alexander*, (then bitterly lamenting the death of his dearest Friend *Clytus*, whom he had newly slaine in his temulent *rage*) your Majesty is given to understand, that the decrees of great Monarchs, who are a kinde of Gods on earth, must be reputed Oracles of Iustice, and their practices may not be reputed unjust either by themselves, or by others. But this sophisticall inversion of these Ancients meaning, was too palpable to please either the wiser or honester sort of Heathen, though living in those corrupt times. For albeit many of them conceived of *Iupiter*, as of a great King, subject to rage and passion, yet all of them held *Iustice* for an upright, milde, and vertuous Lady; ready alwayes to mitigate, ne-

Sunt qui scribant, Anaxarchum solitum eo studio quo cauta accedi unum, ad eum venisse quumque cubantem atque suspirantem offendisset, arridentem dixisse, ignorare ipsum cur veteres sapientes Iustitiam Iovi assidentem fecerint: nimirum quia quicquid à Iove decernitur, id juste factum esse censeri debent, ipsorum igitur, quæ à magno Rege fierent, justa existimari; primum quidem ab ipso Rege, deinde à cæteris mortalibus. Atque hac quidem dicta non nihil solatii Alexandro attulisse. Ego vero majoris errati quam priùs autorem Alexandro Anaxarchum fuisse censeo, talem virì sapientis sententiam esse statuit. Arrian. de expedit. Alex. lib. 4.

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ver to ratifie his rigorous decrees; alwayes tempering his wrath with equity. The true Iehovah, as hee needes no sweet-tongued consort to moderate his anger, as *Abigail* did *Davids*; so hath hee no use of such Sophisters as *Anaxarchus*, to justifie the equity of his decrees, by his Omnipotent Soveraignty or absolute dominion over all his creatures.

2 To derogate ought from his power, who is able to destroy both soule and body in hell fire, I know is dangerous; and to compare the prerogatives of most absolute earthly Princes with his, would be more odious. Yet this comparison I may safely make: * Hee doth not more infinitely exceed the most impotent wretch on earth in power and greatnesse, than he doth the greatest Monarch the world hath, or ever had, in Mercy, Iustice, and Lovingkindnesse; nor is his will the rule of Goodnesse, because the designes thereof are backt by infinite power; but because holines doth so rule his power, and moderate his will, that the one cannot enjoyne, or the other exact any thing not most consonant to the eternall or abstract patternes of equity. His will revealed doth sufficiently warrant all our actions, because we know, that he wils nothing but what is just and good; but this no way hindereth, but rather supposeth Iustice and Goodnesse to be more essentiall objects of his will, than they are of ours. And therefore when it is said [Things are good because God wils them] this *illative* infers only the cause of our knowledge, not of the goodnes wch we know: and the logicall resolution of this vulgar Dialect, would be this, *We know this or that to be good, because Gods*

* *Quanto superior est Deus omine, tam mea malitia est inferior bonitate eius, ut qualitate ita etiam quantitate. Anselm. in meditat. cap. 8.*

Gods will revealed commends it for such. But his will revealed commends it for such, because it was in it nature good; for unlesse such it had bin, he had not willed it. These principles though unquestionable to such as fetch their Divinity from the Fountaine, will perhaps in the judgement of others that never taste it but in trenches, be lyable to these exceptiõs. cap. 12.

3 If the goodnesse of every thing presuppose its being, & nothing can be without Gods will, what cã be good (we speake in order of nature, not of time) before God wills it? Of being or goodnesse actually existent in any creature, it is most true, neither can be without some precedent Act of Gods will. But as there is a *logicall possibilitie* presupposed to the working of the Almighty power: so is there a goodnesse *objective* precedent in order of nature, to the Act or exercise of his will. And unto some things considered as *logically possible*; this *goodnesse objective* is so essentially annexed; that if it bee his will to give them actuall being, they must of necessity be actually good; nor can hee that can doe all things, will their contraries. Hee might, had it pleased him, have taken life and existence from all mankind, when he preserved *Noah* and his Family. But to reserve them men, and no reasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent; much lesse doth his omnipotency enable him to worke ought contradictory to his owne *nature* or essentiall *goodnesse*. As is the man, so is his strength, and as is the *nature* of the *willer*, such are the objects of his will. *Simile gaudet simili.* To long after such meats as feed diseasefull humors, is naturall to eve-

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ry diſeaſe. And our nature being corrupted, whets our appetites to ſuch things as are agreeable to the prædominant corruption wherewith it is tainted, not to the purity wherein it was created. To will onely that which is conſonant to his nature, is ſo much more eſſentiall to God, than unto us, by how much his nature is more ſimple than ours is. And ſeeing it is eſſentiall purity, altogether uncapable of corruption, his will cannot pitch but on that which is pure and holy. Whence the prime rule of all goodneſſe, *without himſelfe*, is conſonancy to his eſſentiall purity and Iuſtice. *For as much as thou art righteous thy ſelfe, thou ordereſt all things righteouſly, thinking it not agreeable to thy power to condemne him that hath not deſerved to bee puniſhed. Wiſdome* 12. 15. He loveth truth and ſincere dealing becauſe he himſelfe is true and *juſt*. That *veracitie* which is coeternall to his Eſſence, includes an everlaſting enmity unto treachery, fraud, and perjurie; his immortally ſpotleſſe and unchangeable purity, cannot approve of luſt and intemperancie, or condemne chaſtity in any perſon at any time. Nor could hee have given a Law, as ſome lawleſſe Lawgivers have done, for the authorizing of promiſcuous or prepoſterous luſt. To legitimate violence or entitle oppreſſion unto the inheritance bequeathed to conſcionable and upright dealing, is without the prerogative of omnipotency; it cannot be ratified by any Parliament of the Trinitie, bleſt for ever. The practiſe, or countenance of theſe and the like, are evill; not in us only, to whom they are forbidden; but ſo evill in themſelves, that the

the Almighty could not but forbid and condemne thē, as professt Enemies to his most sacred Majestie.

4 To square great mens actions to the dictates of reason or nature, given in their good dayes, or to bring their wills within compasse of any constant Law; seemes greater violence, than if wee should seeke to fashion their bodies by handsome well proportioned garments, but much too strait. And yet we see by daily experience, that such as are most impatient of *regulation* or restraint, are most importunate to have their owne unruly wills, the rules of their inferiours minds and consciences. To doe otherwise than they would have them, though they alleage the dictates both of reason and Gods word, will admit no appeale from the censure of *peevishnesse* or perverseneſſe. But for them to set constant patternes of that moralitie or good behaviour, whose defects in inferiours they either punish or make advantage of; is reputed a kinde of *Pedantisme*, or *Mechanicall* servitude. To request such performances, seemes as harsh, as if we should intreat them to set us copies, or songs, or take paines in teaching us some honest trade. And seeing inferiours, are secretly blinded with this pride of heart, which breakes forth more violently in superiours; most of both rankes, measure Gods will by their owne. But if we will condemne this impatience of restraint, as a fault in our selves, we must of necessity acquite the Almighty from the like. The infinite greatnesse of his Majesty, cannot wrest his most holy will from strict observance of such rules of *Righteousneſſe* as he sets us to follow. That integrity

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5 This may instruct us, that those patternes of Holinesse or perfections which wee are bound to imitate in *Him*, are not to bee taken from his bare Commandement, or revelation of his will, but from the objects of his will revealed, or from the eternall practises which hee hath exhibited; as so many expresse or manifest proofes, that his will is alwayes Holy and Iust: albeit we cannot alwayes so expressely discerne the manner how it is just and holy in some particular Commandements; but must implicitely beleeve it to bee such in them, because it is so eminently and apparantly holy and just,

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just in those perfections, whereof our generall duties are the imperfect representations. Of all his morall commandements, not one there is, whose sincere practise doth not in part make vs truly like him; & we are bound to be conformable to his will revealed, that we may be cõformable to his *nature*; without conformity whereunto, wee cannot participate of his happinesse; For, Happinesse is the immediate consequent of his nature. The antecedent of *Lactantius* Argument, [*Qui nos irasci jubet, is utiq; irascitur,*] .i. *He that biddeth us be angry, is certainly angry himselfe,*] is not so certaine or authentique, and the inference is somewhat doubtfull. But out of all question, he that bids us unfaignedly blesse our persecutors, doth unfaignedly tender his blessings to such as persecute *Him* in his members. He that seriously exhorts us to bee mercifull and kind to all, sheweth kindnesse to the most unkinde. That charity which hee hath injoyned every man towards all (his greatest enemies not excepted) though we consider it in the most charitably minded Martyrs, in whose death it seemed to shine, were but as weake sparkles, or vanishing smoake, of those infinite and eternall flames of love, which burst out in him toward such, as have deserved worse at his hands, than any Tyrant of his tormented servants. That truth and fidelity, which he exacts of us, the faithfulnesse of *Abraham* himselfe; is but a little mappe, or narrow surface of that infinite *solidity* of *truth*, whereon his promises are *founded*. Betweene the chastity and temperance of purest virgins, and his eternall purity, there is the like true correspon-

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dency; but not so great, as there is betwixt the dross and corpulency, and the refined or sublimated spirits of the same bodies. Or could that rule, which is the fulfilling of the whole Law and the Prophets, *Doe unto every man as we would be done unto*; be exactly fulfilled by us; it would bee but a slender, though a true modell or representation of his eternall equity. *He that honoureth me, him will I honor.* For in this, and the like, hee expects no more than the inward affection of mortall hearts, or prayses of man whose breath is in his nostrills, being ready out of his goodnesse, to recompence these silly services, with glory, love and happiness everlasting. But doth he intend thus well to all, or destruction unto some, as it is a *meanes* of blisse to those whom he loves? If so he did, we might bee exempt from that negative precept, of not doing evill that good might ensue. For the only reason why we are bound not to doe so, is because in so doing wee should become unlike our heavenly Father, and *not be perfect* as he *is perfect*. But as he turnes the voluntary evils of some, to the good of others; so may wee, and ought to consecrate such forfeitures, as legally fall into our hands to pious uses; or better the states of such as tender publike welfare, by others deserved harmes.

6 Be it then granted, (which is the root of all objections against these resolutions) that Gods glory must as well appeare in the punishment of the Reprobate, as in the beatifying of the Elect; the consequence will bee quite contrary to that which their objections would hence inferre; For, if the foun

foundation of Gods glory, bee as sure in the one case, as in the other; the manner of his dealing with both must bee alike perfect, and alike behovefull for us to follow. *Sine bonitate (saith Seneca) nulla majestas, Goodnesse is the foundation of glory.* Now, were it true, that hee did intend evill to some, before they had committed any (though not as evill to them, but as a meanes of others good) or absolutely ordained them to eternall inevitable misery, for the advancement of his owne glory; wee should not sinne, but rather imitate the perfection of our heavenly Father, in robbing *Iudas* to pay *Peter*, or in feeding the hungry, such especially as be of the houshold of Faith, with the spoiles of ungodly rich men, or unbeleevers. More warrantable it were to guesse at the perfection of his Iustice towards the wicked, and of his bounty towards the godly, by the commendable shadow or imitatiō of it in earthly Gods. To procure the com mon good without intention of harme to any, and with admission of as few private mischiefes as may be, is the chiefe praise of great States-men. And it is the glory of Princes, to encourage all men unto vertuous courses by good example, gratious exhortations, and unpartiall distribution of publike honors or commodities: and yet withall to inflict disgrace upon haughty contemners of those gratious allurements; and to be sterne in execution of Iustice (without favour) upon notorious transgressors of wholesome Lawes. Yet not to use severity without sorrow, nor draw blood but by way of medicine; for preserving of their cap. 13.

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Crownes and dignities, for maintenance of publike peace, or for preventing the like diseases in other particular members of the same body. Magistrates that would mind these matters, more than raysing themselves, their friends, or posterity, more than life it selfe, which they owe unto their Countrey; should exhibite us a true modell, though (God wot) but a slender one of our heavenly Fathers wisdome and loving kindnesse: first in drawing men to repentance, by gratious promises, and unfaigned proposalls of inestimable rewards for their service: Secondly, in making the wicked and obstinate despisers of his infinite goodnesse, serve to the manifestation of his endlesse glory, and confirmation of those that love him in the immortall state of happinesse. These prints of his Fatherly care and Iustice, are yet fresh to bee seene in his proceedings with ungratious *Cain*. *And the Lord said unto Cain, why art thou wroth? and why is thy countenance fallen? if thou doe well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sinne lyeth at the doore: And unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him*, Gen. 4. *ver.* 6, 7. Severe punishment for doing evill, without precedent loving instructions, or good encouragement to doe well, is the naturall of-spring of unnaturalnesse. It beares no shadow of that *Iustice* or equity, whose glorious patterne shines most brightly in our heavenly Father.

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Chap. 14.

Of Gods infinite love to mankind.

1 IF the Apoſtles authority could not perſwade us to beleeve, his reaſons would inforce us to grant, that the *iſſues* of *bleſſing* and *curſing* from one and the ſame mouth, are contrary to the courſe of nature, and argue the nature of man, (in whom alone this diſcord is found) to be much out of tune. *Out of the ſame mouth proceedeth bleſſing and curſing, my brethren, theſe things ought not ſo to be.* Iam. 3. 10. For nature in other things gives you a better example. *Doth a fountaine ſend forth at the ſame place, ſweet water and bitter? Can the Figtree, my brethren, beare Olive berries? either a Vine figs? &c.* Theſe and the like fountaines of naturall truth, are as open to us, as they were to him, and wee ſhould much wrong both this Ambaſſador of Chriſt, and Gods image in our ſelves, if we did beleeve them only for his authority, and not for their owne native perſpicuity. The beſt uſe of Apoſtolique authority, in theſe allegations, is to warrant our uſe of the like, though in matters divine: not one of his inſtances but holds as truly in God, as in man; not one but receiveth a neceſſary increaſe of ſtrength, from the indiviſible unity of the divine Eſſence. For a Figtree to beare Olive berries, is leſſe impoſſible, than for the tree of life to bring forth death. To cauſe

Sect. 2. the Vine bring forth Figs, were not ſo hard a point of husbandry, as to derive curſedneſſe or miſery from the fountaine of bliſſe. For a Spring to ſend forth water ſweet and bitter, freſh and ſalt, at one and the ſame place, is more compatible with any reaſonable conceipt, than for hate or harmfull intentions to have any iſſue from pure love. *But God is love: yea, love is his Eſſence as Creator.* In that he is the Author of being, hee is the Author of goodneſſe to all things that are, (*Being, unto every thing in its owne proper being, is good*) and goodneſſe in an intelligent *Doner* is alwayes the fruit of Love. Hence ſaith the Wiſeman, of him that is wiſeſt of all, of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived: *He hateth nothing that he hath made.* For even their being, and that goodneſſe which accompanies it, is an undoubted pledge of his love. If to bleſſe God the maker, and to curſe men which are made after his ſimilitude, argue (in the Apoſtles ſuppoſall) a diſſolution of that internal harmony, which ſhould be in the humane nature: to hate ſome, and love others of his beſt creatures, all being made after his owne image; would neceſſarily infer a greater diſtraction in the indiviſible Eſſence, beſides the contradiction which it implies to infinite goodnes. To love the workes of his owne hands is more eſſentiall to him, that made all things out of meere love, than it is unto the fire to burn matter combuſtible: and if his love be, as he is, truly infinite, it muſt extend to all, ſeeing all are leſſe than infinite.

2 Love, were it perfect in us, would perfectly fulfill Gods Law, and make up a compleat bodie

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or *Syſtem* of morall goodnes. Now the moſt abſolute perfection of that love, whereof the humane nature (though uncorrupted) could bee capable, would be but an imperfect ſhadow of our heavenly Fathers moſt perfect love; which hath the ſame proportion to his goodneſſe, that love in us (were it as perfect as it poſſibly might be) ſhould have to our morall goodneſs. That is, it is his compleat communicative goodnes. And though theſe two in him bee rather different names, than divers attributes, yet we love his goodnes better, whiles it is attired with the name of Love. For, of men that doe us equall good turnes, we love them beſt, whom we conceive to love us moſt: and loving kindneſſe ſeemes good and lovely, even in the eyes of ſuch as reape no profit from it, beſides the ſight of it. The very exerciſe of it in others, excites our weake inclinations to the like: and our inclinations moved, ſtir up a ſpeculative aſſent or ſecret verdict of conſcience, to approve that truth which wee cannot follow in the practice: *Beatius eſt dare, quam accipere: It is a more bleſſed thing to give, than to receive.* No man meaſureth that which wee call a good nature (as of men ſome are better natured than others) either by the means it hath to benefit, or by the benefits beſtowed; but by the fervency of unfaigned good will, and hearty deſires of doing good to all. This is that wherin (eſpecially when it is holpen by grace) we moſt reſemble the divine nature, which is infinitely better than the humane nature (though takē at the beſt) not only in reſpect of his ability to do good, but of his good wil to do the beſt that may be.

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And this his good will exceeds ours, not intensively only, but extensively. For we are bound to imitate him as well in the extension of our unfaigned good will towards all, as in the fervency of our desires to do the best good we can to some, because his loving kindnes to man is both waies infinitly perfect. *Thus saith the Lord, Let not the wise man glory in his wisedome, nor the strong man glory in his strength, neither the rich man glory in his riches: But let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth, and knoweth me; that I am the Lord which exercise loving kindnes, judgement, and righteousnesse in the earth: for in these things I delight, saith the Lord.* Ier. 9. 23, 24. The first then and most native issue of infinite *goodnesse*, is the exercise of *bounty* or loving kindnesse, which floweth from it, without matter or motive to incite it. This is that which gave *being*, and with being, some portion of goodnesse unto all things that are; it alters the *name*, but not the *nature* in the current. To prevent others with good turnes before they can expect or deserve them, is the highest point of bounty, whereto the ability of man can reach. But God gave us that we most desire, proper *being*, with the appurtenances, before we could desire it; for it is the foundation of all desire. From Bounty or Loving-kindnesse, or from that Goodnesse whence they spring, Mercy and Compassion differ onely in the extrinsecall denomination taken from different objects. *Compassion* is good will towards others, provoked from notice of their miserie: and *Mercy* is but an excesse of *Bounty*, not estranged from ill deservers, in distresse; so long as the

the exercise of it breeds no harm to such as are more capable of bountifull love and favour. This incompossibility betweene the exercise of Mercy and Bounty towards particulars ill deserving, and the preservation of common good, occasioneth the interposition of Iustice punitive; whose exercise is, in a sort, unnaturall to the Father of mercy. *For he doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. Lamen* 3.33. Nothing in good men can provoke it towards offenders, but the good of others deserving either better or not so ill, which might grow worse by evill doers impunity. To take pleasure in the paine or torture of notorious malefactors, is a note of inhumanity: their just punishment is onely so farre just'y pleasant, as it procures either our owne, or others welfare; or avoydance of those grievances, which they more justly suffer, than wee or others of the same societie, should doe. The more kind and loving men by nature are, the more unwilling they are to punish, unlesse it be for these respects. How greatly then doth it goe against his nature, who is loving kindnesse it selfe, to punish the works of his owne hands; *Man* especially, who is more deare unto him, than any child can be unto his Father, for hee is the Father of all mankind? *For it is he that made us, and not we our selves*; not those whom we call Fathers of our flesh, for even they likewise were made by *Him*. Hence he saith, *Call no mã Father on earth, for one is your Father wch is in Heaven, Mat.* 23. *ver.* 9. Is the title his peculiar, more than the realty answering to it? Is hee more willing to bee called the onely Father of all Cap. 14

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the sonnes of men, than to doe the kind office of a Father to them? *No, like as a Father pitieth his owne children, so the Lord pitieth them that feare him, For he knoweth our frame, hee remembreth wee are but dust.* *Psal.* 103.13,14. It seemes this Psalmist either was or had a most kinde and loving Father, and hence illustrates the kindnesse of his Heavenly Father, by the best modell of kindnesse which he knew. But if God truly be a Father of all mankind, he certainly exceedes all other fathers as farre in fatherly kindnesse, as hee doth men in any branch of goodnesse or perfection. This is the first foundation of our Faith, layd by his onely Sonne: * *Aske and it shall be given unto you, seeke and ye shall finde, knocke and it shall be opened unto you. For every one that asketh, receiveth, and he that seeketh, findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened. Or what man is there of you, whom if his sonne aske bread, will he give him a stone? Or if he aske a fish, will hee give him a serpent,* *Math.* 7. *ver.* 7,8,9,10. Every Father that heard *Him*, would have beene ready to have answered no; yet none so ready or carefull as they should bee, to give or provide best things for their children, because all besides him are evill Fathers. *If yee then being evill know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more shall your Father which is in Heaven, give good things to them that aske him, ver.* 11. He is then so much more willing to give good things to his children, as he is better or greater than other Parents. His love to all men, seeing all are his sonnes, by a more peculiar reference than *Abraham* was *Adams*, or *Isaac* *Abrahams*,

* *Ad multiplicandū quippe sanctorum sapientiam proficit, quod postulata tardè percipiunt, ut ex dilatione crescat desiderium, ex desiderio intellectus augeatur. Intellectus verò cum intenditur, ejus in Deum ardentior affectus aperitur. Affectus autem ad prometenda cœlestia tanto sit capax, quanto fuerit expectando longanimis.* *Greg. lib.* 20 *moral. in Iob ca.* 24.

Abrahams, is infinitely greater than any Parents beare to the fruits of their bodies. Mortall fathers love children when they have them; but love to themselves, or want of meanes to immortalize their owne persons, makes them desire to have children. The onely wise immortall God (who is all sufficient to all, most to himselfe, unacquainted with want of whatsoever can bee desired) out of the abundance of his free bounty and meere loving kindnesse, did first desire our being; and having given it us, doth much more love us, after wee are instamped with his Image. For hee sowes not wheat, to reape teares; nor did he inspire man with the breath of life, that he might bring forth death. cap. 14.

3 The Heathens conceived this title of *Father*, as too narrow for fully comprehending all references of loving kindnesse betwixt their great *Iupiter* and other Demigods or men.

Iupiter omnipotens regum rex ipse, Deusq;
Progenitor, genitrixq; Deum, Deus unus, & omnis.

And another Poet *,
Iupiter & mas est & nescia femina mortis.

* *Orpheus. Vide Apul. in lib. de mundo. et Forcatul. lib. 5. p. 703*

And because the affection of mothers, especially to their yong and tender Ones, is most tender: the true Almighty hath deigned to exemplifie his tender mercy and compassion towards *Israel*, as *David* did *Ionathans* love towards him; far surpassing the love of women, yea of mothers to their children. *Sion had said, the Lord had forsaken me, and*

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my God had forgotten mee. But her Lord replyes, *Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the sonne of her wombe? yea they may forget, yet will I not forget thee, Esay 49. ver. 15.* And if his love could sufficiently bee expressed by these deerest references amongst men, whose naturall affection towards their tender brood (in respect of meaner creatures) is much abated by wrong use of reason (as many mothers by greatnesse of place, or curiosity of education, are lesse compassionate towards their children, then other silly women are) he hath chosen the most affectionate female amongst reasonlesse creatures, to blazon his tender care and loving protection ouer ill-deserving children: *How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a Hen gathereth her chickens under her wings! Math. 23. ver. 37.* Finally, as he gives much more to our being, than our earthly Parents, whom we suppose to give us being; so all the sweet fruits or comforts of love, whether of fathers and mothers toward their children, of husbands towards their wives, or of brethren to brethren, sisters to sisters, or one friend to another (their sinfulnesse onely excepted) are but distillation s or infusions of his infinite love to our nature. To witnesse this truth unto us, the son of God was made both father, brother and husband to our nature, &c. Every reference or kinde office, whereof reasonable creatures are mutually capable, every other creature (though voyd of reason, so not voyd of love and naturall affection) may expresse some part of our heavenly Fathers loving kind-

kindnesse: but the love of all, though infinitely increased in every particular, and afterwards made up in one, could no way equalize his love towards every particular soule created by him. Feare of death or other danger, hath such joynt interest with love, (as well in the heart of man, as in other creatures) that, albeit they would doe more for their yong ones than they doe, if they could, yet they doe not usually so much as they might: not so much for their model of wit or strength, as God for his part though infinite in wisdome and power doth for the sonnes of men. He that feareth none, but is feared of all, he that needs no Counsellor, but hath the heart of Prince and Counsellor in his hand, makes protestation in his serious griefe, that he hath done all for his unfruitfull vineyard that he could, as much as possibly could be done for it. Or, if his serious protestations cannot deserve credit with deceitfull man, his solemne oath is witnesse of greater love than hath beene mentioned, of greater than the heart of man is able to conceive, even towards such as all their life time have hated Him. *As I live saith the Lord, I will not the death of him that dyes.* cap. 14.

If besides the authority of these and infinite more sacred texts most perspicuous in themselves, the interpretation of the Church, bee required for establishing of the doctrine delivered; the whole ancient Church, some peeces of Saint *Austine* onely excepted, which may bee counterpoyzed with other parts of the same Fathers writings, is ready to give joynt verdict for us. And whether the re-

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ſtrictions which ſome reformed Churches have endeavoured to lay upon Gods promiſes, bee compatible with the doctrine of the *Engliſh* Church, comes in the next place to be examined.

Chap. 15.

What the Church of England *doth teach concerning the extent of Gods love: of the diſtinction of* ſingula generum, *and* genera ſingulorum: *of the diſtinctiõ of* voluntas ſigni, *&* voluntas beneplaciti.

1  Hat middle courſe ſoever the *Church of England* doth hold, or may take for compromiſing contentions betweene ſome other reformed Churches in points of *Election* and *Reprobation*, of free will or mans ability, before the ſtate of regeneration: She doth not in her publike and authoriſed doctrine come ſhort of any Church this day extant, in the extent of Gods unſpeakeable love to mankind. No nationall Councell, though aſſembled for that purpoſe, could fit their doctrine more expreſſely to meet with all the late reſtrictions of Gods love, than the Church our mother, even from the beginning of reformation, hath done; as if ſhe had then foreſeene a neceſſity of declaring her judgement in this point, for preventing ſchiſmes or diſtraction in opinions amongſt her ſonnes. Firſt, ſhe injoynes us to beſeech God to *have mercy upon all men.* This was the practice of the Ancient Church, which in her opinion, needed no reformation. A practice injoyned by

by *S. *Paul, I exhort or desire first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving thankes be made for all men.* If any man shall seeke to lay that restraint upon this place, which S. *Austine* somewhere doth, as if the word [*all men*] did import only *genera singulorum* [*all sorts of men,*] not, *singula generum*, [*every particular man:*] the scanning of the words following, the sifting of the matter contained in both, with the reason of the exhortation, and other reall circumstances, will shake off this or other like restriction, with greater ease than it can be laid upon it. We are commanded to pray for no more, than them, whose salvation we are unfainedly to desire, otherwise our prayers were hypocriticall. Are we then to desire the salvation of some men onely, as they are dispersed here and there, throughout all nations, sorts, or conditions of men, or for every man of what condition soever, of what sort or nation soever he be? The Apostle exhorts us to pray for Kings (not excepting the most malignant enemies which the Christians then had) and *for all that be in authority.* And if we must pray for all that are in authority, with fervency of desire, that they may come unto the knowledge of the truth; then questionlesse, we are to desire, wee are to pray for the salvation of all and every one, which are under authority. *God is no accepter of persons*; nor will the Omnipotent permit us so to respect the persons of the mighty in our prayers, as that we should pray that all and every one of them might become *Peeres* of the heavenly Ierusalem, and but some choice or selected ones of the meaner

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*1 Tim. 2. 1

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ner ſort might bee admitted into the ſame ſociety. Wee muſt pray then for high and low, rich and poore, without excepting any, either in particular or indefinitely. The reaſon why our prayers for all men muſt be univerſall, is, becauſe wee are bound to deſire the ſpirituall good of all men; not as they fall under our indefinite, but under our univerſall conſideration. The reaſon againe, why wee are bound to deſire the ſpirituall good of all men univerſally conſidered, is, becauſe wee muſt be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect. Vnto this univerſall deſire, we muſt adde our beſt endeavours that ſaving truth may be imparted unto all; becauſe it is our heavenly Fathers will, his unfained will, that all *ſhould come to the knowledge of truth.*

2 Both parts of this inference [*as firſt, that it is our duty to pray for all ſorts of men, and for every man of what ſort ſoever: And ſecondly, that we are therefore to pray thus univerſally, becauſe it is Gods will, not onely that wee ſhould thus pray, but that all without exception ſhould come unto the truth and be ſaued*] are expreſſely included in the prayers appointed by the Church of England to bee uſed upon the moſt ſolemne day of devotions. The Collects or Prayers are in number three. The firſt, *Almighty God we beſeech thee graciouſly to behold this thy family for the which our Lord Ieſus Chriſt was contented to bee betrayed, and given up into the hands of wicked men, and to ſuffer death upon the Croſſe, &c.* The tenour of this Petition, if we reſpect onely the *forme*, is indefinite not univerſall: but every Logician knowes, and every Divine ſhould conſider, that the neceſ-

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sity of the matter, whether in prayers or propositions, will stretch the indefinite *forme* wherewith it is instamped, as farre as an absolute universall. That the *forme* of this petition is in the intention of the Church of *England*, to be as farre extended as wee have said (that is) [to all and every one of the congregation present] the prayer following puts out of question. For in that we are taught to pray for the whole Church, and for every member of it. *Almighty and everlasting God, by whose spirit the whole body of the Church is governed and sanctified: receive our supplications and prayers, which we offer before thee for all estates of men in thy holy Congregation; that every member of the same, in his vocation and ministery, may truly and godly serve thee. &c.* If here it be excepted, that albeit this prayer be conceived in termes *formally* universall, yet is the universall *forme* of it to be no further extended, than its proper matter or subject; and that (as will be alleaged) is the mysticall live body of Christ, whose extent or the number of whose members, is to us unknowne: the third and last prayer will clearely quit this exception, and free both the former petitions, from these or the like restrictions. For in the last prayer wee are taught to pray for all and every one which are out of the Church, that they may be brought into the Church, and bee made partakers with us of Gods mercy, and the common salvation. *Mercifull God, who hast made all men, and hatest nothing that thou hast made, nor wouldest the death of a sinner, but rather that he should bee converted and live: have mercy upon all Iewes, Turkes, In-*

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fidells and heretiques, and take from them all ignorance, hardneſſe of heart, and contempt of thy word: And ſo fetch them home, bleſſed Lord, to thy flocke, that they may bee ſaved among the remnant of the true Iſraelites, and be made one fold, under one ſhepheard Ieſus Chriſt our Lord. If God therefore will not the death of any Iew, Turke or Infidell, becauſe of nothing hee made them men: wee may ſafely conclude that he willeth not the death of any, but the life of all, whom of men or infidells, hee hath made Chriſtians; to whom he hath vouchſafed the ordinary meanes of ſalvation, and daily invites, by his meſſengers, to imbrace them. He which made all things without invitation, out of meere love, made nothing hatefull; nor is it poſſible that the unerring fountaine of truth and love, ſhould caſt his diſlike, much leſſe fix his hatred upon any thing that was not firſt in it nature odious. Nothing can make the creature hatefull or odious to the Creator, beſides its hatred or enmity of that love, by which it was created, and by which *hee* ſought the reſtauration of it when it was loſt. Nor is it every degree of mans hatred or enmity unto God, but a full meaſure of it, which utterly exempts man from his love; as that reverend * Biſhop and glorious Martyr, one of the firſt Reformers of the Religion profeſt in this Land, obſerves.

3 If with theſe authorized devotions wee compare the doctrine of our Church in the publike catechiſme, what can bee more cleare, then that as God the Father doth love all mankind, without exception; ſo the Sonne of God did redeeme not ſome

* Hooper in his Preface to the ten Commandements. See Parag. 8 of this chapter.

some onely of all sorts, but all mankind universally taken: First wee are taught *to beleeve in God the Father who made us and all the world.* Now, if the Church our mother have in the former prayers truly taught us, that God hateth nothing which he hath made; this will bring forth another truth: *viz.* That either there be some men which are not of Gods making; or else that hee hateth no man (not *Esau*) as he is a man, but as a sinner, but as an enemy or contemner of his goodnesse. And consequently to this branch or corollary of this former truth, wee are in the same Catechisme, in the very next place taught to beleeve in God the Son who hath redeemed us and all mankind. And if all mankind were redeemed by him, than all of this kind were unfeignedly loved; none were hated by him. And though in the same place, we are taught to beleeve in the holy Ghost as in the sanctifier of all that are sanctified, yet this wee are taught with this caveat, that he doth sanctifie al the elect people of God, not all mankind. All then are not sanctified by God the holy Ghost, which are redeemed by God the Sonne, nor doth God the Father bestow all his spirituall blessings upon all whom hee doth unfeignedly love, or on whom hee hath bestowed the blessing of Baptisme as the seale or pledge of their redemption. All these inferences are so cleere, that the consideration of them makes us doubt, whether such amongst us, as teach the contrary to any of these, have at any time subscribed unto the booke of Common prayers, or whether they had read it before they did subscribe un-

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4 But how, or by what Will doth hee will that they should be saved that are not saved? Doth he will their salvatiō by his revealed, not by his secret will? Doth he give signification onely of his good will towards them, whereas his good will and plea-

sure,

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ſure is not finally to doe them any reall good? This I take to be the meaning of *voluntas ſigni*, and *beneplaciti*. But, it being granted, that God doth will the ſalvation of all men, by his revealed will, or *voluntate ſigni*; This alone will ſufficiently inferre our intended concluſion [That he truly wils the ſalvation of all, without the exemption of any.] Vpon ſuch as contradict this doctrine, it lyes upon them to prove not the negative onely, that God doth not will the ſalvation of all by his ſecret will; but this poſitive particular, that God doth nill or unwill the ſalvation of ſome by his ſecret will, whoſe ſalvation he willeth by his revealed will. Now if it be anſwered, that he doth by his ſecret will or good pleaſure, unwill or nill the ſalvation of the ſame parties to whom he willeth ſalvation by his will revealed or ſignified; they muſt (without remedy) acknowledge the one or the other member of this diviſion: as, either [that there be two wills in God of as different inclinations *ad extra*, as the reaſonable and ſenſitive appetite are in man:] or [that there is a manifeſt contradiction in the object of one and the ſame Divine Will.] That, *All men ſhould be ſaved*, and *that ſome men ſhould not be ſaved*, implyeth as formall a contradiction, as to ſay, [All men are living creatures, ſome men are no living creatures.] Now that all men ſhould be living creatures, and that ſome men ſhould not be living creatures, fals not within the object of Omnipotency. And if the will of God, be as truly undivided in it ſelfe, as the omnipotent power is: it is no leſſe impoſſible that the ſalvation of all, and the non-ſalvation of ſome

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should be the object, or true parts of the object of one and the same divine will undivided in it selfe, than that the actuall salvation of all, and the actuall and finall condemnation of some, or the non-salvation of all, should be really effected by the omnipotent power. Whether this divine will be clearly revealed, or in part revealed and in part reserved or secret in respect of us, all is one; so this will in it selfe and in its nature, bee but one, and undivided. The manifestation or reservation of it, or whatsoever other references it may have to us, can neither increase nor abate the former contradiction in the object. Or if *voluntas signi*, be not essentially the same with *voluntas beneplaciti*, there is a manifest contradiction or contrariety betwixt them: If the salvation of all bee the object of the one, and the non-salvation or reprobation of others, be the object of the other.

5 Yet doe we not (like rigorous Critiques) so much intend the utter banishment of this distinction out of the confines of Divinity, as the confinement of it to its proper seat and place. Rightly confined or limited, it may beare faith and allegiance to the truth, and open some passages for clearing some branches of it: But permitted to use that extent of liberty which hath beene given to it by some, it will make way for canonization of Iesuiticall perjuries, for deification of mentall evasions or reservations. Let us compare Iesuiticall practices with that *patterne*, which is the necessary resultance of some mens interpretation of Gods oath in this case. Were this interrogatory put to any Iesuiticall Assassinat,

saſſinat, imagine a powder-plotter; [*Doe you will or intend the ruine of the King or State, or doe you know of any ſuch project or intendment?*] there is none of this crue ſo miſchievouſly minded, but would be ready to ſweare unto this negative [As the Lord liveth, and as I hope for life and ſalvation by him, I neither intend the ruine of King or State, nor doe I know of any conſpiracy againſt him.] And yet in caſe the event ſhould evidently diſcover his proteſtation to be moſt falſe; yet would hee reſt perſwaded, that this or the like mentall evaſion or reſervation [*I neither intended the ruine of King or State, ſo they would become Romane Catholiques; nor did I know of any conſpiracy againſt them, with minde or purpoſe to reveale it unto them,*] may bee a preſervative more than ſufficient, a ſoveraigne Antidote againſt the ſinne of perjury, which hee had ſwallowed or harboured in his breſt; ſpecially if the concealement of his treaſon, make for the good of the Church. To put the like interrogatory unto the Almighty Iudge, concerning the ruine or welfare of men, no Magiſtrate, no authority of earth hath any power. Yet *hee*, to free himſelfe from that foule aſperſion, which the Iewes had caſt upon him (as if ſuch as periſhed in their ſinnes, had therefore periſhed, becauſe it was his will and pleaſure they ſhould not live but dye,) hath interpoſed his often mentioned voluntary oath; *As I live, I will not the death of him that dyes, but rather that he ſhould live.* Shall it here bee enough to make anſwer for him, *interpretando*, by interpreting his meaning to be this? I doe not will the death of him cap. 15.

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6 In matters then determined by Divine Oath, the distinction of *voluntas signi* and *beneplaciti*, can have no place; specially in their doctrine who make the bare *entity* or personall *being* of men, the immediate object of the immutable decree concerning life and death everlasting. For the *entity* or personall *being* of man, is so indivisible, that an universall negation and a particular affirmation of the same

ſame thing, [to wit, Salvation] falling upon man, as man, or upon the perſonall being of men, drawes to the ſtricteſt point of contradiction. Farre ever be it from us to thinke, that God ſhould ſweare unto this univerſall negative, *I will not the death of the man that dyeth*; and yet beleeve withall, that he wils the death of ſome men that dye, as they are men, or as they are the ſonnes of *Adam*: that he ſhould by his ſecret or reſerved will, recall any part of his will declared by oath; that hee ſhould proclaime an univerſall pardon to all the ſonnes of *Adam* under the ſeale of his oath, and yet exempt many from all poſſibility of receiving any benefit by it.

7 Shall we then conclude that the former diſtinction hath no uſe at all in Divinity? Or if this concluſion be too rigorous, let us ſee in what caſes it may have place, or to what particulars it may be confined. Firſt, it hath place in matters of threatning, or of plagues not denounced by oath. Thus God, by his Prophet *Ionas*, did ſignifie his will to have *Nineveh* deſtroyed at forty dayes end; this was *voluntas ſigni*; and he truly intended what hee ſignified: yet was it his *voluntas beneplaciti*, his good will and pleaſure at the very ſame time, that the Ninevites ſhould repent and live. And by their repentance, his good will and pleaſure was fulfilled in their ſafety. But in this caſe there was no contrariety betweene Gods will declared or ſignified .i. [*voluntas ſigni*] and his good will and pleaſure, .i. [*voluntas beneplaciti*]; no contradiction in the object of his will however conſidered, for that was

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not one and the same, but much different, in respect of Gods will signified by *Ionas*; and of his good will and pleasure, which, not signified by him, was fulfilled. One and the same immutable will or decree of God did from eternity award two doomes, much different, unto *Nineveh*; taking it as it stood affected when *Ionas* threatned destruction unto it, or as it should continue so affected; and taking it as it proved, upon the judgement threatned. All the alteration was in *Nineveh*, none in Gods will or *decree*: and *Nineveh* being altered to the *better*, the selfe same rule of Iustice, doth not deale with it after the selfe same manner. The doome or sentence could not be the same without some alteration in the Iudge, who is unalterable. And in that hee is unalterably Iust and Good, his doome or award, was of necessity to alter, as the object of it altered. *Deus sæpe mutat sententiam, nunquam consilium.* Gods unchangeable will or counsell doth often change his doome or sentence. The same rule holds thus farre true in matter of blessing or promise not confirmed by oath: upon the parties alteration unto worse, unto whom the promise is made, the blessing promised may be revoked, without any alteration of Gods will or counsell. Yet may we not say, that the death or destruction of any to whom God promiseth life, is so truly the object of his good will and pleasure, as the life and salvation of them is, unto whom he threatneth destruction. The same distinction is of good use in some extraordinarie cases, or as applyed to men after they have made up the full measure of their iniquity, and are

cut

cut off from all possibility of repentance. Thus God willed *Pharaoh* to let his people goe out of Egypt, and signified this his will unto him by *Moses* and *Aaron*, in mighty signes and wonders. This was *voluntas signi*, only, not *voluntas beneplaciti*. For though it were his good will and pleasure, that his people should depart out of Egypt; yet was it no branch of this his good will and pleasure, that *Pharaoh* should now repent or be willing to let them goe. Rather it was his good will and pleasure (specially after the seventh plague) to have the heart of *Pharaoh* hardned. And yet after his heart was so hardned, that it could not repent, God so punished him, as if it had beene free and possible for him to repent, and grant a friendly passe unto his people. But *Pharaohs* case was extraordinary; his punishment so exemplary, as not to bee drawne into example. For as our Apostle intimates, it was an argument of Gods great mercy and long suffering, to permit *Pharaoh* to live any longer on earth, after he was become a vessell of wrath destinated to everlasting punishment in hell. The reason why God thus plagued *Pharaoh*, for not doing that which now he could not doe (all possibility of amendment being taken from him) was to teach all generations following, by his fearfull end, to beware of his desperate beginnings, of struggling with God, or of persecuting them, whose patronage hee had in peculiar manner undertaken. And here againe, there is no contradiction betweene these two propositions [*God from all eternity did will the death of Pharaoh; God from all eternity did not will the death, but* cap. 15.

Sect. 2. *rather the life of Pharaoh.*] For albeit *Pharaoh* continued one and the same man, from his birth unto his death, yet did he not all this time continue one and the same object of Gods immutable will and eternall decree. This object did alter as *Pharaohs* dispositions or affections towards God or his neighbours altered. There is no contrariety, much lesse any contradiction, betweene these, [God unfaignedly loveth all men: God doth not love, but hate the Reprobate, although they be men, yea the greatest part of men] For here the object of his love and hate is not the same; he loves all men unfaignedly as they are men, or as men which have not made up the full measure of iniquity: but having made up that, or having their soules betroathed unto wickednesse, he hates them. His hate of them as Reprobates, is no lesse necessary or usuall, than his love of them as men. But though he necessarily hates them being once become Reprobates, or having made up the full measure of iniquity: yet was there no necessity layd upon them by his eternall decree, to make up such a measure of iniquity.

8 How these deductions will consort with some moderne Catechismes I doe not know: sure I am they are consonant to the opinion of that learned Bishop and blessed Martyr in his Preface to his expositions of the ten Commandements; a fit Catechisme for a Bishop to make. Every man is called in the Scripture, wicked, and the enemy of God; for the privation and lacke of faith and love, that he oweth to God. *Et impii vocantur, qui non omnino sunt pii*; that is, They are called wicked that in all things

thngs honour not God, beleeve not in God, and observe not his Commandements as they should doe; which we cannot doe by reason of this naturall infirmity, or hatred of the flesh, as *Paul* calleth it, against God. In this sense taketh *Paul* this word, wicked. So must we interpret St. *Paul* and take his words; or else no man should be damned. Now we know that *Paul* himselfe, St. *Iohn*, and Christ damneth the contemners of God, or such as willingly continue in sinne, and will not repent. Those the Scripture excludeth from the generall promise of grace. Thou seest by the places afore rehearsed, that though wee cannot beleeve in God as undoubtedly as is required, by reason of this our naturall sickenesse and disease, yet for Christs sake in the judgement of God wee are accounted as faithfull beleevers, for whose sake this naturall disease and sickenesse is pardoned, by what name soever S. *Paul* calleth the naturall infirmity, or originall sinne in man. And this imperfection or naturall sickenesse taken of *Adam*, excludeth not the person from the promise of God in Christ, except wee transgresse the limits and bounds of this originall sinne by our owne folly and malice; and either of a contempt or hate of Gods word, we fall into sinne, and transforme our selves into the image of the devill. Then wee exclude by this meanes our selves from the promises and merits of Christ, who only, received our infirmities, and originall disease, and not the contempt of him, and his Law. cap. 15.

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That Gods good will and pleaſure is never fruſtrated, albeit his unſpeakeable love take no effect in many to whom it is unfeignedly tendered.

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In what ſenſe God may be ſaid to have done all that he could for his vineyard, or for ſuch as periſh.



IO *found* both parts of a contradiction in truth, falls not within the ſphere of omnipotency, and we may with conſent of all Divines, maintaine it to bee impoſſible. The true originall aſwell of our aptneſſe to conceive difficulties in the points propoſed, as of our ignorance in aſſoyling them, is becauſe we extend not this Maxime ſo far as it naturally would reach; and the reaſon why we extend

extend it not ſo farre, is our proneneſſe to extend our owne power to the vtmoſt, and, for the moſt part farther then juſtice or true goodneſſe can accompany it. It is our nature to be humorous, and the nature of humour to bee unconſtant. *Fortunes character* may bee every ſonne of *Adams* Motto: *Tantum conſtans in levitate, Onely conſtant in unconſtancy.* And being ſuch, nothing can imply any conſtant contradiction to our nature; nothing that is truly and conſtantly the ſame, but will one time or other contradict our changeable and inconſtant humors. And theſe enraged with contradiction, doe, (Tyrant-like) arme power, without juſt tryall or examination, without either reſpect or reverence, againſt whatſoever contradicts them. The right uſe of power in creatures meerely ſenſitive, is to ſatiate their appetites of ſenſe: for nothing hath power to move it ſelfe, but what is ſenſitive: and, all power, whether of body or mind, was beſtowed on man for the execution of his will, or accompliſhing his deſire of good: but, ſince his will, by his fall, became irregular and his deſires corrupt; his power is become like a common officer, or undercommander to all his unruly appetites, domineering by turne or ſucceſſion; all other inclinations being under the command of it. So the wiſe man hath charactered the reſolution of voluptuous men, *cap.* 1. 6. *Come on therefore, let us enjoy the good things that are preſent, and let us ſpeedily uſe the creatures like as in youth.* And *ver.* 11. *Let our ſtrength be the Law of juſtice; for that which is feeble is found to be nothing worth.* Even in ſuch as are by moſt

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most esteemed good men and sober, those notions of truth and equity which are naturall and implanted, are so weake and ill taken; that, rather than upstart carnall appetites or desires which custome countenanceth, should bee enraged through their reluctance, they presently yeeld their consents to such proposalls, as (were they resolute, firme and constant) would as offensively contradict them, as punishment or paine doth our sense of pleasure. Vnto such proposalls we often yeeld, as are impossible to be approved by *Equity*; to whom we usually professe our dearest love and allegiance, with promises to frame our lives by her rules. But love in us (whether one, simple and indivisible quality, or an aggregation or cluster of divers inclinations, all rooted in one Center,) is not alike set on divers objects. Hence, when it comes to opposition betweene sense and reason, betweene our selves, our private friends, and common equity, it divides it selfe unequally. The particular inconveniences, whereto wee are daily exposed, by the inordinate love of the world, and the flesh, are infinite; all may be reduced to these two originalls: First, it blindes our judgements, and makes our intentions seeme upright and just to our partiall desires, or at least not incompatible with the rules of equity; when as, to impartiall judgements, they are palpably unjust. Secondly, having blinded our judgements, it forthwith abuseth our power or authority; to effect whatsoever is not, for the present, apprehended for a grosse and evident wrong. So that nothing whereon our love or liking is for the present mainly

mainly ſet, ſeemes any way impoſſible unto us; unleſſe it be altogether without the compaſſe of our power: And, through the variouſneſſe of our humerous diſpoſition, *that*, which we cannot like or admit to day, will be allowed of to morrow. But though there be none that doth good, no not one, yet ſome there be doe leſſe evill than others. And ſeeing thoſe amongſt us, whoſe love to equity is more ſtrong and conſtant than their neighbours, are alwayes drawne with greater difficulty to diſpenſe with truth or approve unjuſtice; the conſequence neceſſarily amounting from this experi- " mented truth, is, That [if any mans judgement " in matters of equity and juſtice were infallible, " and *his love* to juſtice and knowne equity alto- " gether conſtant and invincible, it would bee im- " poſſible for him to tranſgreſſe in judgement.] Thus as well the ſtrength of unconſtant humorous deſires, as the faintneſſe of love or equity (both which moſt men may experience in themſelves) as the contrary vertues, which they may obſerve in ſome few, joyntly conſpire to rectifie our conceit of God, in whom the Ideall perfection, of the ones integrity and conſtancy, is without all mixture of the others vice or humorous impotency. cap. 16.

2 The firſt rule for right extending the former Maxime [To make both parts of a contradiction true, is no part of the object of power omnipotent] would be this; Many effects which are very poſſible to power alone conſidered, or as it hath the maſtery over weake inclinations unto equity, neceſſarily imply a direct and manifeſt contradiction unto

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some Divine Attributes, no lesse infinite or immutable than Almighty power. Hence it followes, that many effects or designes, which seeme *possible* to the humane nature, may bee impossible or most incongruous to the Divine. It is more shamefull then impossible for rich men to lye and cozen, or for Magistrates to oppresse and wrong their inferiors; albeit the ones riches or others power, were infinitely increased, without internall increase of their fidelity. But to him that is eternally true and just, yea eternall *truth* and *justice*, it is as impossible to speake an untruth, or doe wrong, as for truth to bee a lye, or *justice* to bee *unjust*. Many things then are possible to meere power, which are impossible to it, as linkt with truth or love; and many things againe possible to it, as linkt with these, which yet directly contradict the eternall patterne of justice orgoodnes; & are by consequent impossible to the Almighty, who is no lesse just & good, then powerfull. Many Pyrats by Sea, or Robbers by Land, might they enjoy but halfethe power and authoritie for a Month, whereof ordinary Princes by inheritance are possest; would doe their companions and friends more good, and worke their enemies greater spoyle in this short space, than any Monarch can doe in his whole raigne, which holds it a point of Majestie to moderate his actions by that Princely rule; *Princeps id potest quod jure potest, Princes can doe no more than they can doe justly.* In this sense, I thinke wee may truly say, all before Christ were theeves and robbers, or in respect of him very unjust; not *Abraham, David, Ezekiah, Iosias*, not one of the Prophets, might they have

had but halfe that power and authority committed to them over Angells for a night, which the ſon of God from everlaſting had, without robbery; but would have thought it very poſſible to have removed the Romane Army with as great terrour, loſſe and diſgrace, as the Angell of the Lord ſometimes had done the *Aſſyrians*, from *Ieruſalems* ſiege; whoſe fatall deſtruction, God incarnate cleerly foreſeeing, bewailed with teares, but would not, but could not prevent. For to the King of everlaſting righteouſneſſe, that onely was poſſible, which was juſtly poſſible. And though hee were a Father to *Iſrael*, and the Prince of peace, yet hee approves a moſt bloody and mercileſſe warre, before an unjuſt peace and diſgracefull to Eternall Majeſtie; for ſo the Prophet had ſaid in his name, before, *There is no peace unto the wicked*; to ſuch as ſtubbornely abandon the wayes of peace, and wilfully neglect ſaving health, ſo often and lovingly tendred unto them; *Hos ſalus ipſa ſervare non potuit*, and ſhall infinite power ſave them, whom infinite ſalvation cannot ſave? Cap. 16

3 To have ſmitten the men of *Sodom* with blindneſſe, before luſt had entred in at their eyes; had beene a worke as eaſie to Almighty power, as blinding them in the attempt or proſecution of luſt conceived. But that contradiction which the prevention of this ſinne, did not imply unto Gods power, it did (all circumſtances conſidered) neceſſarily imply unto his Iuſtice; by whoſe immutable and eternall rules, they were left unguarded againſt theſe foule temptations, for wilfull contempt of

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his goodneſſe, for abuſing his long ſuffering and loving kindneſſe. But did it imply any contradiction to his goodneſſe or loving kindneſſe, to have prevented the *Sodomites* former contempt or abuſe of them? Out of queſtion it did, unto his eternall equity; *for all his waies are mercy and truth.* And theſe *Sodomites* wilfulneſſe preſuppoſed, the eternall rule of his goodneſſe and loving kindneſſe, had appointed juſtice to debarre them, as now they are, from reaping thoſe fruits, whereof his goodneſſe, as they were men, had made them capable. The principle whence the juſt proofe of theſe ſeeming paradoxes, as alſo the right explication of all difficulties in this argument, muſt be derived, is a Schoole Maxime borrowed from orthodoxall antiquity, now not much uſed, but of much uſe in true Divinity, and for this reaſon to be more fully inſiſted upon, in the *Treatiſe of mans firſt eſtate.* The Maxime it ſelf is briefly thus; *It is impoßible for man or other created ſubſtance, to bee abſolutely impeccable from his creation.* Onely *He* that is infinite in being, is infinitely good; and infinite goodneſſe only implyes an abſolute impoſſibility of being bad. As God onely eſſentially *is*, ſo hee onely is eſſentially and immutably good; all things beſides him, are or ſometimes were ſubject to mutability, aſwell in *Eſſence* as in their ſtate and condition. Power omnipotent could not from the firſt Creation, have pared off all mutability from mans morall goodneſſe, without *periſhing* the onely poſſible root of his eternall and immutable happineſſe. To decline to evill, implyes no contradiction to *Being ſimply*, but

but onely to *omnipotent being*: it is so possible to all Creatures, that without this possibility, it were (as we shall afterwards prove) impossible for them to be truly like their Creator, for a moment, in that attribute, whose participation is the onely assurance of their eternall weale. If God either by his omnipotent power, or infinite wisedome, had necessarily (though without any violence) restrained this possibility in man, of declining from good to evill, man had forthwith ceased to have beene truly and inherently good, and ceasing to be such, had utterly lost all possibilities of that estate, whose pledge or earnest he received in his creation. Gods goodnesse is his happinesse. And his participative goodnesse is the foundation of mans happinesse. So that not Gods justice onely, but that loving kindnesse whereby hee created man, and appointed him as heyre apparent of life eternall, did remove all necessity from his will, because the imposition of necessity (whether layd upon him by power or wisdome infinite) had utterly extinguished that goodnesse wherein it was onely possible for the creature to expresse the Creators goodnesse manifested in his creation. Now that was not Gods essentiall or immutable goodnesse, for that is incommunicable. All the goodnesse man is capable of, doth but expresse Gods goodnesse communicative. It is the stampe of it communicated. As God then did communicate his goodnesse to his creatures, not by necessity but freely, so could not the creature be truly good (that is like his God) by necessity but freely. Nor was it possible for him to have beene either cap. 16.

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confirmed in ſuch goodneſſe as he had, or tranſlated to everlaſting happineſſe; but by continuing freely good for ſome ſpace, or leſſe evill, than by the liberty which God by his immutable law had given him in his creation, hee poſſibly might have beene. Continuing good, though but for a while, without neceſſity, the riches of Gods free bounty, had beene continually increaſed towards him, and had finally eſtabliſhed him in everlaſting bliſſe by confirmation of him in true goodneſſe, or by inveſting him with immortality. Since his fall wee are not uſually capable of mercy or of the increaſe of his bounty; much leſſe of theſe everlaſting fruits whereof bleſſings temporall are the pledges; but by free abſtinence from ſome evils, unto whoſe practices, the poſſibility of our corrupted nature might be improved. And albeit we doe not alway that which is in its nature evill, yet we can doe nothing well, but even the good which we do we doe it naughtily: yet unleſſe we doe both leſſe evill, and the good which we doe leſſe naughtily than we poſſibly might doe, God ſtill diminiſheth the riches of his bounty towards us; and by inhibiting the ſweet influence of his gracious providence, ſuffers us to fall from one wickedneſſe to another, being prone to runne headlong into all, if once the *reines* of our unruly appetites, bee given into our unweildie hands. Farre bee it from any ſonne of *Adam* to thinke hee is able without Gods love and favour to withdraw himſelfe from the extremities of miſchiefe, much leſſe to doe ſuch good as may make him capable of well-doing

doing. So ſtrong is our love to ſinfull pleaſures, ſince our firſt parents gave the reines unto our appetite, that none can recall themſelves or repent, without the attractions of infinite love. And yet many whom this infinite love doth daily imbrace, becauſe they apprehend not it, are never brought by the attractions of it to true repentance. *Deſpiſeſt thou the riches of his goodneſſe,* ſaith the Apoſtle, *Rom. 2. 4. his forbearance and long ſuffering, not knowing that the goodneſſe of God leadeth thee to repentance?* Of whom ſpeakes he thus? of ſuch only as truly repent, and by patient continuance in wel-doing, ſeeke for glory, honour and immortality? nay, but, of them who for *hardneſſe of heart, cannot repent; but treaſure up wrath againſt the day of wrath, and the revelation of the righteous judgment of God.* cap. 16.

4 Were the riches of his bounty therefore fained, or did hee onely profer, but not purpoſe to draw them unto repentance, which repented not? this is no part of our heavenly Fathers *perfection*, no fruit of that wiſedome which is from above, but a point of earthly policy devoid of honeſty; a meere tricke of worldly wit, to whoſe practice nothing but weakneſſe and impotence to accompliſh great deſires, can miſ-incline mans corrupted nature. But doth it not argue the like impotency, though no ſuch want of integrity in God, not to effect what he wills more ardently and more unfainedly, than man can doe the increaſe or continuance of his welfare, or avoydance of endleſſe miſery? No; it being ſuppoſed (as we have ſaid) that man is not capable of end-

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thinke, that power, though infinite, ſhould bee the true immediate parent of love, which never ſprings in any reaſonable creature, but from the ſeeds of love or lovelines ſown in the humane ſoule, though they doe not alwayes proſper. Conſtraint, becauſe it is the proper and immediate effect of power, is a companion fit for luſt; whoſe ſatisfaction breeds rather a loathing of the parties conſtrained, than any good will or purpoſe to reward them for being unwilling, unloving, or impatient paſſives; nothing but true unforced love, can yeeld contentment unto love. Needy man, to whom benevolences though wreſted are ever gratefull, cannot bee induced to love the parties from whom they are wreſted. For, *Non tantum ingratum ſed inviſum eſt beneficium ſuperbè datum: Good offices whileſt they are preſented by pride, are not onely ungratefull but odious.* But God who giveth to all men liberally, and upbraydeth no man; as he eſteemes no gifts (howſoever given) ſo he alwayes deteſts the niggardly backwardneſſe, and loves the cheerfulneſſe of the giver. cap. 16.

5 From theſe diſcuſſions the truth of the former rule with the right ſolution of the maine probleme propoſed, may be illuſtrated, by examples of divers kindes in ſubjects knowne and familiar. Be the charge never ſo great, ſo the exonerations bee well nigh equall, the incoms are leſſe than if their charge were little, and their exonerations none. Or, bee a mans revenues never ſo large, ſo his neceſſary expences be no leſſe, hee ſhall not bee able to doe as much for his friend in ſome reall kindneſſe, as hee

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whoſe eſtate is not halfe ſo great, if ſo his annuall expences be tenne times leſſe. In like caſe, though mans love to his deareſt friend, bee (in reſpect of Gods love to us) but faint, and his power but ſmall; yet becauſe his love to juſtice is much leſſe, or rather his partiality greater, he oft-times effects that for his temporall good, which God though infinite in power, doth not effect for thoſe whom hee infinitely loves. For the bequeſts or grants made unto man by his infinite love, muſt undergoe the examination of *juſtice* and *equity*. What are alike infinite, before they paſs the irrevocable ſeale of infinite power, one of theſe cannot attempt, much leſs abſolutely bring ought to paſs, without the others conſent. Infinite love cannot overſway, either Gods incomprehenſible wiſedome to deviſe, or his omnipotency to practiſe meanes for mans ſalvation, which contradict the unchangeable rules of infinite equity. His love is as truly indiviſible, as infinite; and is for this reaſon more indiſſolubly linkt unto the unchangeable rules of his owne juſtice or equity, than unto mankinde, whoſe goodneſſe in his beſt eſtate, was but mutable; nor are any of *Adams* poſterity ſo capable of that infinite mercie, wherewith God embraceth them, as Gods Iuſtice and Majeſty are of his infinite Love. Theſe being as He is abſolutely immutable, are throughout eternity immutably loved of him, who indiviſibly is *Majeſty, Iuſtice, Love, immutable.*

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The truth and ardency of Gods love unto such as perish, testified by our Saviour, and by S. Paul.

1  Heſe are no Paradoxes, but plaine truth; without whoſe acknowledgement, we ſhall hardly finde any true ſenſe or good meaning in Gods proteſtations of ſorrow for his peoples plagues, or in his expoſtulations of their unthankfulneſſe, or in his kind invitations of them to repentance, which never repent, or in his tender profers of ſalvation to thoſe which periſh. *I have ſpred out my hands all the day long unto a rebellious people, which walketh in a way that was not good, after their owne thoughts, &c. Iſay* 65.2. His infinite power expects their converſion, as the Mariner doth the turning of the Tyde; but may not tranſport them into the land of Promiſe, untill his Loving-kindneſſe have converted them. The unremovable rules of eternall equity, will not ſuffer him to ſtretch out his hands any farther than he doth, towards the ſonnes of men; and when the meaſure of their iniquity is accompliſhed, his infinite *Iuſtice* will not ſuffer him to ſtretch them out ſo farre any longer. Albeit hee cannot then without unfained ſorrow, withdraw them from thoſe to whom in love unfained hee hath ſtretcht them out. Thus Ieruſalems iniquity come to the full

Sect. 3. did fill our Redeemers heart with woe, and his eyes with teares. *If thou hadst knowne, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace; but now they are hid from thine eyes: Luke* 19. 42. Did he speake this as man, or doth not the Spirit say the same? Hee that spake this, spake nothing but words of spirit and life, nothing but the words of God, if we may beleeve that he meant as he hath spoken. *I have not spoken* (saith * Hee) *of my selfe, but the Father which sent me, he gave me a commandement, what I should say, and what I should speake: whatsoever I speake therefore, even as the Father said unto me so I speake.* His bowels of compassion were freely extended towards them, from that exact conformity which his spotlesse and blessed soule held with Gods infinite love; and yet restrained againe by that conformity, which it as exactly held, with the eternall rules of Gods infinite justice or equity: and from these different motions or distractions, thus occasioned from that indissoluble union of his divisible soule, with these two different attributes of the indivisible nature, were his teares sweezed out. He wept then as man, not as God; and yet in this humane passion, did visibly act that part which God before his incarnation had penned, as a sensible memoriall of his unconceivable love. *O that my people had hearkned unto me: and Israel had walked in my wayes; I should soone have subdued their enemies, and turned my hand against their adversaries. The haters of the Lord should have submitted themselves unto him, but their time should have endured for ever. He should have fed them also with the finest*

* Ioh. 12. 49 50.

fineſt wheat, and with honey out of the rocke ſhould I have ſatisfied thee. Pſal. 81. *ver.* 13, 14, 15, 16. *Wheat* and *Honey*, here promiſed, were Emblemes of better bleſſings purpoſed towards them. And thus avouching this his purpoſe, under no character of courtly complement, but in the forme of legall aſſurance; his words are undoubted tokens of unfeigned love and deſire unquenchable of their welfare, that did not proſper. *Iſrael* might have ſaid, as *Ieruſalem* afterwards did of her ſorrow; *Was there ever any love like unto this love wherwith the Lord imbraced mee in the dayes of my youth.* Notwithſtanding, this exceſſive fervency of *His* loving kindneſſe, (whoſe will is infinite) laid no neceſſity upon their wills to whom hee wiſhed all this good. They had a liberty left them by eternall equity, to refuſe it. Hee out of the wiſhes of his bounty as hee proteſteth, was ready to poure out his beſt bleſsings according to the immenſitie of his loving kindneſſe, ſo *Iſrael* would open his mouth wide to receive them. *But my people* (ſaith he) *would not hearken unto my voice; and Iſrael would none of me; ſo I gave them up unto their owne hearts luſt; and they walked in their owne counſells. Pſal* 81. *ver.* 11, 12. cap. 17.

2 Lord, who had ſinned, the heathen people or their forefathers in like manner as *Iſrael* did, that *in times paſt thou ſuffereds̄t them all to walke in their owne wayes? Acts* 14. 16. *They that obſerve lying vanities forſake their owne mercy*, ſaith the Prophet *Ionah* 2. 8. Never hadſt thou given them up to their owne hearts luſt, to treaſure up wrath againſt

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the day of wrath, had they not deſpiſed the riches of thy bounty; whoſe current, nevertheleſſe was not altogether diverted from their poſterity. *To them thou lefteſt not thy ſelfe without a witneſſe, in that thou didſt good, and gaveſt them raine from heaven in fruitfull ſeaſons, filling their hearts with food and gladneſſe.* To all Nations even in the time of darkneſſe, when they were ſtrangers from thee; theſe and the like temporall and ſenſible bleſſings, were unqueſtionable earneſts of thy everlaſting love, ſince more fully manifeſted; *For thou ſo lovedſt the world* (not *Iſrael* onely) *that thou gaveſt thine onely begotten ſon, to the end that whoſo beleeved in him, ſhould not periſh but have everlaſting life.* What further argumēt of Gods infinite love, could fleſh & blood deſire; thā the Son of Gods voluntary ſuffring *that*, in our fleſh, by his Fathers appointment, wch, unto fleſh and blood ſeemes moſt diſtaſtfull? That this love was unfaignedly tendered to all, at leaſt, that have heard or hereafter may heare of it, without exception; what demonſtration from the effect, can be more certaine, what conſequence more infallible, thā the inference of this truth is frō a ſacred truth received by all good Chriſtians, *viz.* [*All ſuch as have heard Gods love in Chriſt proclaimed and not beleeved in it, ſhall in the day of Iudgement appeare guilty of greater ſinnes, than their forefathers could be endited of; and undergoe more bitter death, than any corruption drawne from* Adam, *if Chriſt had never ſuffered, could have bred.*] I ſhall no way wrong the Apoſtle in unfolding his exhortations to the *Athenians* thus farre; but they rather offer the

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ſpirit by which hee ſpake, ſome kinde of violence, that would contract his meaning ſhorter. *The times of this ignorance* (before Chriſts death) *God winked at, but now commandeth all men every where to repent; Becauſe hee hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteouſneſſe, by that man whom hee hath ordained, whereof he hath given aſſurance unto all men, in that hee hath raiſed him from the dead, Acts* 17. 30, 31. Cap. 17

3 Why all men in the world have not heard of Gods infinite love thus manifeſted, many cauſes may hereafter bee aſſigned, all grounded upon Gods infinite Iuſtice or Mercy. Of Chriſts death many which heard not, might have heard; many which are not, might have bin partakers; ſave only for their free and voluntary progreſſe from evill to worſe, or wilfull refuſall of Gods loving kindneſſe daily profered to them in ſuch pledges, as they were well content to ſwallow; fooliſhly eſteeming theſe good in themſelves, being good onely as they plight the truth of Gods love to them, which he manifeſted in the death of his Sonne. With this manifeſtation of his love, many againe out of meere mercy have not beene acquainted; leaſt the ſight of the medicine might have cauſed their diſeaſe to rage, and make their caſe more lamentably deſperate.

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Want of conſideration, or ignorance of Gods unfeigned love to ſuch as periſh, a principall meanes or occaſion why ſo many periſh.

1  VT if the moſt part of men, as we cannot deny, doe finally periſh, what ſhall it availe to revive this doctrine of Gods infinite love to all; by whoſe fruitleſſe iſſue, he rather is made an infinite looſer, than men any gainers? As for God, he hath frō eternity infallibly forecaſt the entire redemption, of his infinite love, which unto us may ſeeme utterly caſt away. And of men, if many dye, whom he would have live (for his will is, that all ſhould bee ſaved, and come to the knowledge of the truth) the fault is their owne, or their inſtructers; that ſeeke not the prevention of their miſcariage; by acquainting them with this cœleſtiall fountaine of ſaving truth; whoſe taſte we labour to exhibite unto all, becauſe the want of it, in obſervation of the heathen, is the firſt ſpring of humane miſery *. Or, in language more plaine, or pertinent to the argument propoſed, moſt men reape no benefit from Gods unſpeakable love; becauſe, not conſidering it to be his *nature*, they doe not beleeve it to be as he is, truly *infinite*, unfeignedly extended to *all* that call him Maker. But had the doctrines, which thoſe divine Oracles [*God is love, and would have all men to be ſaved*] naturally afford,

* *Heu primæ ſcelerum cauſæ mortalibus ægris Naturam neſcire Deûm. Silius Italicus. lib. 4. de bello pœnico.*

afford, beene for these forty yeeres last past, as generally taught, & their right use continually prest, with as great zeale and fervency, as the doctrine and uses of Gods absolute decree, for electing *some*, and reprobating *most*, in that space have beene, the plentifull increase of Gods glory, and his peoples comfort throughout this land, might have wrought such astonishment to our adversaries, as would have put their malitious mouths to silence. Who would not be willing to be saved, if he were fully perswaded, that God did will his salvation in particular; because hee protests hee wills not the death of any, but the repentance of all, that all might live? Or were the particulars of this doctrine, unto whose generality, every loyall member of the Church of *England* hath subscribed, generally taught and beleeved; all would unfeigned endeavour with fervent alacrity to bee truly happy, because none could suspect himselfe to bee excluded from his unfeigned and fervent love, who is true happinesse. Whose love and goodnesse is so great, that hee cannot passe any act, whereby any of his creatures should bee debarred either from being like him in love and goodnesse; or being such, from being like him in true happinesse: But alas, while the world is borne in hand, that the Creator oftimes dispenseth the blessings of this life, not as undoubted pledges of a better, but deales with most men, as man doth with beasts, feeding them fattest which are appointed first to bee slaine: the magnificent praises of his bounty secretly nurseth such a misperswasion in most men of his cap. 18.

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Munera magna quidem miſit, ſed miſit in hamo,
Et Piſcatorem piſcis amare poteſt?

Great gifts he ſent, but under his gifts,
there covered lay an hooke,
And by the fiſh to be belov'd,
can th'cunning Fiſher looke.

2 The frequency of ſiniſter reſpects in diſpenſing of ſecular dignities or benevolences, makes ſuch as are truly kind, to be either unregarded, or miſtruſted by ſuch as ſtand in need of their kindneſſe. And as fiſhes in beaten waters, will nibble at the bait, although they ſuſpect the hooke: ſo the world hath learned the wit to take good turnes, and not to bee taken by them; as ſuſpecting them to bee profered in cunning rather than in true kindneſſe: and cunning, where it is diſcovered or ſuſpected, is uſually requited with craft; love onely hath juſt title unto love. The moſt part indeed are ſo worldly wiſe, that none but fooles will eaſily truſt them; howbeit our naturall miſtruſt of others, makes all of us a great deale worſe than we would be. And as if wee thought it a ſin or point of uncharitableneſſe, to prove other mens conjectures, that meaſure our diſpoſitions by their owne, altogether falſe; wee fit our demeanours to their miſdeemings of us, and reſolve rather to do amiſſe; than they ſhould thinke amiſſe. Howbeit even in this

this perfidious and faithleſſe age, the old ſaying is not quite out of date: *Ipſa fides habita obligat fidē.* Many would be more truſty than they are; and doe much better by us than they doe, would we wholly commit our ſelves to their truſt and kindneſſe. Now, though by mans goodneſſe or badneſs, God can neither become worſe nor better in himſelfe; yet the riches of his bounty, or communication of his goodneſſe, are ſtill multiplyed towards thoſe that ſtedfaſtly beleeve him to bee ſuch as hee is: One, whom all are bound to love; becauſe hee is ſo kind and loving; one whom all may ſafely truſt, becauſe his loving kindneſſe is ſo utterly void of partiality, being armed with power and juſtice infinite. *Thy righteouſneſſe is like the great mountaines, thy judgements are like the great deepe; O Lord thou preſerveſt man and beaſt. How excellent is thy loving kindneſſe, O God! therefore the children of men put their truſt under the ſhadow of thy wings.* *Pſal.* 36. *ver.* 6, 7. This eſpecially ſhould move all to admire his loving kindneſſe, that he loved all without any other motive than his owne meere goodneſſe or loving kindneſſe, either to incline his will or ſtirre up his power to give them a being like his owne: *Wee love him* (ſaith Saint *Iohn*) *becauſe he loved us firſt.* Doe all then whom hee unfaignedly loves, love him unfeignedly? Would God they did: for ſo (as his will is) all ſhould bee ſaved. Did then the Apoſtle meane that his love to us, is no true cauſe of our love to him? yes; yet not ſimply as it is in him, but as being unfeignedly in him it is truly apprehended by us. Ingenuous

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3 Though secret conscious nesse of our owne unlovelinesse, in the state of nature, makes us oft-times too mistrustfull of others loue: Yet unto our nature unregenerate and overgrowne with corruption, it is almost impossible, not to love them whose love to us we assuredly know to be unfaigned; unlesse their behaviour be very loathsome. Howbeit even so we love their persons, though not their presence, wherewith againe we willingly dispense, if it may gratifie us in other things, which wee much desire. That which makes the worlds condemnation so just, that infinite mercy may not dispence with it, is mens dull backwardnesse to love him, of whose glorious beauty, the most glorious, most admired creatures are but fleeting shadowes, no true pictures. Him of whose infinite love and unfeigned preventions in unrecompensable benefits, all the pleasures wee take in health, the joy of strength, the sweetnes of life it selfe, and whatsoever in it is good and lovely, are infallible pledges, and yet his intention in free bestowing them is to bind himselfe (more strictly than man is bound by receiving the just price of what he bargaines for) to instate us in the incomprehensible joyes of endlesse life.

Hee requires nothing at our hand, but that wee may be more capable of his loving kindnesse, by draw-

drawing ſtill nearer and nearer to him, with all our hearts, with all our ſoules, and with all our ſtrength; of whoſe leaſt portion he is ſole maker and preſerver; of all whoſe motions hee is ſole author and guide. From participation of his favour or preſence, whatſoever is good in them, is undoubtedly capable of increaſe. The ſervices wherein the eternall King requires demonſtration of this our love, are not ſo hard, as thoſe which wee willingly performe to corruptible men, not inveſted with any ſhadow of his *lovelineſſe*, nor ſeaſoned with any tincture of his loving kindneſſe; to men, that cannot be ſo beneficiall as loving to their friends, nor halfe ſo loving as they are lovely, though their lovelineſſe come farre ſhort of their greatneſſe. Far otherwiſe it is with *him*, whoſe Greatneſſe and Majeſty are truly infinite: hee is as glorious and lovely as great, as loving as lovely, and yet withall no leſſe beneficiall than loving to thoſe which love him, and doe his will. cap. 18.

4 This unfained love of him, raiſed from beleefe of his loving kindneſſe towards us, is as the firſt conception or plantation of true happineſſe, to which once truly planted, whatſoever in this life can befall us, ſerves as nutriment. *Diligentibus Deum omnia operantur in bonum. Wee know that all things worke together for good, to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpoſe.* Rom. 8. 28.

As this Article of his goodneſſe and love is to be preſt before any other, ſo the firſt and moſt naturall deduction, that can be made from this or any other ſacred principle; and that which every one

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when hee firſt comes to enjoy the uſe of reaſon, ſhould be taught to make by heart, is this. *Hee that gave me life indued with ſenſe, and beautified my ſenſe with reaſon, before I could deſire one or other of them, or know what being meant; hath doubtleſſe a purpoſe to give me with them, whatſoever good things my heart, my ſenſe or reaſon can deſire; even life or being as farre ſurpaſſing all goodneſs, fleſh and blood can conceive or deſire, as this preſent life, I now enjoy, doth my former not being, or my deſireleſſe want of being what now I am.* Theſe are principles, which elſewhere (by Gods aſſiſtance) ſhall bee more at large extended: yet would I have the Reader ever to remēber, that the infinite love, wherewith God ſought us when we were not, by which hee found out a *beginning* for mankind, fitted as a foundation for endleſſe life, can never be indiſſolubly betrothed unto the bare *being* which hee beſtowed upon us. The finall contract betwixt him and us, neceſſarily preſuppoſeth a bond or linke of mutuall love. There is no meanes poſſible for us to be made better or happier than we are, but by unfaigned loving him, which out of love hath made us what we are. Nor are we what we are, becauſe *he is*, or from his *Eſſence onely*, but becauſe he was loving to us. And after our love to him enclaſped with his unſpeakable and unchangeable love to us, whoſe apprehenſion muſt beget it; the faith by which it is begotten in us, aſſures our ſoules of all the good meanes the *infinitie* of goodneſſe may vouchſafe to grant, the *infinitie* of wiſedome can contrive, or power omnipotent is able to practiſe; for attaining the end

end whereto his infinite love from all Eternities doth ordaine us. And who could desire better encouragement or assurance more strong then this, for the recompence of all his labours? or if all this cannot suffice to allure us, hee hath set feare behind us to impell us unto goodnesse; or rather before us, to turne us backe from evill.

Chap. 19.

How God of a most loving Father becomes a severe inexorable Iudge.

1 But if God as we have said bee love, shall not his love be like his nature, altogether unchangeable? How then shall hee punish his beloved Creatures, or have *anger, hate* or *jealousie*, any place or seat in the Omnipotent Majestie? Can these consort with infinite mercy? Many Philosophers have freed God from anger, making him Author onely of grace, and favour towards men. And I could wish their heresies had beene better refuted than they are, or at least, that men would be better perswaded of such refutation, as *Lactantius* hath bestowed upon them, albeit I will not bind my selfe to stand to his decision of this point, but rather illustrate by instance or experiment, how extreame severity may stand with the fervency of fatherly unfeigned love.

2 Few mens hearts would have served them to

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to have dealt with their owne bowels as *Torquatus* did with his. Howbeit in all that mighty people amongst whom he lived, I am perswaded but a few had taken the like care and paines to traine up their children in the most commendable qualities of that age. Not one would have adventured his owne person further, to have rescued his sonne from the enemie, or justified him in any honourable quarrell. In these and the like points, he had, and, upon just occasion, would further have manifested, as much unfained love, as any father could unto his sonne; more than the imbecility of sex would suffer a tender hearted mother, to make proofe of. Doth then the adjudging of this his owne son to death, rightly argue hee loved him lesse than other parents did their children, whose worse deserts they would not have sentenced so severely? No: it rather proves love and care of martiall discipline, and hate to partiality in administration of civill Iustice, to have beene much greater in him, than in other parents of his time. The more just and equall the law hee transgressed was, or might have beene (as for illu-

Meroveo certe auget probitatis famam atq; justitiæ necatus filius, justissimas utiq; ob causas, ne quis ipsi dinitatem in alienos falsò exprobet liberos, vel in suos inauditam sævitiam nullis

fultam rationibus: quales nec Posthumius Tiburtus, nec T. Manlius Torquatus olim habuere. Forcatulus de Gallorum Imperio & Philosophia. lib. 5. Et Paulo post. Posthumus Dictator, quia Aulus filius injustus præsidis egressus hostes fuderat, victorem audacem cædi securi jussit: at Torquatus itidem Latino bello Cos. filium à Metio Tusculanorum Duce provocatum, & forte detractandæ pugnæ pudore incensum, ac spolia referentem, mactari à lictore mandavit: jure forsitan, cum, teste Paulo Iurisconsulto, parentibus Romanis antiquior esset disciplina militaris charitate liberorum. At qui Gelaor Merovei filius in patrem contumax, in cives procax, in omnes superbus & injurius, pudicis matronis vim intulerat, patres & maritos terruerat, ceciderat fœderatos ac amicos Franci nominis lacessierat. Cumq; ex amicissimis aulicis quispiam objecisset Meroveo Lucium Gellium Censorem Romanum, qui filio novercam solicitanti, & præterea parricidium meditanti, ac propemodum convicto, ignovisset, & in reatu constitutum absolvi diligentissime curasset: ille, inquit, boni patris functus est officio, ego boni Ducis: qui debellare hostes didici, & socios honorificè tractare, eorumq; ulcisci injurias.

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ſtration ſake we will ſuppoſe it to have beene a law moſt equall and juſt) the more it commends his impartiall ſeverity, that would not ſuffer the violation of it goe unpuniſhed in his deareſt ſonne; whom the more deſirous hee was to make like himſelfe in religious obſervance of Martiall Diſcipline, and practice of Iuſtice towards the enemy; the readier he was to doe juſtice upon him for doing the contrary. That exceſſive love, which he bare unto his perſon, whileſt his hopefull beginnings did ſeeme to promiſe an accompliſhment of thoſe martiall vertues, whoſe firſt draught he himſelfe had well expreſſed; turnes into extreame ſeverity and indignation, after he proves tranſgreſſor of thoſe fundamentall rules, by which he had taken his direction; and unto whoſe obſervance his deſire of poſterity was deſtinated. So it falls out by the unalterable courſe of nature, or rather by a Law more tranſcendent and immutable than nature it ſelfe, that a leſſe love being chained (by references of ſubordination betweene the objects loved) with a greater, cannot diſlinke it ſelfe without ſome deeper touch of diſpleaſure, than if the bond or reference had beene none. The neerer the reference, or the ſtricter the bond; the more violent will the rupture be, and the diſſociation more unpleaſant: As there is no enmity to the enmity of brethren, if the knot of brotherly kindneſſe once fully unty: The reaſon is, becauſe our love to our brethren, is neereſt united with the love of our ſelves, unto which all other love is in ſome ſort ſubordinate. True affection is alwayes moſt diſpleaſed, where it is moſt defeated; cap. 19.

Sect. 3. where most is deservedly expected and least performed. Now as partiality towards our selves, and indulgence to our inordinate desires, oft-times begets desire of revenge upon unnaturall or unkinde brethren: so doth the constant and unpartiall love of equity and wholesome Lawes, naturally bring forth just severity towards presumptuous neglecters of them, whose persons we love no lesse, than they doe that would plead with teares for their impunity: Towards them, unto whom wee would give reall proofe of more tender and true affection, than their partiall abetters doe, could wee winne them, by these or other warrantable meanes, to link their love with ours, or to love that best which most deserveth love. As *Seleucus* loved his sonne (for saving the one of whose eyes, (both being forfait by the law) he was contented to lose one of his owne) more dearly than most princely mothers do their children, for hee loved him as himselfe; yet could not dispence either with himselfe, or his son, because hee loved the publike law, and common good, that might accrue by this singular example of Iustice; better than either, better than both.

3 For every man to love himselfe best, is in our judgement no breach, but rather a *foundation* of charitie. A law to whose performance every man is bound in matters of necessity concerning this life, or in whatsoever may concerne the life to come; though not in cases of secular honour or preferment, wherein *Proximus quisq; sibi*, must (by the law of conscience and fundamentall rule of Christianity) give place to *Detur digniori*. But nothing

nothing can be so worthy of love or honour as *God*; who will we, nill we, doth and must enjoy this liberty or priviledge of loving himselfe best. And if he love himselfe better than hee doth any creature, he must love equity and justice better than he doth any man; for he himselfe is *equity* it selfe, the eternall patterne as well of Iustice as of Mercy; he cannot be unjustly mercifull towards those men, whom he loves more dearly than any man doth himselfe. And in as much as goodnesse it selfe is the essentiall object of his will, he loves nothing absolutely and irrevocably, but that which is absolutely and immutably good. So was not man in his first creation, much less is he such in his collapsed estate; and yet Gods love (so superinfinite is it) extends it selfe unto our nature so collapsed and polluted with corruption, which he infinitely hates. This his love, which knowes no limit in it selfe, is limited in its effects towards men, by the correspondency which they hold or lose with that absolute goodnes, or with those eternall rules of equity, justice, or mercy, in which his will is to have man made like him. Such as have beene either in *re* or *spe*, though not as they should be, yet such as either infinite loving kindnesse can vouchsafe to accept, to cherish, or encourage to goe forward as they have begunne; or infinite mercy to tollerate in expectation of their repentance, or aversion from their wonted courses: these, if once they finally dissolve the correspondency, which they held with *Mercie*, or burst the linke which they had in Gods love, (with reference to that goodnes, whereto the

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riches of his bounty daily inviteth them) his displeasure towards them kindles according to the *measure* of his former *mercies* or loving kindnesse. If being illuminated by his Spirit, they finally associate themselves to the sonnes of darknesse, or having put on Christ in baptisme, they resume their swinish habit, and make a sport of wallowing in the mire; the sweet fountaines of joy and comfort, which were opened to them as they were Gods creatures, not uncapable of his infinit mercy, prove floods of wo and misery to them as they are sworne servants of sinne and corruption: For, hate to *filthinesse* and *uncleannesse*, is essentially and formally included in Gods love of *absolute goodnesse*, righteousnesse and true *holinesse*. And the displeasure or indignation which hee beares to these, must needs seize on their persons that have covered themselves with them, as with a garment; and to whose soules they sticke more closely than their skinnes do to their bodies, or their flesh unto their bones.

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Chap. 20.

Whilest God of a loving Father becomes a severe Iudge, there is no change or alteration at all in God, but onely in men and in their actions. Gods will is alwayes exactly fulfilled even in such as goe most against it. How it may stand with the Iustice of God to punish transgressions temporall, with torments everlasting.

1 THe summe of all is this; love was the mother of all his workes, and (if I may so speake) the *fertilitie* of his power and Essence. And seeing it is his nature as Creator, and cannot change: no part of our nature (seeing every part was created by him) can bee utterly excluded from all fruits of his love; untill the sinister use of that *contingencie* wherewith hee indued it, or the improvement of inclinations naturally bent unto evill, come to that height as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour. Whether naturall inclinations unto evill, may bee thus farre improved in the children by their forefathers or no, is disputable; but in another place. Concerning Infants (save onely) so farre as neglect of duties to be performed to them, may concerne their Elders, seeing the Scripture in this point is silent, I have no mind here or elsewhere to dispute. If faith they have, or

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such holineſſe as becommeth Saints; neither are begotten by our writing or preaching, nor is the written word the rule of theirs as of all others faith that are of yeares. And unto them onely that can heare or read, or have the uſe of reaſon, I write and ſpeake this, as well for their comfort and encouragement to follow goodnes, or for their terror, " leſt they follow evill. *Love*, much greater than any " creature owes or performes, or is capable off, ei- " ther in reſpect of himſelfe, or in others, is the eſ- " ſentiall and ſole fruit of Gods *antecedent will*, " whether concerning our nature as it was in the " firſt man, or now is in the ſeverall perſons deri- " ved from him. And of this love every particular " faculcie of ſoule or body is a pledge undoubted; " all, are as ſo many ties or *handles* to draw us un- " to him, from whom wee are ſeparated onely by " diſſimilitude; our very natures being otherwiſe " linkt to his *being*, with bonds of ſtricteſt refe- " rence or dependency. On the contrary, *Wrath* and *Severity* are the proper effects of his *conſequent will*, that is, they are the infallible conſequents of our neglecting and deſpiſing his will revealed for our good, or ſweet promiſes of ſaving health. The full explication and neceſſary uſe of this diſtinction, hath taken up its place, in the Articles of Creation, or Divine Providence. Thus much of it may ſerve our preſent turn. That Gods abſolute wil was to have man capable of *Heaven* & *Hel*, of joyes and miſeries immortall. That this abſolute will whoſe poſſible objects are two, is in the firſt place ſet on mans eternall and everlaſting joy, more fervently

vently than man can conceive; yet not so, as to contradict it selfe by frustrating the contrary possibility, which unto man it had appointed. That Gods anger never kindles, but out of the ashes of his flaming love despised. Nor doth the turning of tender love and compassion, into severity & wrath, presuppose or argue any change or turning in the Father of lights and everlasting mercy. It is wholly seated in mens irregular deviation from that course which by the appointment of his antecedent will they should and might have taken (whereto his fatherly kindnesse did still invite them) unto those crooked wayes, which they doe, but should not follow; from which the same infinite goodnesse doth still allure them by every temporall blessing, and deterre them by every crosse and plague that doth befall them. cap. 20.

2 This bodily Sunne, which wee see, never changeth with the Moone, his light, his heat are still the same; yet one and the same heat in the spring time, refresheth our bodies here in this Land; but scortcheth such as, brought up in this clime, journey in the sands of *Affricke*. His beames reflected on bodies solid, but of corruptible and changeable nature, often inflame matter capable of combustion. But (as some Philosophers thinke) wold not annoy us (unless by too much light) were we in that æthereall or cœlestiall region wherein it moves. At least, were our bodies of the like substance with the heavens; the vicinitie of it would rather comfort than torment us. Thus is the Father of lights a refreshing flame of unquenchable love,

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love, to ſuch as are drawne by love to bee like him in purity of life, but a conſuming fire to ſuch as he beholdeth a farre off; to ſuch as run from him by making themſelves moſt unlike unto him. No ſonnes of *Adam* there be, which in ſome meaſure or other had not ſome taſte or participation of his bounty. And the meaſure of his wrath is but equall to the riches of his bounty deſpiſed. To whom this infinite treaſure of his bounty hath beene moſt liberally opened, it proves in the end a ſtorehouſe of wrath and torments, unleſſe it finally draw them to repentance: According to the height of that exaltation whereunto his antecedent will had deſigned them, ſhall the degrees of their depreſſion bee in hell for not being exalted by it. Nor doth any man in that lake of torments, ſuffer paines more againſt his will, than he had done many things againſt the *will* of his righteous Iudge daily leading him to repentance. The flames of hell take their ſcantling from the flames of Gods love neglected; they may not, they cannot exceede the meaſure of this neglect. Or to knit up this point with evidence of ſacred truth; God alwaies proportioneth his plagues or puniſhments in *juſt* equality to mens ſinnes. And the onely rule for meaſuring ſinne or tranſgreſſion right, muſt bee taken from the degrees of mans oppoſition to Gods delight or pleaſure in his ſalvation. Not ſo much as a dramme of his delight or pleaſure can be abated, not a ſcruple of his will, but muſt finally be accompliſhed. The meaſure of his delight in mans repentance or ſalvation, ſhall bee exactly ſatisfied and

and fulfilled. Mans repentance hee loves as hee is infinite in mercy and in bounty: mans punishment he doth not love at all in it selfe, yet doth he punish as he is infinitely just, or as hee infinitely loveth justice. This is but the extract of *Wisedomes* speech, *Prov.* 1. *vers.* 24. *Because I have called, and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded: But ye have set at nought all my counsell, and would none of my reproofe: I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mocke when your feare commeth. When your feare commeth as desolation, and your destruction commeth as a whirlewind; when distresse and anguish commeth upon you: Then shall they call upon mee, but I will not answer; they shall seeke me early, but they shall not find mee: For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the feare of the Lord. They would none of my counsell: they despised all my reproofe. Therefore shall they eate of the fruit of their owne way, and bee filled with their owne devices. For the turning away of the simple shall slay them, and the prosperitie of fooles shall destroy them. But whoso hearkeneth unto mee, shall dwell safely, and be quiet from feare of evill.* cap. 20.

And it were to be wished, that some moderne Divines, would better explicate than they doe a schoole tener, held by many, concerning Gods punishing sinners in the life to come, *citra condignum*, that is, lesse than they deserve. For by how much their punishment is lesse than the rule of divine Iustice exacts: so much of that delight or good pleasure which God should have reaped from their salvation, may seeme by this remission

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to be diminiſhed. But this point I leave to the judicious Readers conſideration, who may informe himſelfe from the * Expoſitors of that ſacred Maxime. *His mercy is above all his works. Pſal.* 145.9.

3 To thinke God ſhould puniſh ſinne unleſſe it were truly againſt his will, or any ſinne more deeply than it is againſt his will and pleaſure, is one of thoſe three groſſe transformations of the divine nature, which Saint *Auguſtine* refutes. For thus to doe is neither incident to the divine nature, nor to any other imaginable. Moſt of us, are by nature cholericke, and often take offence where none is given, and almoſt alwayes greater than is juſtly given; But to be offended with any thing, that goes not againſt their preſent wills, is a waywardneſſe of men, whereof the humane nature is uncapable. To puniſh any, which doe not contradict their wills, is an injuſtice ſcarce incident to the inhabitants of Hell. It is the mutability of our wills or multiplicity of humors, which makes us ſo hard to be pleaſed. Our minds (at leſt our affections) are are ſet upon one thing faſting, upon another full; on this to day, on that to morrow; on ſweet meats in health, on ſowre in ſickneſſe; on kindneſſe in mirth, on cruelty in anger; and becauſe each hath his ſeuerall inconſtant motions, wee cannot hold conſort long together, without croſſing or thwarting. But no man ever offended by merrily conſor-

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* *Quod in fine verſus 9 dicitur, Miſericordia ejus ſuper omnia opera ejus, hoc, inquit Calv. neq; abſurdum, neq; durum videri debet. Nam cum peccata noſtra totũ mundum involuant Dei maledictione, vbiq; locus eſt miſericordiæ Dei ut brutis etiam animalibus ſubveniat. Hanc locũ tractat Zanchius de natura Dei l. 4. c. 4. q. 4. Quam magna ſit Dei miſericordia. i. Deus de juſtitia ſua multum ſemper remittit. Et reprobi cum poſtea puniuntur non pro meritis puniuntur [Hæc Zanchij ſententia] An igitur remittit illis propter ſatisfactionem Chriſti, an ſine ulla ſatisfactione? [Verba Coppen.] Notandum hic in Diabolis & reprobis condemnatis, poſt hanc vitam non videri quærenda miſericordiæ divinæ veſtigia. Coppen in Pſal. 145. c. videtur Zanchij expoſitio contradicere Iac. c. 2. v. 13. Damnatio ἀνίλεως ei qui non præſtitit miſericordiam.*

ting with his brother disposed to mirth; nor by consenting to wreake his will, whilest hee was in rage. No man ever punished his servant for doing that which for the present he would have him do; nor doe the Divels themselves vexe the wicked (til Gods justice overtake them) but the godly; because the one doth what they would, the other what they would not have him doe; neither could displease them, were it not their wicked will to have all as bad and miserable as themselves. Could the damned by their suffering, either ease these tormentors, of paine, or abate their malice; they would bee lesse displeased at them; and lesse displeased, torment them lesse. And, whom then have they made the *subject* of their thoughts, or did they rather dreame than thinke on God, that sometimes write as if it were not as much against Gods will to have men dye, as it is against mans will to suffer death. For they suffer death, not because God delighteth in it, but that Gods will may bee fulfilled in their *suffering* or *passion*, according to the measure it hath beene neglected or opposed, by their actions. cap. 20.

4 But though the rule of justice bee exactly observed in proportioning their paines to the degrees or fervency of his love neglected; yet seeing the continuance of their neglect was but temporall, how stands it with his justice to make their paines eternall? The doubt were pertinent, if the immortall happinesse, whereunto the riches of Gods bountie, did daily lead them during their pilgrimage on earth, whereof they had sweet promises and full assurance, had not farther exceeded all the plea-

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sures of this mortall life, for whose purchase, they morgaged their hopes of immortality, than the paines of hell doe these grieuances or corrections, which caused them murmure against their heavenly Father. In this sense wee may maintaine what *Mirandula* in another doth: that no man is everlastingly punished for temporall offences as committed against God. How then? Man wilfully exchanging his everlasting inheritance for momentany and transient pleasures, becomes the Author of his owne woe, and reapes the fruit of his rash * bargaines, and so makes up that measure of Gods glory and pleasure, by his eternall sufferings, which he might and would not doe, by eternall participation of his joyfull presence. * And it is more than just, (for it is justice tempered with abundant mercy) that they should suffer everlasting paines, who not twice, or thrice, or seven times onely, but more than seventy times seven times, have wilfully refused to accomplish Gods eternall pleasure by accepting the sweet profers of their eternall joy. In every moment of this life, we have a pledge of his bounty to assure us of a better inheritance, the very first neglect whereof, might in justice condemne us to everlasting bondage. The often and perpetuall neglect, turnes flames of eternall love into an eternall consuming fire. For if love and mercy bee his property as he is Creator and preserver of all mankinde: his love

* For I reckon, that the sufferings of this present time, are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us. *Rom.* 8. 18.

* *Quod si Christo salus nostra tam chara fuit, & tam charò constitit, quid est quare nostram ipsi salutem tantopere negligamus? Quibus supplicijs, & qua ignominia sempiterna non sumus digni, modicum laborem pro re obtinenda tam prætiosa recusantes? Quomodo nos effugiemus (inquit Paulus) si tantum neglexerimus salutem? Acosta con. 3, de circumcisione.*

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(as was said before) must needs bee more indissolubly set on those attributes than on man. The end of his love to man, is to make him happy by being like him in the love of goodnesse: Now the more he loves him with reference to this end, or the oftner he pardons him for neglecting or refusing the meanes that draw unto it; the greater is his wrath against impenitency, or finall contempt of his loving mercy. This is his most* deare and tender attribute, which being foully wronged will not suffer justice to sleepe. cap. 20.

Patientia læsa fit furor. Long restraint of anger upon just and frequent provocations, makes the out-bursting of it, though unseemly and violent, seeme not altogether unjust nor immoderate. Albeit the forme and manner of proceeding, which humane patience much abused, usually observes in taking revenge, cannot in exact justice bee warranted or approved: yet this excesse of anger or delinquency in the *forme*, is so tempered with *matter* of equity, that it makes those actions of patient men much abused, seeme excusable, which in others would be intollerable. The ideall perfection of this rule of equity, thus often corrupted by humane passions, is in the divine nature, without mixture of such passion or perturbation, as is pictured out to the terrour of the ungodly in the propheticall characters or descriptions of his anger. *Et excitatus est tanquam dormiens Dominus, &c. Then the Lord awaked as one out of sleepe, and like a mightie man that shouteth by reason of wine: Psal.* 78. 65. Although he be a Father to all, and seeme

* Isa. 42. 14 I have long time holden my peace, I have been still and refrained my selfe: now will I cry like a travailing woman, I wil destroy & devoure at once.

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to winke at his ſonnes enormities: yet when hee awakes, he hath a curſe in ſtore, for ſuch as abuſe his patience, and make a mocke of his threatnings; more bitter than that which *Noah* beſtowed on *Cham*. To attribute patience to him, and to deny him wrath and indignation; were, in *Lactantius* his judgement, to inrich his goodneſſe, by robbing his Majeſty. *The reaſons of thoſe Philoſophers are apparantly vaine, which thinke that God cannot bee angry. For even earthly Empire or Soveraignty, forthwith diſſolves, unleſſe it be held together by feare. Take anger from a King, and in ſtead of obedience, he ſhall be throwne headlong from the height of dignity. Yea take anger from a man of meaner ranke, and hee ſhall become a prey to all, a laughing-ſtocke to all.*

Ex his apparet vanas eſſe rationes Philoſophorum, qui Deum putant ſine ira: & inter cæteras laudes ejus id ponunt, quod eſt contra ipſâ majeſtatem. Regnum hoc imperiumq; terrenum, niſi metus cuſtodiat, ſolvitur. Aufer iram Regi, non modo neno parebit, ſed etiam de faſtigio præcipitabitur. Imo vero cuilibet humili eripe hunc affectum, quis eum non ſpoliabit? quis non deridebit? Lactantius cap. 23. de ira Dei. p. 477.

5 I am not ignorant what cenſures paſſe upon this Author for his incommodious ſpeeches in this argument of Gods wrath or anger. His words, I muſt confeſſe, ſound ſomewhat harſh, to eares accuſtomed to the harmony of refined Scholaſtique Dialect. Yet * *Betuleius*, a man too learned, and too well ſeene in *Lactantius*, to let groſſe faults paſs without eſpiall, and too ingenuous to ſpare his cenſure upon errors eſpyed; after long quærulous debatements, chides himſelfe friends with his Au-

* *Haſtenus mihi magna contentio fuit cum Lactantio, dum humanis rationibus divinam iram ex humana metiretur fragilitate. Iam autem, quia dicit iram Dei ſicut ipſum etiam Deum, eternam, nihil habeo quod repugnem. Nam ex ſyncriſi divinæ atq; humanæ iræ intelligas, ipſum de divina longe aliter quam de humana loqui: neque eſſe accidens quod in Deum non cadit, ſed proprium, quia ira Dei à juſtitia Dei nihil differt. Iuſtitia verò Dei ex eterna lege manet, contra quam ſi quis deliquerit, vindictam nimirum illius Dei ſentiet, apud quem nullus vel temporum vel locorum terminus eſt. Betuleius in Comm. in cap. 21. Lactan. de ira Dei.*

thor:

thor: whoſe meaning in concluſion he acknowledgeth to be Orthodoxall and good; albeit his characters of divine wrath in the premiſſes, may ſeeme better to fit the fragility of humane peeviſhneſſe, than the Majeſty of the Almighty Iudge. His phraſe (perhaps) might be excuſed in part, by the ſecurity of thoſe times wherein he wrote: his fault (if any fault it were not to ſpeake preciſely in an age more preciſe for maintaining the elegancy or life of ſtyle, than the right uſe or logicall propriety of words) is too common to moſt Writers yet, and conſiſteth onely in *appropriating* that to the Divine nature, which is attributed to it onely by extrinſecall denomination. But leaving his phraſe (about which perhaps he himſelfe would not have wrangled) his argument holds thus farre true: God is more deeply diſpleaſed with ſinne, than man is, though his diſpleaſure be not cloathed with ſuch paſſions, as mans anger is: and yet the motions of the creatures appointed to execute his wrath, are more furious than any mans paſſions in extreameſt fury can be. What mans voice is like his thunder? What Tyrants frownes like to a lowring skie, breathing out ſtormes of fire and brimſtone? Yet are the moſt terrible ſounds, which the creatures can preſent, but as ſo many ecchoes of his angry voice; the moſt dreadfull ſpectacles that Heaven or Earth, or the intermediate Elements can afford, but copies of his irefull countenance. Howbeit this change or alteration in the creature proceeds from him without any internall paſſion or alteration. *Immotus movet: He moveth all things, being himſelfe immovable.* Cap. 20

6 But

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6 But as *Lactantius* may bee so farre justified, as we have said, so perhaps he is inexcusable in avouching anger to bee as naturall to GOD, as mercie, love, and favour are. To him that duely considers his infinite goodnesse, it may seeme impossible that hee should bee moved by us, or by any thing in us, to mercy; seeing, as *S. *Bernard* well observes, he hath the *seminary of mercy in himselfe, and cannot take the seeds of it from any other. The fruits of it, we may, by ill deserving, so hinder, that they shall never take nor prosper in our selves; but to punish or condemne us, we in a sort constraine him.* And though he be the Author as well of punishment as of compassion, yet the manner how these two opposite attributes, in respect of us proceed from him, is much different; the one is naturall to him, and much better than any naturall comfort unto us; the other is in a sort to him unnaturall, and most unnaturall and unpleasant unto us: for as S. [a] *Ierome* saith, *God when he punisheth*, doth in a manner, *relinquish his nature, and therefore when he proceeds to punishment, he is said to goe out of his place*, and to worke *alienum opus*, a strange or uncouth worke. The wicked and reprobate, after this life, shall alwayes see and feele his anger: But though they see him thus, immediately, they doe not see his nature so immediately as the Elect shall doe, to whom he shewes himselfe in love; this is his proper visage, the live-character of his native countenance. The manifestation of his anger in what part of the world soever, or in what manner soever made, is a veile or *vizard* put betweene him and the Repro-

* *Deus ex se sumit seminarium miserendi, quod judicat & condemnat nos, cum quodammodo cogimus, ut longe aliter de corde ipsius miseratio quam animadversio procedere videatur.* Bernard. Ser. 5. in natal. Dom.

[a] *Vide Hieron. in cap. 1. Mich. vide Riberam in 1. Mich. num. 5. Et in 4. Mal. num. 4.*

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Reprobate, leſt they ſhould ſee the light of his countenance and be made whole. Hence, in the ſentence of condemnation, it ſhall be ſaid, *Depart from mee ye curſed into everlaſting fire.* From his eſſentiall preſence they cannot, but from the light of his countenance or joyfull preſence, they muſt of neceſsity depart. For were it poſsible for them to behold it, no torments could take hold of them; the reflex of it upon whom ſoever it lighteth, createth joy; the fruition of it, is that happineſſe which wee ſeeke. To conclude: *Lactantius* rightly inferres, *It were impoſsible ſinne ſhould not be odious to him, to whom goodneſſe is pleaſant and delightfull.* Now his diſpleaſure at ſinne, is the true cauſe of all diſpleaſant motions or alterations in the creatures. His errour, albeit we take him at the worſt, was not great: and as it may eaſily be committed by others, ſo it may as quickly be rectified, if wee ſay, that *Anger* and *Hate* are by conſequent, or upon ſuppoſall of ſinne, as neceſſary to the Divine Nature, as Love and Mercy, but not ſo naturall. But how either *Love* or *Anger*, both of them being either formally paſsions, or indiſſolubly linkt with paſsions, may be rightly conceived to be in God, is a point worth explication.

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Chap. 21.

How Anger, Love, Compaßion, Mercy, or other affections are in the Divine Nature.



O affection or operation that eſſentially includes imperfection, can properly be attributed to perfection it ſelfe. But if the imperfection be onely accidentall, that is, ſuch as may bee ſevered from the affection; the affection after ſuch ſeparation made, may without metaphor (in ſome Schoolemens judgement) be aſcribed to God. Hence the ſame Schoolemen will have diſtributive juſtice to be in him, after a more peculiar manner than commutative juſtice is; becauſe commutative juſtice (as they alledge) eſſentially includes *rationem dati, & accepti*; ſomewhat mutually given and taken. Mercy likewiſe is (in their judgements) more properly in God, than anger or revenge; becauſe it may be abſtracted from compaſſion, which is an imperfection annexed, but not eſſential to the reliefe of others miſerie, wherein mercy (as they contend) formally conſiſts. It ſufficeth us, that ſuch affections or morall qualities as in us formally and eſſentially include imperfection, may be contained in the Divine Eſſence; though not formally, yet eminently, and moſt truly, as wee ſuppoſe anger is. For in this point wee rather approve of * *Lactantius* his Divinity, than of * *Seneca's* Philoſophy. Hee that bids us be angry and ſin not, ſeekes not the utter extirpation

* *De Ira Dei. cap* 21.

* *Quotiens impetu opus eſt, non iraſcitur, ſed exurgit, & in quantum putavit opus eſſe concitatur remittiturq; non aliter quam quæ tormentis exprimuntur tela, in poteſtate mittentis ſunt, in quantum torquentur. Sen. lib.* 1. *de ira. cap.* 9.

Ita aut ira non eſt, aut inutilis eſt. ibid.

tirpation, but the moderation of anger. *Qui ergo irasci nos jubet, ipse utiq; irascitur; He that bids us be angry, is doubtlesse upon just occasion angry himselfe.* Nor should we sin, if we were angry onely as he is angry; or at those things onely that displease him, so far as they are displeasing to him: And were we as much inclined to mercy and loving kindnesse as we are to anger, the motions of the one would argue as great passion as the motions of the other. But seeing * Gods mercy which is proposed unto us for a patterne, is (if I may so speak) more reall and truly affectionate in him than his anger, the difficulty how either should be in him is the same, or not much different: How can there be true compassion without passion, without motion or mutation? In many men it is observable, that the better use they have of reason, the lesse they participate of affection: and to cary those matters with moderation which others can neither accomplish nor affect without excesse of passion or perturbation, is a perfection peculiar to good education, much & choice experience or true learning. And thus by proportion they argue, that God who is infinitly wise, must be as utterly void of passion, though he be truly said mercifull in respect of the event. The conclusion is truer than the reason assigned. And in most men whom the world accounteth wise or subtle, reason doth not so much moderate as devoure affections of that rank we treat of. The cunningest heads have commonly most deceitfull or unmercifull hearts: and want of passion often argues want of religion, if not abundance of habituated atheism or irreligion.

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* *Dum ergo ad verba mutabilitatis nostræ descenditur, ex iis quibusdam gradibus factis ascendet qui potest ad incommunicabilitatem Dei, ut videat sine zelo zelantem, sine ira irascentem, sine dolore & pœnitentia, pœnitentem, sine misero corde, misericordem, sine prævisionibus præscientem Greg. moral. lib. 20 in 30. cap. Iob.*

Sect. 3. Every mans paſſions are for the moſt part moderate in matters which he either leaſt affects or minds the moſt. Perpetuall minding, eſpecially of worldly matters, coucheth the affections in an equall habit or conſtant temper; which is not eaſily moved, unleſs it be directly or ſtrongly thwarted. Deſires once ſtifned with hope of advantage by cloſe ſollicitation, ſecret cariage, or cunning contrivance; take ſmal notice of violent oppoſitions which apparantly either overſhoot, or come ſhort of the game they lye in wait for. But even ſuch moderate politiques, if their nets be once diſcovered and the prey caught from them, fal into *Achitophels* paſſion. Indignation & mercy, becauſe incompatible with ſuch meanes as ſerve beſt to politique ends, are held the companions of fooles. And unto the world ſo they ſeem, becauſe they are the proper paſsiõs of reaſon throughly apprehending the true worth of matters ſpirituall. For though gravity or good education may decently figure the outward motions; yet is it impoſſible not to be vehemently moved, at the miſcariage of thoſe things, which we moſt eſteeme. And the wiſer wee are in matters ſpirituall, the higher wee eſteem the promulgation of religion, the good of Gods church, & promotion of his glory. The better experience we have of his goodneſſe; the more wee pity their caſe which as yet never taſted it: the more compaſsionate we are to all that are in that miſery whence we are redeemed. Did we eſteeme theſe or other duties of ſpirituall life, as they deſerve: the extreameſt fits of paſsion, which any worldly wiſe man can be caſt into, would ſeem but as light flaſhes

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to thoſe flames of zeale & indignatiõ which the very ſight of this miſguided world, would forthwith kindle in our breſts. It is not then Gods infinite wiſedome which ſwallowes up all paſſion, or exempts him from thoſe affections which eſſentially include perturbation; for ſo the moſt zealous and compaſſionate ſhould bee moſt unlike him in heavenly wiſdome. But as the ſwift motion of the heaven, better expreſſeth his immobility or vigorous reſt, then the dull ſtability of the earth: So doth the vehemency of zeale, of indignation, or other paſſions of the godly (ſo the motives be weighty & juſt) exhibite a more lively reſemblance of his immutability or want of paſſiõ, then the Stoical apathie, or worldlings inſenſibility in matters ſpiritual can do.

2 How wee ſhould in godly paſſions, bee likeſt God in whom is no paſſion; or how thoſe vertues or affections which are formally in us, ſhould bee eminently in him; cannot by my barren imagination bee better illuſtrated, then by comparing the circle in ſome properties with other figures. A circle, in ſome mens definitive language, is but a circular line; and to any mans ſenſe (as in ſome reſpects (perhaps) reaſon muſt acknowledge) it is rather one line, then a cõprehenſion of different lines, or a multitude of ſides incloſed in angles. And from the unity of it perhaps it is, that many flexible bodies, as wands or ſmall rods of iron, braſſe, &c. which preſently breake if you preſſe them into angles, or ſeeke to frame them into any other figure, will bee drawne without danger into a circular forme. Notwithſtanding

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some infallible mathematicall rules there be expreſt in tearmes which in ſtrict property of ſpeech (or univocally) agree only to figures conſiſting of ſides and angles; whoſe truth and uſe, reaſon experienceth to bee moſt eminently true in the Circle. Take a Quadrangle ten yards in length, and foure in breadth, another eight yards in length, and ſixe in bredth, a third ſeven yards every way: The circumference of all three is equall 28 yards; ſo is not the ſuperficiall quantity, but of the firſt 40. yards, of the ſecond 48. of the third 49. The ſame induction alike ſenſible in other many-ſided figures, affoords this generall unqueſtionable rule; Among figures of the ſame kind, whoſe circumference is equall, that whoſe ſides are moſt equall, is moſt capacious. Yet frame a five-angled figure whoſe whol circumference is but 28. yardes, though the ſides be not equall, the ſuperficiall quantity of it will be greater, then the ſuperficiall quantitie of the former ſquare: and yet a ſixe-angled figure of the ſame circumference, though the ſides be unequall, will bee more capacious then that. And ſtill the more you encreaſe the number of angles, though without any encreaſe of the circumference, the greater will the capacity or ſuperficiall quantity of the figure be, ſpecially if the ſides bee not unequall. From this evident induction ariſeth a ſecond tryed rule in the Mathematique. Amongſt figures of divers kinds, whoſe circumferences are equall, that which hath moſt angles, is alwayes moſt capacious. The circle which to our ſenſe ſeemes neither to have ſides, nor angles; by a double title grounded

Inter figuras ἰσοπεριμέτρους ὁμοιογενεῖς, ordinatio eſt capacior

Inter figuras Ισοπερίμετρους τας Heteroneas terminatio eſt capacior.

ded on both the former rules, hath the prehe-minence for capacity of all other figures. It is more uniforme than any other, or rather the abſtract or patterne of uniformity in figures, admitting neither difference of rankes, or ſorts, as triangles, quadrangles, or other many-ſided figures doe: nor of inequalitie betweene its owne internall parts or lines: neither can one circle bee more capacious then another of the ſame circumference: nor can any line in the ſame circle bee longer then another that is drawne from one part of the circumference, to another, through the ſame center. It is then in this reſpect more capacious then any other figure, becauſe it is moſt uniforme. The ſides of other figures may bee exactly equall, but the diſtance of every part of their circũference from the center cannot admit ſuch equality, as every part of the circles circumference doth. The circle againe is more capacious then any other figure, becauſe more full of angles: for the angles which it no where hath univocally, formally, or conſpicuous to ſenſe; reaſon apprehends it to have every where eminently. For as the Philoſopher tells us, it is ὁλογωνία a totangle, and ſo hath the prerogative or royalty, though not the propriety of the ſecond Rule. It is more capacious than any other figure, not onely becauſe it is more *ordinate* or uniforme, but withall, becauſe it hath more angles than any other figures can have; even as many as can be imagined, it beeing a totangle. Cap. 21

3 This analogy betweene ſides and angles as they are found in the circle and in other figures, me

Sect. 3. mee thinkes well expresseth that analogy which Schoole Divines assigne betweene wisedome, science, love, hatred, goodnesse, desire, &c. as they are found in God and in man. For no one name or title of any affection can bee univocally attributed to the Creator and to the creature: and yet the rules of equity, of mercy, of justice, of patience, of anger, of love, which we are commanded to follow, though not without passion or affection, are most truly observed by him: yea their truth in him is infinitely eminent: so farre must we be from conceiting him to bee without ardent love, without true and unfeigned good will to us, without wrath burning like fire to consume his adversaries, because he is without all passion. He is most loving, yet never moved with love because he is eternally wholly love; He is most compassionate, yet never moved with compassion, because hee is eternally wholly compassion; He is most jealous of his glory, and a revenger of iniquity most severe; yet never moved with jealousie, yet never passionate in revenge; because to such as provoke his punitive justice, hee is eternally severity and revenge it selfe. Againe, how the indivisible Essence should bee wholly love, and wholly displeasure, wholly mercy, and wholly severity, I cannot better illustrate then by the circle, the true embleme of his eternitie, which is as truly ὁλόπλευρος as ὁλογώνια as well all sides, as all angles. And being such, the side and angles cannot be distinguished in it: but the sides are angles, and the angles sides; at least they are, if not essentially, yet penetratively the same. The circle

circle likewiſe is as truly ἰσόπλευρον and ἰσογώνιον of equall ſides and equall angles, as ὁλοπλευρον & ὁλογώνιον a totrangle or totilate; and did it not containe multiplicity of ſides, as well as of angles in moſt exact and eminent uniformity, it could not have the full prerogative of the former rules. Nor could the indiviſible eſſence either be ſo great or excellent in himſelfe, or a moderator of all things ſo powerfull and juſt, as wee beleeve hee is; unleſſe he did eminently conteine the perfections of all things poſſible as well as of any one. cap. 21.

4 Some Philoſophers have placed the humane nature, as a line diameter or æquilibrium in this viſible ſphere; making man the meaſure of all things, as participating all other natures: much what after the ſame manner that mixt bodies containe the force and vertues of the elements. And mans nature, til it was corrupt, did (without doubt) include ſuch an eminent uniformity to all things created, as the eye doth unto colours. As hee was then the true image of God for his eſſence; ſo did he in this *property*, beare a true ſhaddow of the divine prerogative, whoſe eſſence, though, for number or greatneſſe of perfections contained in it, altogether meaſureleſſe, is the moſt true and exquiſite *meaſure* of all things that are, or poſſibly can be: All the conditions or properties of meaſure aſſigned by the Philoſopher are as truly contained in the imcomprehenſible eſſence, as ſides or angles in the circle, but farre more eminently. A meaſure it is, not appliable to meaſurables, for kind or quantity much different, according to diverſity of parts,

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which it hath none, for it is immutably, eternally and indiviſibly the ſame: and unto it the nature, eſſence, quality, and quantity of all things, are actually applyed, in that they have actuall being. It is impoſſible the immutable Creator ſhould be fitted to any thing created; but in that hee is immutable, and yet eminently containeth all things in his indiviſible eſſence, hee eternally and immutably fits all the poſſible varieties whereof contingency it ſelfe is capable. Being all things elſe, hee is fitneſſe it ſelfe in a moſt eminent and excellent manner: the preſent diſpoſition of every thing, either, whiles it firſt begins to be, or continues the ſame, or whiles it is in the change or motion (whether from good to evill, or from evill to good, from evill to worſe, or from good to better) is more exquiſitely fitted in it owne kind, by eternall, immutable and incomparable fitneſſe; then it could be by any other meaſure, which the Creator himſelfe could create with it, or deviſe for it, after the alteration or change were accompliſhed. In that he is indiviſibly *One*, and yet eminently *All*, he is immutable, contrarietie it ſelfe unto contraries: Arithmeticall equality it ſelfe to things equall, Geometrically equall to things unequall; according to every degree of their unequall capacities, in what ſort ſoever. And as of his other attributes one truly and really is another, ſo in reſpect of man, his *meaſure* is his judgement or retribution whether of rewards or puniſhments, not the rule onely by which hee rewards or puniſheth. Vnto man in his firſt creation, and whiles he continued as he created him, he was and would

See Eſay 66.14,15,16. Ezek.7.4. Deut.7.9,10.

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would have continued bountie it selfe; unto man yet as he is his creature, he is love it selfe: and unto man made by his own folly an impotent wretched and miserable creature, hee is so entyrely mercy and compassion it selfe, that were there a distinct god of love, or a goddesse of mercy, or two infinite living abstracts of meere love, and meere mercie; they could not be so loving and mercifull unto man touched with the sense of his owne miseries, nor solicite him so seriously and perpetually unto repentãce as *he* doth, who is entirely infinite mercy, but not mercy only. Vnto the truly penitent hee is so truly and entirely gratiousnesse it selfe, that if there were a Trinity of such abstract Graces as the Poets have faigned, they could bee but a figure or picture of his solid and infinite gratiousnesse. Vnto the elect and throughly sanctified, hee is so truly and entirely felicity and salvation it selfe; that if the Heathen goddesses, *Felicitas* and *Salus*, or *Platoes Idea* of true happiness, might bee inspired with life and sense; they could not communicate halfe that happiness to any one man (though they would choose his hart for their closet, or actuate his reasonable soule as it doth the sensitive) that is imparted by him to al his chosen, who is entirely infinite happinesse, but not happinesse onely. For unto the impenitent and despisers of his bountie, of his love, his mercy, grace, and salvation; he is justice, indignation, and severity it selfe. *Nemesis* her selfe were she enabled with spirit, life and power much greater then the heathens ascribed unto her, and permitted to rage without controle of any superiour

Qui quotidie contemnit Deum, etiam quotidie judicatur, non manifesto sed occulto judicio, non aperto sed tamen certo: occultiora sæpe sunt certiora manifestioribus. Coppen in Psalm. 7.

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Etiam Dei μακροθυμία est ipsius ἀναιρετικὸν copperi. ibid.

law; should not be able with all the assistance the Furies could afford her, to render vengeance unto Satã and his wicked Angels, in such full and exquisite measure as the just Iudge will do in that last dreadfull day. Then shall he truly appeare to bee, as our Apostle speaks, *All in All:* the infinite abstract of all those powers which the heathens adored for gods, as authors either of good or of evill: Then shall he fully appeare to be mercy, goodnes, grace and felicity; *Nemesis, pavor,* and terror it selfe; the indivible and incomprehensible *Idea* of all things which in this life our love did seeke after, or our feare naturally laboured to avoyd: The only loadstone whereto our love, our desire in our creation were directed, was his goodnesse and loving kindnesse. And feare was implanted in our nature as an Helme or Rudder to divert us from his immutable justice or indignation; which are as rockes immoveable, against whom whosoever shall carelessely or presumptuously runne, must everlastingly perish without redemption.

FINIS.